













































This thesis analyses printed eighteenth-century dialogues in English. It considers them amidst the dialogic nature of cultural life in eighteenth-century Britain more widely. It argues that many printed dialogues successfully imagine, or fruitfully engage with imagined, ideal speech situations. In addition it argues that these texts had a sophistication that stemmed from a dialogicity enabled by the growth of the public sphere. It is alert to novelistic features of dialogues: characterisation, verisimilitude, narrative interest. That is important for this thesis, as the richness of eighteenth-century dialogues plays an important part in the formation of the early English novel. 

Chapter 1 explores eighteenth-century theories of language, many of which posit an originary dialogue. I consider Mandeville’s theories in The Fable of the Bees, James Harris’s Hermes, Monboddo’s Of the Origin and Progress of Language, and, briefly, Horne Tooke.

Chapter 2 considers the consensual aspects of these dialogues by looking at Aphra Behn’s translation of Fontenelle, A Discovery of New Worlds; Shaftesbury’s The Moralists; Mandeville’s Fable again; and Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.

Chapter 3 explores the polemical nature of dialogues, looking at Berkeley’s Alciphron, and some neglected dialogues of the 1790s, both radical and conservative, by Thomas Day, Sir William Jones, Thomas Spence, and in response, writers such as Hannah More.
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Fig. 1. Arthur Devis, Arthur Holdsworth Conversing with Thomas Taylor and Captain Stancombe by the River Dart, 1757.

The modern world, like a grumbling, arguing hive, teems with messages; information winging mercurially among a multitude of subjects, borne by assorted media of kinds unimaginable three hundred years ago. Dialogue, in one form or another, appears central to modernity and yet it seems, in many ways, that the twenty-first century finds the idea of dialogue problematical—beset by questions of translatability and the elusive relations between language and what it is meant to signify; deceptively transparent and suspect in its claims to universality; complicit in the ineluctable discourse of power and the silencing of difference. And we are haunted by anxieties about what can be said and how; what kind of dialogue is permissible. Yet, nonetheless, great claims are made for it. Hermes, the god of communication, seems to be winged in opposite senses: flighted and lofty, yet wounded like a shot game bird.
If we turn to the origins of modernity, the role of dialogue there might be illuminating. Jürgen Habermas has famously charted the development (and later adulteration) in the eighteenth century of a public sphere of bourgeois subjects freely and mutually exchanging and evaluating ideas outside of both the private, domestic realm and the authoritarian domain of the state.​[1]​ Thus we may characterise the period as dialogical (though the historical timing of the emergence of the public sphere has been challenged).​[2]​ Herbert Marcuse describes the dialogic character of classical Enlightenment liberalism thus:
As the economic organization of society is built upon the free competition of private economic subjects, in other words, on the unity of opposites and the unification of the dissimilar, so the search for truth is founded on open-self expression, free dialogue, and convincing and being convinced through argument.​[3]​

It is this that lies behind the development of the public sphere. However, as Marcuse goes on to show, this dialogic rationalism is precarious (he was actually writing this in Germany in 1934 against the background of emerging Nazism), and the class antagonisms that are concealed behind it result in all manner of distortions of that ‘free dialogue’. Yet the utopian aspirations towards authentic dialogicity can be discerned alongside and in tension with those distorting forces. 
The eighteenth century was a period of intensely dialogic activity; I mean ‘dialogic’ here in the fullest sense of an equal and mutually inspirational exchange of ideas. As Peter Gay says, of the European Enlightenment in general (bearing in mind that ‘Enlightenment’ has been a much contested term), ‘The mood of the Enlightenment was favourable to dialogue, and dialogue was favourable to the Enlightenment’.​[4]​ Many philosophical works that are not obviously in dialogue form, such as Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), had a dialogic context; hence:
even Kant experimented with technical ideas in his correspondence and was a popular wit and welcome dinner companion. True, sociable philosophizing created opportunities for gossip and lighthearted generalizations, but at the same time, it was part of an exhilarating intellectual atmosphere in which women were drawn into the circle of discussion, ideas counted more than family origins, and points of view were tested in free debate.​[5]​
 
During this period, many areas of discourse approached that goal of an ideal speech situation, free from constraints and open to all competent participants, theorized in Habermas’s later work, though I will show that there are undercurrents and qualifications to this.​[6]​ For Habermas, the structure of the ‘ideal speech situation’ consists of ‘symmetrical relations’, and, he claims:
An unlimited interchangeability of dialogue roles demands that no side be privileged in the performance of these roles: pure intersubjectivity exists only where there is complete symmetry in the distribution of assertion and dispute, revelation and concealment, prescription and conformity, among the partners of communication.​[7]​ 

The eighteenth-century arena of mutual debate realises the communicative rationalism that Habermas delineates which is the main sense in which I talk of ‘dialogism’. The work of Mikhail Bakhtin and his school generally come to mind in connection with radical accounts of dialogism, and this does inform much of my argument, but I have found Habermas more useful in accounting for my narrower use of the term here. Habermas’s later work on communicative reason does have conservative implications; Hill and Montag’s collection of essays draws attention to some of these.​[8]​ Similarly, the Bakhtinian critiques of Garvey and Roberts see Bakhtin as complementing Habermas but with Bakhtin supplying a dialectical and critical element that they claim is absent in Habermas.​[9]​ However, there is little there to suggest that Habermas in turn can compensate for failings in Bakhtinian thought: it is worth pointing out that the lack of precision in Bakhtin has led to relativism, postmodern aporias, and quietism (and even, in some interpretations, mysticism) that Habermas’s rationalism and commitment to Enlightenment values can serve to correct.​[10]​
Given the appetite for ‘sociable philosophizing’ described above, it is possible to understand the popularity and the rapid growth in the production and consumption of the printed dialogue not only as a genre but also as a commodity. This happens amidst the general expansion of the exchange of pleasurable commodities, of luxury goods, including, in particular, intellectual productions.​[11]​ Thus, the actual exchanges of ideas, paralleling the open market of the new consumer-oriented capitalism, can be re-presented in a form that ensured their even greater circulation. This process may include the translation into and from other European languages—particularly French—as part of an extended public dialogue.
Yet it could be objected that to fix a purported conversation in print is anti-dialogic in practice, and the virtues of public, intersubjective reason may seem to disappear because of the very fixity of the book as a medium. Books, one might say, are static and authoritarian, as Socrates had suggested in Plato’s Phaedrus, whereas living, open-ended dialogue with a teacher leads to dialectical process.​[12]​ The obvious paradox is that Plato’s dialogue itself is a written transcription of this living speech. This dilemma is famously taken up by Derrida as evidence of the long-standing phonocentrism of Western philosophy.​[13]​ Yet in the times of laborious hand-production and reproduction of books, Plato’s strictures may have had relevance to anyone committed to a dynamic and interpersonal approach to the development of thought; the (ambivalent) rejection of writing may not have been the simple, uncritical yearning for presence that Derrida detects. 
By contrast, the advent of mass print technology and the increased speed of production mean that the rapidity of exchange of ideas (again including translation) can take on a conversational quality.​[14]​ In this context, thesis invites prompt reply, absorption and development, and the dialogic fluidity yearned for by Plato is restored. In addition, there are the much-discussed phenomena that capitalism ushered in, which provided a whole new infrastructure for the dialogic activity of the public sphere, now well-known since Habermas’s initial discussion: relaxation of censorship and the tendency to escape state control in other ways; criticism; journals; coffee-houses; circulating, subscription and public libraries. Thus, though I would avoid technological determinism, material conditions dramatically condition the extent to which a medium and, within that medium, a genre, can be dialogic. 
Given this background of active public dialogism, it is not surprising to see that, as I have said, during the eighteenth century the literary genre of the dialogue was immensely popular. Eugene R. Purpus, in a pioneering and succinct article, indicates this popularity and surveys the genre, supplying a useful, if necessarily approximate definition of how ‘Restoration and early eighteenth-century writers’ saw this genre: 
It is a form of expository writing, commonly in a plain and familiar style, presented entirely through the conversation of two or more persons, dramatic only to the extent of attempting to present an impression of the talk of real people, and aimed at the communication of information or points of view through the interplay of arguments on more than one side of the issue at hand.​[15]​

The Appendix below shows a table and derived graphs that indicate the quantity and proportion of titles containing the character strings ‘dialog*’ and ‘conversation*’, published during this period and catalogued in the English Short Title Catalogue.​[16]​ This gives a sense, though incomplete, of the prevalence of the genre in this period.​[17]​ A second table and pair of charts show the results of a similar search of the British Library catalogue for the nineteenth century; there is a significant fall in both the numbers of such texts published and the proportion of these to all catalogue entries.​[18]​
This thesis will argue that eighteenth-century dialogues were not only prolific but had an almost unprecedented richness and sophistication and that this stems from a dialogicity characteristic of the period. Dialogues have always been with us; since we are inescapably communicative beings, it is not surprising to find formal speech exchanges in the earliest literature: the Book of Job, the Upanishads and Bhagavad Gītā, the Analects of Confucius. Such genres as the mediaeval débat, flyting in early modern Scottish poetry, and the rap duels in Black American culture are not unrelated.​[19]​ And there have been periods of history where the dialogue has flourished and acknowledged masters of the genre have emerged: Plato, of course, and Xenophon, in democratic Athens; Cicero in Republican Rome; Erasmus, More, Galileo, and Castiglione in Renaissance Europe; Hobbes, Izaak Walton, Bunyan, and Boyle in seventeenth-century England.​[20]​ Yet my argument aims to show that Enlightenment Britain particularly favoured the blooming of this genre and lent a specific historical flavour to this perennial form. 
Surprisingly, little has been written on the dialogue as a literary form. Aristotle declared that there was no common name for that mimetic art which relied on language alone (that is, without music or dramatic action) and which could be applied to ‘the [prose] mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus and the Socratic dialogues’; thus, the founding text of Western literary theory, so rich in its treatment of epic and tragedy, barely mentions the dialogue.​[21]​ An established reference point is Hirzel’s Der Dialog which, according to Purpus, stops short at 1700.​[22]​ In English, there is Elizabeth Merril’s comprehensive but cursory and not very analytical account of English dialogues; the eighteenth century receives little attention.​[23]​ There has been much written in French on the dialogue, with particular attention being paid to Diderot, who was a master of the form and explored its many possibilities in depth, highly aware of its polarities and tensions.​[24]​ More recently, Stéphane Pujol has explored the eighteenth-century French dialogue in general.​[25]​ One very stimulating recent collection of essays that deal specifically with the eighteenth-century dialogue in English has been published recently, emerging from four panels at the 1993 SCSECS conference; it is to be hoped that this indicates a significant dawning of interest, along with the many and various theoretical discussions of dialogue that are appearing.​[26]​ And there have been two very important monographs on the topic: Michael Prince’s Philosophical Dialogue in the British Enlightenment and Timothy Dykstal’s The Luxury of Skepticism.​[27]​ 
Virginia Cox has argued persuasively for the importance and richness of Renaissance dialogue, and Renaissance Italy shared a certain dynamism with eighteenth-century Britain that would be fertile soil for such a blossoming.​[28]​ She recognises the distinction between open and closed dialogues and that instances of the form may lie on a spectrum ranging from the monologic to the authentically dialogic, but that:
the distinction between didactic and non-didactic dialogues can have the effect of distorting our judgement of dialogues produced in eras, like the late sixteenth century in Italy, when the concept of authority carried great prestige and when didacticism had no negative connotations.​[29]​

This qualification implies that there is a qualitative difference between Renaissance and later dialogues. The dialogues of the eighteenth century in English were, in general, more inclusive and more ubiquitous than those of the Renaissance and the prestige attached to authority was under interrogation. As Cox also says, ‘It is with the Enlightenment, in the following century, that the distinction [between open and closed dialogues] takes on the evaluative slant whose resonance can be detected in much dialogue criticism today’; I expand upon this distinction below.​[30]​ Dykstal claims that, in contrast to the Renaissance dialogue, 
beginning in the late seventeenth century the ruling elite in England found itself having to solicit the opinion of a much wider public to implement, if not yet to legitimate, its commands, and the dialogue was one of the less decorous places where that opinion was formed.​[31]​
 
The dialogues I am looking at had a much broader readership, both in sheer numbers and with the increased participation of women and the lower orders (the development of print culture had increased literacy and readership had broadened proportionally; other institutions of the public sphere played their part too). There was also a greater variety of subject matter and diversity of treatment. 
Hans Robert Jauss argues that ‘Renaissance humanism had revived the Platonic dialogue in opposition to the institutionalized discourse of Scholasticism’, opening up a discussion which drew its validity from the classical period. However, the Enlightenment takes this discussion further, questioning that authority in turn in ways that, as Jauss shows, reveal the unique character of eighteenth-century dialogism:
The desire to change the aims of humanity while at the same time criticizing the prior realization of these aims was a peculiarity of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment’s emancipatory movement, and the dialogue was the preferred didactic medium for this effort because of its open, Socratic form. The triumphal march of the dialogic form, which from this point on appeared everywhere, and even forced its way into the conventionally monologic gestures of literature and rhetoric, resulted in the dialogization of all subject matter over which criticism could exercise its power.​[32]​ 

This link between dialogue, emancipation, and criticism is illuminating, though I would hesitate over suggesting (as does Bakhtin also with the novel) that there is a stark disjunction between pre-Enlightenment monologism and ‘triumphal’ dialogicity—it is rare that a cultural production does not show some dialectical contradictoriness and earlier forms are often dialogic. However, I will argue that, in this period, ‘the dialogue form’ has a significant radicalising effect on the prose narrative, dialogising it in the way that Jauss describes, and contributing to the special nature of the early English novel.
The eighteenth century was fascinated by the dialogue as a printed and widely disseminated representation of non-dramatic conversation, of dialogue of all kinds, in all its forms and registers, although I have paid most attention to the depiction of formal arguments.​[33]​ The archetype of the genre is the philosophical dialogue, of which there are many eighteenth-century examples, but dialogues were written on almost anything that could be the subject of rational conversation between autonomous, reasoning individuals. Thus, though it is important to distinguish between conversation and the dialogue, there was a continual dialectical interplay between the intelligent conversation of the public sphere and the communicative rationality, employed on diverse subject matter, that was embodied in the printed dialogue.​[34]​ I do not want to construct a taxonomy of dialogues, but it is important to see some of the extensive range of kinds of dialogue and subject matter that were published in eighteenth-century Britain.​[35]​ These range from Addison’s dialogues on the usefulness of ancient medals to practical treatises in dialogue form, on fencing, algebra, artillery, the seaman‘s art, ‘the five orders of columns in architecture’, on colouring. There were dialogues on venereal disease; between acid and alkali, and gentlemen and farmers; on the revenue laws, the Corn Laws, and the game laws; on friendship and society; on the Rights of Britons; on morality, economy, and politeness, as well as on hurrying in churches; on friendship and society, and on eloquence. In a curious ascent from low comedy to moral philosophy and ethnology, an attack of diarrhoea prompts a dialogue by Samuel Rolleston on modesty and human nature.​[36]​ Their modal range was wide, including farce and satire, rhapsody and dry seriousness, and something categorised as ‘a politico-polemico-sarcastico-historical dialogue’.​[37]​ 
There were numerous facetious, comical, and satirical dialogues; in particular, short comic dialogues, akin to chapbooks, on proverbial and stereotypical themes, aimed at a more plebeian audience (and not too dissimilar from Hannah More’s anti-Jacobin dialogues in Village Politics, which I look at in Chapter Three). These were popular, certainly not cerebral, and not particularly dialogic, but obviously the form itself enabled the easy consumption of age-old comic themes. The full titles are worth giving; for example, The Wonder; or, A Comical Dialogue which Lately happened in this Neighbourhood, between an Old Woman of Threescore and Ten, and a Youth about Twenty, with whom she lately married (1800?); and The Comforts of Matrimony, Being a comical and diverting Dialogue, which Happened between an old Woman of Forescore and Ten, and a Youth about Nineteen Years of Age, with whom she lately married. Containing the many Questions he ask'd her and the complaisant Answers she gave him promising Obedience in every Respect, and more perhaps than it is in the Power of any Woman to perform (1755?). The lengthy subtitles adequately convey the narrative of these short pieces. Or, there were similar, more satirical, works catering to contemporary prejudices: A Comical New Dialogue Between Mr. G----ff, a Pious Dissenting Parson, and a Female-Quaker, (a Goldsmith's Wife) near Cheapside; whom the Reverend Preacher pick'd up. With the Discourse that pas'd between them, and the Treatment he gave her. Also, how He was Apprehended for the same, and carried before a Justice of Peace: And sent to Wood-street-Compter on Wednesday Night last (1706). The emphasis on narrative, voice, and character here is apparent, but these functions are also highly developed in the more formal dialogues, as I will show. Akin to this tradition of comic narrative, there were, too, erotic dialogues, often derived from the whore dialogues of Pietro Aretino (1492–1556), and ultimately of Lucian, which both Fontenelle and Mandeville subvert in different ways.​[38]​ Lucian’s satirical, sceptical dialogism is always present as a tendency as much as other, more sedate models.​[39]​
Dialogues of the Dead, also originating with Lucian, were very popular, though I have not dealt with them here: more often than not, they are one-sided polemics on the decadence of modern thought compared to some salutary Ancient, or denunciations of some historical rogue, and there are more intriguing exchanges to explore elsewhere.​[40]​ There is one important novelistic transformation of this subgenre in Book III of Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels, where key figures from antiquity engage in question and answer, though the dialogue is reported indirectly.
Mandeville (who was an accomplished dialogist and is a key figure in my study) wrote a medical dialogue on melancholy and hysteria which anticipates the ‘talking cure’ of psychoanalysis and many contemporary therapeutic concerns with dialogue.​[41]​ The scientific dialogue in general proved an important model for a critical, rational model in other spheres: hence, Dryden would claim that his own dialogue, Of Dramatic Poesy: An Essay (1688), lay in a tradition of rational doubt that led from Socrates, through Cicero, to the new science: ‘my whole discourse was sceptical, according to that way of reasoning which was used by Socrates, Plato, and all the Academics of old, which Tully and the best of the Ancients followed, and which is imitated by the modest inquisitions of the Royal Society’.​[42]​ Earlier scientific dialogues had been truly dialogic in that the scientific enterprise necessarily values free rational enquiry and the form reflected this. But Galileo, writing under highly undialogic conditions, employed the dialogue defensively and for very different reasons than those that motivate dialogues of the eighteenth century.​[43]​ By contrast, Boyle’s dialogue, The Sceptical Chymist (1680), was written when partially secularised networks and institutions of scientific dialogue were coming into existence.​[44]​ 
Subgenres may be identified by readership as much as by content or formal attributes. Thus, there is an important subcategory of dialogue that bloomed during this period, defined by a new audience for women who wanted to learn natural philosophy (which, as I have indicated, was well served by the dialogue). This was initiated by Fontenelle’s Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes (1687), which popularised the new heliocentric astronomy in an eroticised setting that also stimulated speculation about the possibility of life on other planets. This was enormously popular and went through many editions and translations, notably into English by Aphra Behn; I discuss this in Chapter Two.​[45]​ It had many imitators: notably, Francesco Algarotti’s Il Newtonianismo per le dame (1737) (on Newtonian optics); Gilles Augustin Bazin’s Histoire naturelle des abeilles (1744) (a dialogised version of the entomologist Réaumur’s treatise on bees); John Harris’s Astronomical Dialogues (1717).​[46]​
Pedagogical dialogues for children were very popular; there is a notable tendency for these to be more engagingly dialogic than catechistic (as earlier educational texts had been), owing to the educational theories of Locke, Rousseau, and the Edgeworths.​[47]​ An important subset of these again conveyed natural history and this was related to that similar popularisation of natural philosophy through dialogues for women.​[48]​ There were, here, such massive and encyclopaedic works as the instrument maker and public lecturer, Benjamin Martin’s The Young Gentleman and Lady's Philosophy (1764).​[49]​ This is of particular interest because of its origins as a periodical (The General Magazine of Arts and Sciences, Philosophical, Philological, Mathematical, and Mechanical (1755–1764)), showing the links between dialogue and serial publication as a central medium of the public sphere.​[50]​ A later and similar enterprise was that of Jeremiah Joyce and his Scientific Dialogues (1807); a Unitarian radical, he was charged with treason alongside John Horne Tooke, who in turn would write his own dialogues on language in response to his later prosecution for sedition.​[51]​ Women, as might be expected, took on the role of pedagogical dialogist readily: Priscilla Wakefield composed celebrated dialogues on natural history and on travel for children; Anna Laetitia Barbauld who, with her brother, John Aikin, composed an important educational miscellany, Evenings at Home, containing many dialogues on such subjects as the manufacture of paper, on moral topics such as ‘A dialogue on different stations in life’, and on the educational process itself (‘Dialogue, on things to be learned; between Mamma and Kitty’).​[52]​ One other crucial text in this realm is David Fordyce’s Dialogues Concerning Education (1745) which promotes many of the themes I am concerned with, emphasising a dialogic, Socratic educational process; public life; and free, non-partisan inquiry, subject to no authority other than reason. It includes a close examination of conversation, particularly its gendering.​[53]​
The Enlightenment promised universal ideals of human equality that were, as has often been noted, not always materially delivered. Yet that unfulfilled promise is, regardless, an always imminent possibility in Enlightenment culture. The dialogue, as a genre most suited to this universality of exchange and as an image of the idealised public sphere did, in fact, lend itself to the voices of excluded groups. The genre was particularly adaptable to women’s interests in gaining admission to the public sphere and many women were adept dialogists, employing the dialogue not only as an educational device but in spheres that might be considered less feminine; for example, Barbauld composed an intriguing and witty feminist philosophical dialogue, her ‘Dialogue between Madam Cosmogunia, and a Philosophical Enquirer of the 18th Century’.​[54]​ Clare Brant accounts for the dialogue’s appeal to women thus: ‘Lacking a clear authorial voice, the dialogue accommodated women’s anxieties about authorship, but its double-sided argument simultaneously asserted women’s powers of reasoning’.​[55]​
People from the labouring classes and their allies would also find the genre a potent medium for articulating their discontent (while the ruling classes in turn would employ it against them in order to secure a false sense of equanimity); this is touched upon in Chapter Three below. Discussions concerning conversation flourished,​[56]​ as did those on language itself as I show in Chapter One. But one innovation of special interest within the genre was the dialogue of dialectal observation, invented by ‘Tim Bobbins’ (John Collier) who recorded the Lancashire dialect with accuracy and sympathy, and not as ridicule, generating many imitations.​[57]​ The democratic spirit of authentic dialogue lies behind this subgenre; Collier was from humble roots and this informed the sympathetic engagement with and inclusion of the speech of the working classes.​[58]​ Collier was also a radical whose other writings and his Hogarthian caricatures (as published in Human Passions Delineated (1773), for example) enact the polemical aspect of dialogue against the dominant order. Swift’s ‘A Dialogue in Hibernian Style between A. and B.’ [c. 1735] is a comic precursor of these (though Carole Fabricant argues that his intentions can be seen as more sympathetic towards the native Irish than is apparent).​[59]​ Successors included Ann Wheeler’s The Westmorland Dialect (1790) which has links with the comic dialogue but has highly developed narrative interest, and feminist concerns in the ‘Dialogue between Ann and Mary, upon running away from a bad Husband’, and Mary Leadbeater’s Irish Cottage Dialogues (with a preface by Maria Edgeworth, whose own An Essay on Irish Bulls had defended the specificity of Irish dialect); it is possible to see this interest in the vernacular as finding its way into novels such as Edgeworth’s, which in turn influenced Scott.​[60]​ Edgeworth does, in fact, illustrate her remarks on dialect by quoting Bobbins, though as evidence of the ridiculousness of Lancashire speech, revealing an ambivalence about the status of lower-class speech.​[61]​ The accurate and sympathetic representation of dialect, apart from fulfilling criteria of realism that could be regarded as novelistic, facilitates that component of Bakhtinian dialogicity that he calls heteroglossia.​[62]​ Thus, senses of dialogism coalesce here. Relatedly, some dialogues were employed as tutorials in languages other than English; the colonial setting of some of these has its own ambiguities in the same way as does the work of Sir William Jones, whom I discuss in Chapter Three, who was both in mutual dialogue with the culture of the East and yet an agent of the colonising power.​[63]​
There were, tellingly, dialogues on dialogue.​[64]​ This attention to, and concern with, the conversation of others, both in terms of content and of manner, and extended sometimes to the evaluation of, for example, the letter-writing of others is often expressed as metaconversation and can be formalised as a dialogue or appear in a novel. These concerns overlap with the many dialogues on taste or aesthetics.​[65]​


Fig. 2. William Hogarth, A Midnight Modern Conversation, c. 1765.

There were even musical dialogues: for example, Handel’s oratorio, Il trionfo del Tempo e del Disinganno (The Triumph of Time and Dis-illusion) (1707).​[66]​ Though perhaps the concerto and the symphony—both of which were perfected during this period—epitomise the musical dialogue: the concerto with its pitting of orchestra against soloist, the symphony both for its uninhibited incorporation of diverse genres and for the dialectic of subject and counter-subject that is explored in sonata form.​[67]​ The centrality of dialogue can be discerned in visual art: there are the conversation pieces of Hogarth, Devis, and Reynolds where social discourse is depicted (see Fig. 1).​[68]​ Hogarth, sensitive to the antinomies of dialogue, portrays the disintegration of sociality in a novelistic and realist style as drunken antidialogue in A Midnight Modern Conversation (1732) (Fig. 2); an interest in the underside of dialogue, its negation, will emerge in this study.​[69]​
Some limitation of scope has had to be necessary. I have chosen dialogues which seem best to exemplify the communicative reason at play that is my concern or, in contrast, those that engage rather more hesitantly with authentic dialogue, for the more interesting of these latter reveal that a struggle against the public sphere is often nevertheless touched by the spirit that they oppose. Contrariwise, I have omitted, for example, the many verse dialogues; partially, because these are often dialogue in presentational form only, devoid of any real exchange of ideas. I have thus chosen not to give an analysis of eighteenth-century eclogues such as Swift’s as, in general, they do not exemplify the openness that is embodied so richly in other texts of the period.​[70]​ While it would be wrong to characterise this as a secular period, the spirit of communicative reason is, I maintain, a dominant tendency, and one that puts into question monologic sources of authority, whether in this world or elsewhere. More orthodox and conservative thinkers certainly employed the dialogue in theological debates but these do tend to be dogmatic and heavily one-sided and I have paid them less attention, yet even these are not untouched by the dialogical force—Berkeley is a case in point; see Chapter Three below. Thus, I have avoided in general religious, political, and pedagogical texts that are dialogues in presentational form but which are, more properly, catechisms, or diatribes against straw men. I have given, however, enough examples of this mode to get a sense of what the more typical dialogues had achieved. 
I want now to establish another aspect of the characterization of the eighteenth-century dialogue—one which connects the printed dialogue with the impossible-to-avoid cliché, ‘the rise of the novel’.​[71]​ I have already mentioned Bakhtin, who inevitably comes to mind when ‘dialogue’ is mentioned.​[72]​ It is well known that Mikhail Bakhtin elevates the novel above all other genres for its dialogic nature; I hope to show that, in part, the novel is dialogic in a more literal sense and that the eighteenth-century dialogue develops alongside the early novel, overlaps with it, and becomes in part a constituent element of it.​[73]​
One important strand of Bakhtin’s thought is his stress on the heterogeneous nature of the novel, of the way in which disparate genres are placed in conjunction with each other. Another is what Julia Kristeva would later transform into the notion of intertextuality, but without her poststructuralist slant and its denigration of agency. This is rather that conscious authorial response to texts which is a prominent feature of the examples I examine (and is enabled by the institutions of the public sphere, including the networks and intellectual formations as well as, for example, coffee-houses and periodicals) to the extent, sometimes, of the, parodic or endorsing, direct citation of other works. Certain names, it will be seen, reoccur. I have chosen works that intersect with each other and authors who knew each other personally, collaborated with, or polemicised against each other in order to show dialogues both consensual and adversarial among people and texts but, in truth, this pattern did not need forcing. Part of my point is that one of the consequences of the general dialogic activity that characterises this period is the development of networks, or intellectual formations—groups of thinkers and writers who met and corresponded, and developed their arguments in mutuality or in antagonism.​[74]​ Many of these writers were themselves dialogists and my selection of texts will reveal these connections and the continuous responsiveness of writers to texts among these networks. 
In my first chapter I consider that the eighteenth century was unusually concerned with investigations into language and that, generally, language was seen as a social process—thus, essentially dialogic.​[75]​ This interest in the dialogic, partially because of the comparative lack of division of intellectual labour, influences discourses other than the purely linguistic, impacting on what we would call philosophy, psychology, poetics, anthropology, and literature amongst others.​[76]​ Thus, the investigation begins in Chapter One with an exploration of eighteenth-century theories of language, many of which posit an originary dialogue where language is founded in the first tentative attempts at communication by a primal dyad. Following suggestions by Nicholas Hudson that describe a shift to dialogism from the individualistic theory of Locke, I consider Mandeville’s theories in the dialogues of Part Two of The Fable of the Bees (1705–1734), James Harris’s Hermes (1751), Lord Monboddo’s Of the Origin and Progress of Language (1773–1792), and, briefly, Condillac, Rousseau, Adam Smith, and Horne Tooke.​[77]​
Think of the ways that a dialogue might be conducted: I might shout you down; you may sarcastically demolish my naïve statements; you might, with seeming modesty, lead me into humiliating contradictions and aporias; we might both, in gentlemanly fashion, puzzlingly worry away at a problem, neither of us too sure of ourselves, in order to uncover its secrets. I might whisper sweet somethings into your ear and win you over to my position. There may be a conclusive victory at the end, or indeterminacy, whether deliberately so or not. Thus dialogues may range from the one-sidedness or authoritarianism of catechism, polemic, or satire, to the genuinely open free play of ideas or the depiction of a consensual learning process.
For example, there is a tendency—prevalent in dialogues before this period, evident even in the later Plato (this is despite Bakhtin, who holds up Socrates as dialogic hero​[78]​)—to render the dialogue one-sided, to weight the argument by authorial cunning, to bully. And, of course, few writers in any age are genuinely neutral in an argument; many engage in fierce polemics against an enemy idea, often employing the outer garb of dialogue. However, eighteenth-century dialogues aimed in general at a more eirenic mode. Yet we should recall one of the undercurrents that I hinted at before—the equanimity of the eighteenth-century dialogue could conceal very real antagonisms or could exclude dissent; the very form of the dialogue as even-handed debate can thus have an ideological force. One can easily think of contemporary situations where an appeal to conciliatory dialogue evades the fact of profound material divisions. 
This potential to become one-sided is frequently addressed in the prefaces to eighteenth-century dialogues to the point of anxiety. Among the founders of eighteenth-century aesthetic theory, Hugh Blair raises this concern, warning that ‘the greatest part of Modern Dialogue Writers’, set up their interlocutors such that:
the one personates the Author, a man of learning, no doubt, and of good principles; and the other is a man of straw, set up to propose some trivial objections; over which the first gains a most entire triumph, and leaves his sceptical antagonist at the end much humbled, and, generally, convinced of his error.​[79]​

I will look at tactics employed by some of the more resourceful dialogists in this period that restore the sense of genuine give-and-take that was supposed to occur in the polite conversational arena of the public sphere (and very often did so, remarkably, within certain limits). Earlier dialogues were generally less afraid to be polemical, particularly where religious dissent is concerned—one was either on the right or the wrong side. Eighteenth-century dialogues can at least believe in the possibility of harmonious and polite argument. But the very form of the genre is, in some way, openly declarative (as dialogic); whether or not it lives up to these claims is what is interesting. As Jauss says:
A corresponding process of the continuous establishing and altering of horizons also determines the relationship of the individual text to the succession of texts that forms the genre. The new text evokes for the reader (listener) the horizon of expectations and rules familiar from earlier texts, which are then varied, corrected, altered, or even just reproduced.​[80]​

Thus, for eighteenth-century consumers of the dialogue the expectations from earlier dialogues presuppose the bare minimum of structures of rational argumentation transmitted from Plato, but these expectations have also been altered by the fervour of dialogic activity that permeated their world, and by the rich particularity that novels offered, or were beginning to offer.
It is thus important to distinguish the degrees of ‘dialogicity’; their openness, even-handedness, rhetorical strategies, and so on, and measure them against these horizons. Mention has been made of the ‘openness’ of dialogue: a dialogue is relatively open to the extent that it facilitates the free play of opinions between the participants and does not a priori enforce a viewpoint one-sidedly and in an authoritarian manner. A closed dialogue, by contrast, could more properly be called a catechism; here, the inferior interlocutor is dictated to by the more authoritative voice. This may take place with apparently benign intentions, in a pedagogic situation, for example, or in a more aggressive manner, as in many propagandist theological arguments, where the intent is to show one participant as incontrovertibly mistaken. The open dialogue fulfils some of Habermas’s criteria for communicative reason to take place, approaching his ‘complete symmetry in the distribution of assertion and dispute’ described above. It also meets Bakhtin’s notions of dialogicity: open and closed dialogues, perhaps confusingly, can be classed as dialogic or monologic. Kristeva points out that the Bakhtinian distinction of these terms ‘does not correspond to the direct/indirect (monologue/dialogue) distinction in narratives or plays. [. . .] dialogue can be monological, and what is called monologue can be dialogical’.​[81]​ Yet there is another dimension involved: dialogues can be either polemical or eirenic to various degrees, ranging from vicious hostility, often satirical, to a peaceable and amicable agreement to debate. Early commentators identified the ‘eristic’ in opposition to the dialectic, a demarcation which has some correspondence with the Socratic critique of the Sophists.​[82]​ Eristic dialogues are adversarial for the sake of it, disregarding any commitment to the discovery of truth. This is but one aspect of antagonistic dialogue, however, and is more likely to be used as an accusation aimed by an opponent at an interlocutor’s method. Polemical dialogues more generally make claims to be truth seeking and direct their hostility at the wilful mischief or misology of their opponents. Thus dialogues may be classified along two axes: polemical/eirenic, and closed/open. Yet these may impact on one another; the domineering of polemic, the distortions of satire are particular ways in which the mutual respect imagined in the open dialogue and Habermas’s preconditions of rational discourse may be undermined. 
Following the distinctions above, Chapter Two deals with the sociable, and even the amatory, illuminating state of consensus as one pole of dialogue. I consider Aphra Behn’s translation of Fontenelle’s Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes, A Discovery of New Worlds (1688); Shaftesbury’s The Moralists (1709); Mandeville’s The Fable of the Bees once more; and, briefly, Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779). These dialogues are, on the whole, eirenic, though Mandeville’s depicts a shift from antagonism to a more consensual mode; the two-dimensional schema I described above is not meant to define rigidly—it is more a field around which dialogues can wander. The shift in Mandeville is of interest as it reveals how the preconditions for dialogue have first to be negotiated, a procedure not found in, say, Hume. This, in itself, allows, or perhaps necessitates, a deeper characterisation, suggesting the novelistic aspects of dialogues, which are a major concern of this thesis. The ‘Commerce of Light’ of my title appears in Fontenelle as an image that simultaneously suggests the marketplace and the mutual interchange of ideas among all thinking beings but, in particular, with erotic overtones, between men and women.​[83]​ This conjunction of intellectual equality and romantic attraction is a theme that I will revisit elsewhere.
But dialogue, if it is to represent authentic intellectual inquiry, cannot always be so harmonious; it must be prepared to contest, even to be adversarial. Further discordance arises out of the conflictual undercurrents of the eighteenth-century ideology of polite consensus. Chapter Three examines dialogues where mutuality has broken down; satire and raillery become a central concern here: Berkeley’s Alciphron (1732), and dialogues of the 1790s, both radical, by Thomas Day, Sir William Jones, and Thomas Spence, and in response, anti-Jacobin writers such as Hannah More. Again, it is important to be aware of the two axes I sketched above, for to be consensual is not necessarily to be open: Berkeley’s earlier Three Dialogues (1713) exhibit the willing submission of one to the authority of the other. However, the distinction between this and the more Socratic, elenctic or maieutic, model of dialogue (where questioning elicits free and rational responses that lead one partner of dialogue towards truth) is often hard to discern.​[84]​ In contrast, most dialogues that are antagonistic are also closed: it is hard to imagine how a polemical, but open, dialogue would work and what ends it would serve, though Mandeville, as I have observed, subtle as always, does introduce his dialogues with a state of antagonism, then cleverly, through open dialogue, manoeuvres to a position of equanimity. Alciphron is a curious case here too: starkly polemical, it yet allows, as I argue below, a degree of autonomy and openness to the materialists whom Berkeley targets which threatens to destabilise his position. 
In the dialogues I examine in these two chapters, I am also alert to features of them which may be characterised as novelistic—an interest in subjectivity and characterisation, verisimilitude, narrative interest. Kames had emphasised the importance of the novelistic skills of ‘imitating characters and internal emotions’ in the dialogue as satisfying eighteenth-century notions of taste:
what is truly most difficult, is a characteristical dialogue upon any philosophical subject: to interweave characters with reasoning, by suiting to the character of each speaker, a peculiarity not only of thought, but of expression, requires the perfection of genius, taste, and judgement.​[85]​

It is an important argument of this thesis that the richness of the eighteenth-century dialogue plays an important part in the formation of the early English novel.​[86]​ Hence, in Chapter Four, I examine the important role the dialogue plays in the composition of novels of the period. Chiefly, I look at Samuel Richardson’s Pamela (1741); Sarah Fielding’s dialogue, Remarks on Clarissa (1749) and her dialogue-novel, The Cry (1754); and Robert Bage’s Hermsprong (1796), with a preliminary discussion of Swift’s A Compleat Collection of Genteel and Ingenious Conversation (1738). In this period, when the book in general as commodity was being exchanged at an unprecedented rate, the particular kind of book that I am looking at also flourished. The demand for the printed representation of conversations, usually on subjects of importance such as philosophy, bloomed. But alongside that was the much better known growth of that other kind of printed commodity, the novel, which was consumed even more avidly. 
Most accounts of ‘the Rise of the Novel’ concern themselves with the development of, or transformations of, narrative technique—how the novel, as prose narrative, is continuous or discontinuous with romance, or epic, or other contenders; or with the content of narrative, ideas of temporality, and so on. I want to focus on just one small part of the non-narrative aspect of the novel for, as J Paul Hunter shows, these are as important (indeed, the presence of such components is a key characteristic of the novel).​[87]​ The dialogue, I argue, is an element that contributes very much to the ‘novelness’ of the novel.
Bakhtin concentrated on the novel or on what, at times, is only ‘the novel’ through his somewhat selective appropriation of earlier prose fictions (which other writers more usually categorise as ‘romance’ in sharp contrast to ‘the novel’).​[88]​ And the novel, for Bakhtin, is the supremely dialogic text due to its granting equal space to a polyphony of diverse voices without imposing one single authoritarian, authorial voice.​[89]​ Bakhtin can be maddeningly imprecise and unhistorical, and sweepingly exclusive; it is perhaps more useful to identify some hypothetical tendency of ‘the novelistic’ to which an open text should ideally aspire. However, my point is to show briefly that the printed dialogue in the eighteenth century shares peculiarly the dialogicity of the novel. I have already suggested that many of these dialogues avoid—or yearn to avoid—the authoritarian voice, mirroring the social questioning they emerge from. They depart from their predecessors in other significant ways. The novelistic dialogue may even include the sympathetic and realistic depiction of character, and may attempt to reproduce the elegance of actual polite conversation in the same way that the novel did. It is interesting to note here that polite conversation, according to contemporary manuals, was to be modelled as much on the printed text as the dialogue was intended to capture the elegance and openness of conversation.​[90]​
I argue, too, that eighteenth-century novels are dialogic in a very literal way—they physically incorporate this now-enhanced genre of argumentation into their structures of narrative, of psychological exploration, and of narratorial comment. Yet in doing so they become dialogic in both Bakhtin’s sense of enabling multiple perspectives and as Habermas’s advocacy of the ideal of communicative reason and rational examination of validity claims, briefly glimpsed in the eighteenth-century public sphere. Crucially, too, in terms of the claims to universality immanent in Enlightenment thought, gender has an important role. I have already noted the new audience of women and the ease with which women turned the dialogue into an instrument of their aspirations. It is well-known, too, that women were prominent both as consumers and producers of the new fiction. The incorporation of the dialogue into the novel often merged the spheres of rational debate and courtship, especially among those few writers who granted intellectual equality to women and saw their autonomy and rationality as itself erotic. This mutual synthesis of romance and intellect is played out in many dialogues between men and women that are embedded in novels, especially the Jacobin fictions of the 1790s, and this forms the final fruition of the ‘Commerce of Light’ that Fontenelle anticipated and that epitomises the eighteenth-century dialogue.





Chapter One: Before Babel: The Presence of the Dialogic in Eighteenth-Century Theories of Language

Histories of Linguistic Thought

Since Noam Chomsky’s opening of the field in 1966 with Cartesian Linguistics, various histories have been written about the development of linguistics in the eighteenth century.​[91]​ Some of these derive the production of scientific knowledge from extrinsic social forces—usually political or economic—and have a tendency to ignore the intransitive dimension (in Roy Bhaskar’s terms), veering towards social constructivism and an antirealist undermining of science.​[92]​ Chomsky’s own history traces the internal development of the science and seeks to found the modern linguistics that he largely instigated in the general grammars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, tracing the gradual refinement of certain concepts from then. These conflicting histories are themselves symptomatic of underlying contradictions and of unfinished dialogues over the nature of language.​[93]​
Chomsky’s narrative identifies and defends a strand in the history of linguistics which stems from the Cartesian grammar of Port-Royal and bypasses the English empiricist tradition, supposedly founded in Locke. He considers that mechanistic and anti-humanist approaches, dominant during the 1950s and 60s, had profoundly negative effects on linguistics (both scientifically and politically). These could be surpassed by a return to the Cartesian tradition; simultaneously, Chomsky finds his own transformational generative grammar, with its emphasis on the innate and therefore universal creativity of language, prefigured in Cartesian linguistics.​[94]​
However, as well as the scientific sterility that behaviourism brings to linguistics, Chomsky is concerned with the ethical and political consequences of mechanistic approaches to human behaviour. He is rarely explicit about this but it comes to the fore in his scathing attack on the anti-humanism of Skinner’s account of language acquisition.​[95]​ In his parallel career of denouncing Western imperialism, he has paid much attention to the abuse of language by intellectuals in order to shroud atrocities.​[96]​ In an interview in 1969, he was asked whether the use in his linguistic work of ‘concepts like “freedom”, “spontaneity”, “creativity”, “innovation”’ had any bearing on his political views. He replied that they were ‘logically independent’ but that he felt that ‘there is a kind of tenuous connection’ and that ‘the fundamental human capacity is the capacity and the need for creative self-expression, for free control of all aspects of one’s life and thought. One particularly crucial realization of this capacity is the creative use of language as a free instrument of thought and expression.’​[97]​ This defence of human subjectivity aligns Chomsky with thinkers in the Enlightenment period, both progressive and conservative, as we will see. 
I have dwelt for some time on Chomsky: his polemic with other linguists recapitulates the tensions of eighteenth-century thought about language, particularly over human autonomy; his concern with those thinkers is illuminating for my study and some understanding of his thought is necessary in order to situate their ideas properly. The importance, for Chomsky, of such universal grammars as those of Port Royal, James Harris, and Wilhelm von Humboldt is that not only do they share his universalist humanism and his stress on creativity but that they also, with their emphasis on ‘inner form’, seem to anticipate to some extent the actual scientific procedures of TG.​[98]​ It may be too that, despite the association of eighteenth-century liberals with empiricist positions, and the undoubted radical bent of materialism, that there was a progressive content in idealist linguistics that Chomsky has detected; a truly radical theory might only arise from the dialectical transcendence of both poles of thought.
Hans Aarsleff argues that ‘Cartesian Linguistics’ is a chimera and that Chomsky has entirely misrepresented Locke’s role in the development of linguistics and, even more, that of his disciple, Condillac (whom Chomsky never mentions).​[99]​ However, whilst Chomsky may be mistaken about Locke’s own doctrine, it is certainly demonstrable that the behaviourist position, and a whole group of similarly positivistic theories, can be derived from Locke’s empiricism, and that the categorisation of attitudes as respectively ‘rationalist’ and ‘empiricist’ is not without some value.​[100]​ A series of other oppositions appears, all related in subtle ways, and all manifested in different ways throughout eighteenth-century speculations and analyses of language. Most important, for this argument, is Chomsky’s exclusion of the intersubjective dimension. 
A sharp contrast emerges in British linguistic thought over this period between rationalism and empiricism: typically represented by, on the one hand, James Harris’s Hermes (1765) and Lord Monboddo’s Of the Origin and Progress of Language (1773-92) and, on the other, John Horne Tooke. Early in the nineteenth century, in his Diversions of Purley (1786–1805), Horne Tooke would react vigorously against the former thinkers’ positions. Aarslef comments: 
Among the Englishmen [sic] whom Horne Tooke singled out for special dislike were James Harris and Lord Monboddo; I have chosen to deal with Monboddo because I find him both more interesting and more representative than Harris. Harris’ Hermes belongs in the tradition of universal grammar, but with very significant differences which make it a poor representative of its kind.​[101]​

It would be interesting to know what these ‘very significant differences’ are and, for this very reason, I will later be examining Harris alongside the Scotsman, Monboddo. 
The Soviet linguist and colleague (or alter ego) of Bakhtin, V.N. Vološinov, in his Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, offers a brief narrative which differs considerably from Chomsky’s. The latter sees Wilhelm von Humboldt as the culmination of Cartesian linguistics, in a tradition which asserts the creativity of language, ending there as mechanistic theories take over. Vološinov, however, considers Humboldt to be the antithesis of the Cartesians:
While the tradition of Cartesian linguistics tended to consider every language as a closed, stable system of rules, as a ready-made normative instrument inherited from preceding generations, Humboldt saw it as a natural creative activity of mankind.​[102]​

Jürgen Habermas, too, draws on Humboldt in order to draw out another contrast with Chomsky—one that is central to my argument:
Humboldt’s distinction between language as ergon and as energeia—has, of course, been taken up by more recent theories of language (langue versus parole, linguistic competence vs. linguistic performance). In the process, however, language has been deprived of an important dimension: the intersubjectivity of possible mutual understanding (Verständung). Unlike Humboldt, neither Saussure nor Chomsky conceives of dialogue (Gespräch) as the central point of language.​[103]​

Chomsky is not alone in this selective emphasis on certain strands—for example, Aarsleff in turn ignores a crucial turning point that Nicholas Hudson highlights; I will take this up below.​[104]​ Aarsleff insists on forgotten or suppressed continuities in his concern to argue against Chomsky, rescue the neglected role of Condillac, and discern a lineage from Locke through Condillac to Herder and Wilhelm von Humboldt.​[105]​ However, he tends to present too homogeneous a view of intellectual history—genuine changes and fissures become obscured; useful, if contentious, distinctions between empiricism and rationalism, Enlightenment and Romanticism disappear altogether. On the other hand Murray Cohen overstates (with his mentor, Foucault) the importance of discontinuity, fetishising it in an irrational manner.​[106]​ Taking up a dialectical approach, wherein themes persist and yet undergo transformation, the most promising line of enquiry pays attention to the intersubjective aspects of language and its various treatments in eighteenth-century theories. The creativity of language, which concerns both Chomsky and Vološinov, is a subordinate theme, though one that is intimately connected to the former one. As Raymond Williams says, ‘The major emphasis on language as activity began in the eighteenth century, in close relation to the idea of men having made their own society, which we have seen as a central element in the new concept of “culture”’.​[107]​ He adds, 
Historically this emphasis on language as constitutive, like the closely related emphasis on human development as culture, must be seen as an attempt both to preserve some idea of the generally human, in face of the analytical and empirical procedures of a powerfully developing natural science, and to assert an idea of human creativity, in face of the increased understanding of the properties of the physical world, and of consequential causal explanations of them.​[108]​





Hans Aarsleff points out the singular interest of thinkers in the eighteenth century in the origin of language in particular: 
It is common knowledge that the eighteenth century was vitally interested in the origin of language. It is safe to say that no other century has debated that question with greater zeal, frequency, consistency and depth of insight.​[109]​

This interest can be explained, in part, by the heightened sense of historicity of the period and the faith in human progress associated with it. As David Spadafora says:
Three such major issues were prominent at the time. What had been the origin and history of language? How were language, thought and society developmentally related? And in what ways and with what consequences could language be improved? As it deals with these questions, the literature of British language study indicates the existence in eighteenth-century thought of a close connection between opinions on language and the idea of progress.​[110]​ 

These questions are intimately linked by Aarsleff with the project of universal, rational grammars: ‘It is characteristic that the late eighteenth century and the early nineteenth understood the terms “universal grammar” and “grammaire générale” to include the problem of origin of language in its Condillacian formulation’.​[111]​ 
Most crucially, Nicholas Hudson, concentrating on this preoccupation with origins, has discerned a highly significant phase in the history of linguistic thought in the eighteenth century, highlighting a dialogic understanding of language. Hudson charts a shift from the methodological individualism of Hobbes and Locke, who held views on language as an essentially private process, to a social, dialogic approach—a rupture overlooked by Aarsleff.​[112]​ This is valuable in that it reveals a more finely grained particularity to the history of thought than Foucault’s incommensurable epistemes or Derrida’s even more sweeping and homogenizing characterisation of all ‘Western reason’ as logocentric.​[113]​ It may be, too, that Hudson’s differentiation highlights some shift in the development of early capitalist society—some need to emphasise sociality whilst attenuating individualism, perhaps, in the same way that Terry Eagleton sees the developments concerning aesthetics in the same period.​[114]​ One must be careful here to recognise that a science can mutate for reasons other than purely ideological ones, that it can, in fact, genuinely refine itself and advance as a field of knowledge (which is why I have stressed the need for both approaches to the history of science); it must also be noted that shifts in what may loosely be assigned to the superstructure are not always immediate reflex responses to more obviously material developments.​[115]​
In any case, theories of language in the eighteenth century did not so much shift from one pole (monologic, or individualistic) to the other (dialogic; stressing social interaction) in the way that Hudson describes, as it is more the case that these two approaches are ever-present possibilities that remain in an unresolved state of tension throughout the period (and, indeed, today—which provides one justification, I hope, for my analysis). Thus, in contemporary thought, Jürgen Habermas critiques Chomsky’s theory at its very heart for its monological assumptions and its consideration of linguistic competence in abstraction from its social, pragmatic context; Habermas’s dialogism will be central to my analysis.​[116]​ Yet perhaps we should not altogether lose Chomsky’s insights, but hold them as it were in dialogue with Vološinov and Habermas. These antinomies mirror the similar tendencies in dialogues themselves that I have noted in the introduction whereby discourse can recoil from a utopian mutuality to an atomised, antagonistic logomachy. In the meantime, I will follow Hudson’s trajectory, treating various episodes in more depth as I see fit.
Hudson opens his discussion by showing that eighteenth-century orthodoxy held that the origin of language was non-divine but that: 
While earlier philosophers like Hobbes and Locke assumed that language was invented for the private use of individuals later writers like Mandeville, Condillac and Rousseau argued that language evolved through the interaction of many people. Language is an essentially social activity that began, they claimed, with dialogue.​[117]​
 
Hudson describes the seventeenth-century individualistic precursors of these more dialogic thinkers. For Hobbes, ‘a “solitary reasoner” invented a system of “marks” (notae) to record his private observations of the world’; marks then became signs and entered into dialogue. Again, for Locke, words stood for ‘Ideas in the Mind of him that uses them’.​[118]​ But, for Hudson, Locke ‘represents a point of transition’ from Hobbes’s position to those later thinkers in that he recognises the communicative, ‘social function’ of language yet generates a ‘central paradox [where] the function of language is social, but its meaning is always private’, giving an inevitable fallibility to dialogue which must be guarded against by such means as ‘the avoidance of any figurative language’.​[119]​ 




Bernard Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees (1705-1734) had outraged readers on publication due to its acknowledgement of the less savoury appetites that drove the productive (and relatively well-ordered) economy of eighteenth-century Britain. He generalised this expansive, luxury-fuelled social model back into prehistory and derived language in a subversively materialist way out of what was widely considered to be immorality and animality.​[121]​
Significantly, Mandeville chose to expound his theory of language in dialogue form, and an examination of the way he uses the genre reflects back on his dialogic theory of language; I will therefore examine his thought in detail and the way it interacts with his chosen form. The set of six dialogues appear in the second part of The Fable of the Bees—a work which had itself evolved in a somewhat defensively dialogic manner, engaging with hostile critics and with his own texts, through Mandeville’s continued republication, annotation, and expansion of the original matter (the satirical poem, The Grumbling Hive (1705)) by which Mandeville hoped to justify himself in the face of the almost universal calumny he had received.​[122]​
All three interlocutors in Mandeville’s dialogues (Horatio, Cleomenes, and, briefly, Fulvia) are modish people: the class who are concerned above all ‘to be agreeable, and appear well-bred’ rather than ‘to seem burden’d with more religion than is fashionable to have’ (12). This sets the tone of a world of artifice, civilization, and sociality that is central to Mandeville’s approach. Horatio is of the ‘better sort of them [that is, the modish] as to Morality’ (15), though distrusting ‘the Sincerity of Clergymen’ (15-16). He is ‘vers’d in the classicks’ and more well-read than is usual among his class (16). Cleomenes is similar and, having ‘for his Amusement’ dipped ‘into Anatomy, and several parts of natural Philosophy’ (16), and studied human nature; he has encountered The Fable of the Bees and been persuaded of its arguments. However, this has caused a breach between the two friends, Horatio having uncritically accepted the common view of that work as immoral and irreligious. The dialogues dramatise Mandeville’s own situation: Cleomenes has been ostracised (that is, expelled from dialogue) by his friend Horatio for his espousal of the Fable and uses the dialogue to defend himself and his arguments and argue himself back into society.
It is in the sixth dialogue that Mandeville explores the origin of language, after discussing the evolution of different social institutions in general and—crucially—having posited a primitive ‘wild couple’ at the very beginnings of society. For Mandeville, language is not innate; rather, reason preceded speech and language gradually evolved through the exercise of that reason and through a dialogue generated to realise human ends: 
[I]t was with Thought as it is with Speech; [. . .] that, tho’ Man was born with a Capacity beyond other Animals, to attain to both, yet whilst he remain’d untaught, and never conversed with any of his Species, these Characteristicks were of little use to him. (269)

To Horatio’s question, ‘what Language did your wild Couple speak?’, Cleomenes replies ‘it is evident, that they could have had none at all’ (284). Primitive men had few desires or appetites and, as such, had no need of language and would be able to understand each other very easily as ‘Animals of the same kind, in their mutual Commerce, [are] intelligible to one another’ (285). Brutes, says Horatio, are endowed with the innate ability to make sounds that express their passions, but that, says Cleomenes, ‘is no argument to make us believe, that Nature has endowed Man with Speech’ (286), for there are many other instinctive features of animals which humans do not share. Mankind has universal signs to express his most natural needs—gestures rather than sounds: ‘To express Grief, Joy, Love, Wonder, and Fear, there are certain Tokens, that are common to the whole Species’, such as ‘Weeping, laughing, smiling, frowning, sighing, exclaiming’ (286-87). Such signs are natural, and are sufficient to creatures who are ‘confin’d within a narrow Compass’ to ‘the wild State of Nature’: true language only becomes necessary when more sophisticated wants develop.​[123]​
Language comes into being only ‘By slow degrees, as all other Arts and Sciences’ (288). The original couple, the longer they lived together, would rely less on the primary gestures and ‘for the Things they were most conversant with they would find out Sounds, to stir up in each other the Ideas of such Things, when they were out of Sight’ (288). They would teach this to their young, who would improve upon it. Each generation then gradually extends the language.
With Mandeville’s scepticism about the natural nobility of human beings (arguing principally against Shaftesbury), he repudiates Locke’s idea that language exists to communicate ideas by saying that men do not speak ‘in order that their Thoughts may be known, and their Sentiments laid open and seen through by others’ but, attributing to language a strategic function, ‘that the first Design of Speech was to persuade others, either to give Credit to what the speaking Person would have them believe, or else to act or suffer such Things, as he would compel them to act or suffer, if they were entirely in his power’ (289).​[124]​ And of course, Cleomenes in his dialogue with Horatio, and Mandeville in his with the reader, is aiming ‘to persuade others’; if he is to be believed, is he not also aiming to compel them to act? There is an ambiguity in ‘persuasion’ between deceit and argument, sophism and dialectic. Cleomenes does accept Horatio’s qualification that ‘Speech is likewise made use of to teach, advise and inform others for their Benefit’ but adds, ‘no Body would have invented Speech for those purposes’, leaving the boundaries between benevolence and self-seeking, truth and opportunism somewhat sophistically blurred.
Speech does not entirely displace gesture in this evolutionary process—infants and ‘the most forward, volatile and fiery Tempers make more use of Gestures’ (290)—as do foreigners, and here Mandeville introduces that evaluative attitude to specific languages which is common through these debates (though, surprisingly, it is not always the native tongue that is discovered to be the finest). England, says Mandeville through Cleomenes, more than anywhere, is used to a ‘Tranquility of Discourse’, particularly among ‘the beau monde, who, in all Countries, are the undoubted Refiners of Language’ (292). But the converse of the refinement of language is that ‘Scurrility is the effect of Politeness’ and that the former only emerges when ‘Language is arrived to great Perfection’ (295)—since, prior to this, animosity would have been settled by fighting.​[125]​ Thus Mandeville concerns himself with the opposition of the eirenic to the polemical that I identified in my introduction.
Here, Mandeville’s mythical history betrays its bourgeois roots. His scenario of the creation of language in prehistory actually redescribes the foundation of the public sphere in more recent eighteenth-century history, with its idealised model of the resolution of conflict over primal urges, or individual interests, through rational dialogue rather than force. Thus Habermas’s twentieth-century description of the eighteenth-century advent of such procedures parallels Mandeville’s notion of civilisation:
Once you invent these universalistic Enlightenment concepts, forms of communication, like court cases, that are meant to settle practical conflicts in terms of mutual understanding and intended agreement manifestly rely on the force of more or less good reasons as the only alternative to overt or covert violence.​[126]​

Habermas is arguing here against the Foucauldian depiction of Enlightenment discourse as irredeemably exclusionary and totalitarian, and for a utopian, truly dialogic moment within it. Yet, in Mandeville’s account, there is ambivalence over whether the persuasive politeness that has replaced naked violence is genuine discourse or strategic action.
Mandeville is ambivalent, too, about the refinements that language brings, and the typical anti-French sentiment is smuggled in: French appears to be too civilized; it is ‘charming’ and ‘engaging’—‘to one that loves his Belly, for it is very copious in the Art of Cookery, and every thing that belongs to eating and drinking’. French is over-luxurious, then, and is more fit ‘To coax and wheedle in’ (296) than English. French expressions ‘sooth or tickle’ whereas ‘nothing is more admired in English, than what pierces or strikes’. ‘The French call us Barbarous, and we say, they are Fawning’ (297)—so the distinctions between social and natural become somewhat relativised and the exaltation of civilization hitherto becomes qualified.​[127]​ At this point, of course, perhaps swayed by loyalty to England, Mandeville’s whole defence of ‘private vices’, consumption, and luxury has become unstable, for he has nowhere satisfactorily distinguished ‘healthy’ vices from undesirable ones. 




Hudson’s tracing of the original dialogue in linguistic thought moves on to Condillac and Rousseau, who may have been influenced by Mandeville’s stress on sociality; for them, however, dialogue is ‘not merely an external tool, but [. . .] a formative influence on the mind and on the origins of society’.​[128]​ The cosmopolitan interchange of ideas in the Enlightenment between Britain and the continental mainland, particularly France, should not be ignored; however, I am concentrating on texts in English, and must apologise for not giving due attention to these thinkers.​[129]​ 
Etienne Bonnot, Abbé de Condillac, in An Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge (1746), begins from a Lockeian epistemology. Combining the inspiration of William Warburton with the evidence of one of the many ‘wild children’ that feature fascinatedly in eighteenth-century anthropological speculations, Condillac argues that individuals alone could not have invented language.​[130]​ For Locke, the sole use of language was to communicate our hidden ideas to others, thus forging the bonds of society. Yet, despite his Lockean premises, Condillac by contrast argued that ‘language and social interaction were the source of our ideas’.​[131]​ In Condillac’s version of the primal dialogue, staged ‘sometime after the deluge’ to avoid religious controversy, ‘two children, one of either sex, had gotten lost in the desert before they would have known the use of any sign’ (113). Only on living together does the perception of need come to be associated with signs. Intellect develops in this social, dialogic contact in parallel with, and as a consequence of, the development of language through the repeated association of signs with perceptions.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau was a fundamentally dialogic thinker. His own Dialogues or Rousseau, Judge of Jean-Jacques (1776) dramatise the perpetual self-questioning nature of his thought, his permanent debate with himself, splitting his psyche into the interlocutors, ‘Rousseau’ and ‘the Frenchman’, who discuss and quote, ‘Jean-Jacques’.​[132]​ Rousseau’s speculations on language are to be found principally in two texts: A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (1755) and the Essay on the Origin of Languages (1754?; published posthumously, 1781).​[133]​ 
Rousseau discusses the hypothesis of an original parent-child dialogue as being the origin of language, adopting it for a while, hinting that necessity was the drive behind the creation of speech (rather than, as for Mandeville, lust); natural adults being without this social need, suggests that children are, if not the inventors of language as system (langue), at least the innovators in speech (parole) (64-65).​[134]​ Having been toyed with, this vaguely dialogic theory is then abandoned. He skips over the problem of origins and offers a developmental theory which merely sketches a process of increasing abstraction from the original ‘cry of nature’ (66). 
In the Essay, by contrast, Rousseau completely abandons any theory based on need and posits a fully-fledged dialogic theory of origin where passion becomes the driving energy of language. Also, unlike in Condillac’s theory, the development of language can precede the acquisition of intellect. Yet, despite these differences, part of the Essay is supposed to have been composed alongside the Discourse, suggesting an unresolved, perhaps creatively open-ended, dialogue in Rousseau’s own thought.
Rousseau thus inverts Mandeville’s narrative to undermine the latter’s hedonistic satisfaction with civilisation; for Mandeville, the initial dialogue initiates a sequence of progressively more sophisticated conversations, albeit spiced with vice; Rousseau sees the immediacy of the primal dialogue become buried in luxury and deceit.​[135]​ A primal potential for eirenic communicative reason and open dialogue has degenerated into the strategic action of contemporary commerce.
After Rousseau, Hudson says, the future development of linguistic thought took a different course, abandoning concerns with the dialogue and taking up (with Monboddo and Herder) Rousseau’s problematic of ‘the paradoxical interdependence of language and society’. Such speculation had come to an end:  
Herder and Monboddo totally rejected the model of a primitive dialogue in the state of nature. [Herder] argued that language must have begun in the thoughts of the individual mind; he had little to say about language as a medium for social exchange.​[136]​

Adam Smith, however, was an exception.​[137]​ His primordial dialogue imagines communication being born from need as in Condillac, not desire. But the dominant mood was that of Dugald Stewart, for whom Smith’s ‘model of an original dialogue was too “conjectural”’, though this was not as disparaging as Hudson implies.​[138]​ 
In each of Mandeville’s, Condillac’s, and Rousseau’s conjectural dialogues, assumptions about the nature of intersubjectivity are enacted that display the modes of dialogic interaction I have delineated in the introduction. Thus, Mandeville’s original dialogue is an unmediated exchange of signalled desire; later in human history, he sees the dialogue evolve into a sophisticated veneer whereby agents employ rhetorical devices to persuade each other to satisfy covert urges. This is thus strategic action and not truly dialogic. Yet the dialogic strategies in civilized society do result in ‘publick benefits’ that would not have been achieved before—dialogue impels civilization forward (dialogue as historical motor is thus related to dialectic as it appears in Hegel and Marx).​[139]​ By contrast, Condillac seems oblivious to the possibilities of distorted dialogue, whilst Rousseau is profoundly ambivalent.
These hesitations in bourgeois thought on how sociality, or civilisation, is evaluated were paralleled by debates over relativism and universalism and, indeed, in the original split away from Hobbes’s crude, and Locke’s more attenuated, atomism, to the social emphasis in these later thinkers.​[140]​ A range of values is seen from the cheerful cynicism, or tolerance, of Mandeville and the disillusionment of Rousseau (whose own individual psychology, his feelings of isolation, betrayal and even paranoia, led him in some ways to emphasise the losses rather than the gains of modernity, focussing on one pole of the contradictions).​[141]​ The primal dialogue imagined by Mandeville, Condillac, Rousseau, and Smith was one means of transcending at least some of these contradictions.




Hermes, Progenitor of language


Fig. 3. James Stuart, Frontispiece to James Harris, Hermes (2nd edn)

Let us now consider James Harris, in whom Chomsky takes a special interest, and who in many ways is the antithesis of these earlier thinkers—in his Platonism and anti-empiricism, his antimodernism and appeals to classical authorities, and, above all, his apparent lack of interest in genesis and development.​[143]​ Harris’s Hermes (1765) was, for some time, considered an authoritative work of universal grammar. Though the origin of language is only tangentially hinted at in Hermes, and no primal dialogues are invoked, the dialogic persists in other ways in Harris: in, perhaps, his universalism (which is what appeals to Chomsky), or his stress on the public and communicative use of language; origins are pushed to the background, but social ‘inventors’ are still assumed.
The hermetic image was commonplace in discussions of language.​[144]​ Hermes, or the Egyptian god, Thoth, was bringer of language, inventor of the alphabet, messenger god and—significantly—god of commerce: in eighteenth-century England, commerce and sociality were intimately linked; ‘commerce’ always has those other senses of ‘Interchange (esp. of letters, ideas, etc.)’, ‘Communication, means of free intercourse’ (and, occasionally, of ‘Intercourse of the sexes’) nearby (OED).​[145]​ Hermes was mediator between both Man and death, and Man and the gods—even between masculine and feminine; ‘Hermetic’ is appropriate for this shifting, insubstantial force of mediation that is so akin to language itself.​[146]​ Harris introduces the Egyptian ‘Inventor of Letters, and Regulator of Language,’ ‘Theuth’ (or Thoth), by way of explaining the frontispiece to Hermes (reproduced here as Fig. 3).​[147]​ A head alone is shown because no other part of the body ‘was deemed requisite to rational Communication. Words at the same time, the medium of this Communication being (as Homer well describes them) Επεα πτεροέντα, Winged Words, were represented in their Velocity by the Wings of his Bonnet’.​[148]​ 
Hermes begins by revealing an agenda that is both rationalist (in the sense of ‘Continental Rationalism’) and dialogic; his purpose ‘in making it public’—and that ‘public’ is significant—is to ‘excite his Readers to curiosity and enquiry [. . .] to induce them, if possible, to become Teachers to themselves, by an impartial use of their own understandings’ (v). This approach presupposes both certain innate intellectual faculties and an educational process that involves those faculties interacting with others in the public sphere; here, the reader is in a dialogue with the text itself, which can be supposed to stand in for a Socratic interlocutor.​[149]​
His methodology, then, is both universalist and rationalist, and yet Harris wavers: if, as I have argued, there are fundamentally contradictory aspects to eighteenth-century language theory, then it is likely that this sort of oscillation will occur. In the case of Harris, moments of empiricism can be seen to disturb the rationalism; moments of particularity assert themselves in order to complete the description of language. Crucially, too, these moments occur around the ideas of language origin and development, of the transition from and relation of language to culture, and of dialogism, which envelops all these themes as I will show below. 

Dialogic Invention in Hermes

Harris immediately affirms the social character of language in his Introduction: ‘If men by nature had been framed for Solitude, they had never felt an Impulse to converse one with another’ (1). And, again, he simultaneously asserts the involvement of language with reason and the separation of rational humanity from animals:
And if, like lower Animals, they had been by nature irrational, they could not have recognised the proper Subjects of Discourse. Since Speech then is the joint Energie of our best and noblest Faculties [. . .] our Reason and our social Affection. (1-2)

In many other places, Harris suggests that conscious and collective artifice is involved in the origin of language; he uses phrases like ‘Artists of Language’, who have supplied the two words ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ ‘for the sake of brevity’ (note f, 151-2). And again custom is invoked and the social, arbitrary nature of language stressed: ‘Yet even here Custom has consulted for Brevity, by returning for Answer only the single essential characteristic Word’ (note f, 153)
‘Every Object which presents itself to the Senses or the Intellect’, says Harris, ‘is either perceived for the first time, or else is recognized as having been perceived before’ (63). Inevitably, ‘as all Conversation passes between particulars or Individuals’ (64), there will be occasions when objects will be until then unacquainted with each other. Nouns will not serve the function of denoting in this situation. Originally, and as can be observed still in accompanying gestures, pointing would have served this function. But ‘the Authors of Language were not content with this’ (64-65). Hence, Pronouns were invented—divided into those of First, Second and Third Person—words which stand in for that deictic gesture. Interestingly here, Harris discovers the formation of language in a social situation, and one (with its ‘authors of language’) suggestive of that primal dialogue that other linguistic theorists would postulate. Rousseau and Adam Smith, among others, had placed the different parts of speech in a narrative of increasing complexity, having them evolve in response to social needs of varying sophistication. Harris shares with these thinkers the assumption that gesture preceded language proper and that the particularistic denotation of pointing evolved into a system of increased generalisation.
Harris envisages a narrative of the development and increasing sophistication of a primal language: 
The first Words of Men, like their first Ideas, had an immediate reference to sensible Objects, and that in afterdays, when they began to discern with their Intellect, they took those Words, which they found already made, and transferred them by metaphor to intellectual Conceptions (269)

A theory of origins is adumbrated here and, like other thinkers, he hypothesises a transition from the concrete to the abstract, and from the natural (or expressive, or emotive) and motivated to the intellectual and arbitrary. But it is noticeably not dramatised as a dialogic situation.




In his final chapter, Harris sketches out the other pole to his universalising grammar—the restoration of particularity, both at the generic scale of cultures or nations, and at the specific scale of individual persons; he is concerned to discover how surface differences have emerged out of that universal grammar which reflects the shared understanding of a shared universe. Thus the developmental, historical approach of other thinkers—hitherto neglected—is necessarily employed. And with the new emphasis on particularity, the sensuous and the aesthetic nature of language can also be explored.
Everything must be comprised of something ‘common, and belonging to many other things; and of something Peculiar; by which it is distinguished’ (309-12); Harris cursorily applies this principle to his own analysis of language which, for most of the book, has sought to identify universal features but, to be complete, must allow for a strategy that can derive the peculiar, inessential, and contingent; the description of performance rather than competence. In conducting this sort of investigation, ‘we shall be led to observe, how Nations, like single Men, have their peculiar Ideas; how these peculiar Ideas become the Genius of their Language’ (407). Here, then, Harris begins to restore the particularity and the temporality that had hitherto been abstracted from his account of language. It seems to follow that, having recognised this particularity and having argued earlier for the correspondence of language with thought (or with the real), ‘the wisest Nations, having the most and best Ideas, will consequently have the best and most copious Languages’ (408). 
The particularity of various languages—‘motley and compounded’—is due to their having ‘borrowed from different countries different Arts and Practices’; they ‘discover by Words, to whom they are indebted for Things’ (408). Thus here again history is admitted, together with a kind of dialogism of nations, and even political economy. He describes this process as it is seen in English: literary terms come from Greek; for music and painting, English seeks out Italian; for the culinary and the martial, French; for navigation, Dutch. This cosmopolitanism may explain why English is ‘so deficient in Regularity and Analogy’ (408). Yet, ‘what we want in Elegance, we gain in Copiousness, in which last respect few Languages will be found superior to our own’ (408-9). This, disregarding nationalistic overtones of superior value, surely has a certain truth and demonstrates a materialist awareness of the inter-relationship of history and culture that counterbalances the more prominent idealist tendencies of Harris’s arguments. Hermes is staged here as the god of the market-place, of commerce (in both of the common senses of trade and intercourse); his gift of language is born from the other activities of trade and exchange—that particular bourgeois and materialist aspect of dialogue—that he also presides over.
Turning to the eastern world, which ‘has been at all times the Seat of enormous Monarchy’ (409): ‘Their Ideas became consonant to their servile State, and their Words became consonant to their servile Ideas’ (410); there is an interaction here more dialectical than the simple dogmatic idealism whereby Idea determines World; Harris’s prior assumption of linguistic and human universals makes this move necessary in order to account for the particularity of languages in a different social structure.
Since in the Orient the relationship of Tyrant and Slave is dominant and this affair is ‘the most susceptible of pomp, and empty exaggeration’, ‘every Sentiment was heightened by incredible Hyperbole’ (410). This style sometimes ascends to ‘the Great and Magnificent’ (410)—and here Harris cites the Scriptures; this is somewhat heretical, suggesting that the poetics of the Word of God derive from slavery, so Harris hastily adds a contradictory explanation that ‘perhaps the principal cause is the intrinsic Greatness of the Subjects there treated’ (note e, 410). The Eastern style can as easily descend to ‘the Tumid and Bombast’ (411). The Asian Greeks, often subjugated by eastern tyrannies, could become ‘infected by their neighbours [. . .] hence that Luxuriance of the Asiatic Stile, unknown to the chaste elegance and purity of Athens’ (411). Here, then, the dialogic intercourse between nations or cultures can become diseased (rather than enriching, as with the dialogue of English with Other).​[150]​
Harris now attends to the Romans and to Latin: ‘A Nation engaged in wars and commotions, some foreign, some domestic, which for seven hundred years wholly engrossed their thoughts’ (411). Their language thus became ‘copious in all Terms expressive of things political, and well adapted to the purposes both of History and popular Eloquence’ (411). Yet Rome was not a nation of philosophers, and their language was ill-equipped for this subject; Cicero is compelled to create numerous neologisms in order to philosophise (which, of course, would demonstrate that languages do not rigidly determine a world view, since innovation of this sort is possible—a standard objection to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis). 
The Greek city-states, on the other hand, ‘while they maintained their Liberty, were the most heroic Confederacy, that ever existed’ (416): the Greeks were ‘the politest, the bravest, and the wisest of men’, pre-eminent as ‘Statesmen, Warriors, Orators, Historians, Physicians, Poets, Critics, Painters, Sculptors, Architects, and [. . .] Philosophers’ (417). The period of Greek history between the end of the threat of Persian domination and the rise of Alexander seems ‘a Providential Event in honour of human Nature, to shew what perfection the Species might ascend’ (417). The humanism is characteristic of Harris; so is the reverence for the classical age and the intimation that things have declined since.
This period of creativity and optimism, Harris calls the Socratic period, and a like period of peace and opportunity in Rome, the Ciceronian period. It is suggestive that Socrates and Cicero were the two masters in ancient letters of the dialogue. In both periods, once the threat of ‘destruction by Foreigners and Barbarians’ was over, ‘instead of attending to the arts of defence and self-preservation, they began to cultivate those of Elegance and Pleasure’ and by this ‘the bonds of union were insensibly dissolved’ (note g, 418). Social division then leads to the restoration of tyranny. One can detect here allusions to contemporary anxieties about the instability of the post-revolutionary settlement in Britain and fears of the tyranny of absolute monarchy. Thus it would be unsubtle, too, to ascribe the descriptions of eastern tyranny as simply ides over. - that rade and exchangetylism. itted)at inflected languages allow means that poetic effect is not subordinateunthinking Orientalism; Harris defends a certain liberalism here.
The Greek language conforms to the superiority of Greek thought (thought, for Harris, being prior to speech). From such matter, ‘Words followed of course, and those exquisite in every kind, as the Ideas for which they stood. And hence it followed, there was not a Subject to be found, which could not with propriety be expressed in Greek’ (420). And yet Harris’s anti-modernism expresses a tension here, for there are of course things that cannot be said in Greek—the very areas of expansive modernity that English had to borrow globally and copiously from other tongues in order to express, and that Harris seemed to be celebrating earlier. In Harris’s reading, there is a perfect consonance between thought and the manner of its expression in the Greek writers. Thus Aristotle is 
strict, methodic, and orderly; subtle in Thought; sparing in Ornament; with little address to the Passions or Imagination; but exhibiting the whole with such a pregnant brevity, that in every sentence we seem to read a page.  (421-22)

With Xenophon and Plato, none of that methodicalness appears; instead, ‘a train of Dialogue and truly polite Address, in which, as in a Mirrour, we behold human Life, adorned in all its colours of Sentiment and Manners’ (422). Yet these two differ between themselves, exhibiting the abundant pluralism of voices that Harris admires. Plato is ‘copious, figurative, and majestic; intermixing at times the facetious and satiric, enriching his Works with Tales and Fables, and the mystic Theology of antient times’ (422-23).
Harris’s frequent laudatory use of ‘copious’ suggests his fascination with and delight in the creativity of language, of its prolixity and its many-voicedness; he finds copiousness in Socratic dialogue and in the progeny of commercial exchange, the English language. It belies his distaste for sensuality elsewhere. Having eulogised the ‘Propriety and Universality’ (423) of the Greek tongue, he wishes that modern readers would ‘employ their liberal leisure’ (424) in reading the Greeks rather than ‘the meaner productions of the French and English Press’ or ‘that fungous growth of Novels and Pamphlets’ (424). Here, Harris reacts against the expansive dialogism of eighteenth-century Britain. But connecting the previous associations of tyranny and the degeneration of language, he talks of those who read or write ‘from views more sordid’ as to be left ‘like Slaves, to their destined drudgery’ (424). The modern tyranny is thus the commodification of thought and language; yet, alongside this, as I suggested earlier, there would also be Harris’s Whiggish concerns with the still-prevalent threat of a return of Jacobite tyranny.
Harris’s brief final, chapter, seemingly an afterthought, neatly complements his earlier chapters.​[151]​ Harris’s poetics restores particularity, history and matter, and adds to the intellectual abstraction of the grammar a celebration of the pleasure of language, of its diversity and of its fluidic development in the process of dialogue, and incorporates a poetics of freedom that coincides with the universalism of his grammar.

Dialogue in Genesis and the Genesis of Dialogue: Lord Monboddo

Rousseau, according to Lévi-Strauss, overturned the Cartesian epistemology, and indeed he did, as we have seen, question the frontiers of the social and the natural.​[152]​ Harris returned to a Cartesian simplicity; without concerning himself with origins, he accepted that speaking man is radically other than animal—his idealism and religious beliefs (though these were not particularly orthodox) facilitated this move, of course. The Scottish thinker, James Burnett (Lord Monboddo), however, turned his attention again to the origins of language; this genetic focus made these boundaries uncertain once more, despite his beginning from Harris’s position, and despite an insistence on the radical separation of man from nature.​[153]​ Monboddo developed a theory of language that is intimately entwined with his poetics (which is again genetic in approach). In his poetics, he explicitly discusses dialogue among other styles, figures, or genres (dialogue seems to slip promiscuously among these categories) and so it seems a lucky opportunity to situate the thought of an eighteenth-century analyst of language alongside his treatment of dialogue. Despite the significance and interest, and because of the sheer volume, of Monboddo’s work, I shall dwell only on some small points of continuity with the previous thinkers in order to illuminate the dialogic in his thought.

Monboddo and the Development of Language

Lord Monboddo’s own account Of the Origin and Progress of Language begins with the assumption ‘That Language is not natural to man, proved, first, from the origin and nature of the Ideas expressed by language; and, secondly, from the nature of Articulation’ (i, iii); to this, he devotes the first third of the first volume of six.​[154]​ Language is ‘the most wonderful of all human arts’—that is, it was invented—and though ‘man in his natural state, is the work of God’, man is ‘the work of man’; Monboddo repeats and enlarges upon Harris’s stress on the creativity of humanity in language. As with Harris, an idealist approach again favours energeia and autonomy. Monboddo does not believe in progress: ‘the rise of civilized men, in all nations, has been constantly declining from the earliest times’ (i, iii) and, with acknowledgments to Rousseau, shows that the purpose of this enquiry into origins is that a project of restoration can be envisaged.​[155]​
It is important ‘when we consider, that man is so much a creature of art [. . .] to separate what is artificial in him from what is purely natural’ (i, iv). Thus Monboddo’s historical anthropology needs to be founded upon natural history. And, as ‘men have been found, very nearly, if not altogether in that original state’ (i, v); as, in Africa (and here he draws, as Locke and others had done, on the wealth of travel narrative that had proliferated during this period), ‘races of wild men, without the use of speech, are still to be found’ (i, v). And a general account of the transformation of nature through culture is needed; hence Monboddo has studied ‘the alteration that culture makes upon other animals, and likewise upon vegetables’ (i, v). It is perhaps this transformative, historical strategy that Monboddo brings to the problem of the interrelation of culture and nature that is dramatically new in his work.
Monboddo uses an extract from Condillac’s Treatise and refers back to the problem articulated by Rousseau concerning the precedence of language over society, noting the latter’s reference to the earlier work. Following these thinkers, he too supposes that language was invented and that ‘before men used language, they conversed together by signs and inarticulate cries: That from these last, language was formed: And that the first languages had a great deal of prosody, or musical tones’ (i, x). There is a sense of something having been lost in this disappearance of musicality through civilisation, like that registered by Rousseau and others; yet Monboddo will later assert the superiority of the abstractions introduced by ‘higher’ languages. 
The formation of ideas is voluntary and not instinctive (i, 168). Monboddo is acutely concerned to separate human creative activity from the mechanistic behaviour of animals. We have faculties by nature that provide a basis for our ability to form ideas—such as sense and memory, and the physical organs that facilitate speech—but language and consciousness must still be an acquired, not an innate, ability (i, 172-73), and the history of this acquisition by the species will show signs of development from crude to sophisticated. Thus ideas, which are the form of language, are acquired; Monboddo wants to show, too, that sounds—the matter—are likewise, as in the infant, so the species, acquired ‘slowly, and with a great deal of labour and difficulty’ (i, 185). The solitary savages that feature much in eighteenth-century ventures into what would now be anthropology, psychology, and linguistics are, being speechless, harnessed to his argument (i, 186-87). Further, ‘a whole nation [. . .] have been found without the use of speech’ (i, 187)—the Orang Outangs, who Monboddo thought were human as they—allegedly—walk erect, ‘live in society’, ‘make huts of branches of trees, and they carry off negroe girls, of whom they make slaves, and use them both for work and pleasure’ (i, 188) (the last, a sad indictment of humanity and a typical projection of eighteenth-century practices onto a universal human essence). But these ‘humans’, though having ‘organs of pronunciation as we have’ (i, 189), are again speechless.
Monboddo discusses the nature of man by way of the opposed taxonomical systems of Buffon and Linnaeus; Buffon denies that life can be divided into ‘genuses and classes, and insists much upon nature having only formed individuals’ (i, 315). But, though Monboddo disagrees with some of Linnaeus’ classification, he cannot accept Buffon’s extreme nominalist particularism: ‘there can be no science of individuals, and we have no knowledge of any thing but by the genus or species to which it belongs’ (i, 315-16). The conflict is that between rigid definitions and an unstable concept of human essence—partially because of the historical evolutionary condition of the latter. Monboddo justifies his method by appealing to Aristotle once more and this method of ranking species under genuses may be seen, he says, in Plato’s dialogues ‘and likewise in Mr Harris’s dialogue upon Art, which is the best specimen of the antient dividing, or diaeretic manner, as they called it, that is to be found in any modern book’ (i, 320).​[156]​ The dialogic is thus inscribed into the very method of his anthropology.
Following these a priori arguments for the artificiality of language, he suggests an a posteriori case. Natural signs of communication—‘looks, gestures, and inarticulate cries’—are understood by all animals of the same species (i, 202). Yet of language proper there is no universal language among men. Monboddo finds it absurd that the multitude of languages actually in existence should all be natural.​[157]​ Lastly, he suggests—dubiously—that since language is not necessary for human survival, nature could not have bestowed it upon us (i, 206).
So far, in Monboddo’s genetic account, ‘we have only made of man a rational animal; it remains still to make him a speaking animal. For this purpose I hold society to be absolutely necessary’ (i, 215) and thus, in the second part of Volume i, the enquiry leads to the origin of society (and Monboddo again acknowledges Rousseau’s emphasis on their interdependence). He asks whether man is naturally social or solitary, and affirms his complexity in a typically eighteenth-century, proto-dialectical use of parallelisms: ‘He is rational and irrational; he has intellect, and he has not intellect; he is a land-animal, and he is a water-animal; and, among other varieties, he is social, and he is not social’ (i, 220-21). The central, and perhaps insoluble, antinomies of origins theories are here neatly encapsulated.
For Monboddo, Man can live in society, but is not obliged to and it is not particularly determined by his nature to do so. However, this is not to concede to Hobbes ‘that man is naturally the enemy of man’ (i, 222): Hobbes, despite his acuity, 
did not know what man was by nature, divested of all the habits and opinions that he acquires in civil life, but supposed that, previous to the institutions of society, he had all the desires and possessions that he now has. (i, 222-23)

Alongside the almost-compulsory need to refute Hobbes—who, in eighteenth-century writers appears as a secret self-knowledge of early modern rapacity—Monboddo here is demonstrating a tentative, rare historical awareness and avoiding the ahistorical attribution of contemporary traits to human essence; simultaneously, of course, he is espousing a romanticised primitivism that was all too common. But humans, for Monboddo, are political by acquired habit, and this derives from our rationality, not nature; we have herded only when we shared some ‘common work’ (i, 231), and language only became possible after this. However, this premise, shared by Rousseau, of the self-sufficient original man to whom sociality is not essential is as time-bound as Hobbes’s vision, and reflects the autonomous individual subject created by, and required for, capitalist society.​[158]​
From this position, Monboddo charts the progress of political institutions, showing the increase of civilisation as apparently the increase in the powers and scope of the state and other authorities, culminating in the education of youth and regulation of citizens, ‘neither of these being left to the will and pleasure of each individual; but both directed by public wisdom’ (i, 364) as in Sparta or as devised by Plato; Monboddo, it seems, was not democratically inclined. 
The variety of human institutions is enough to show their invented character (he has used a similar argument about language): ‘for nature is permanent and unchangeable [. . .] And, accordingly, the wild animals [. . .] still preserve the same oeconomy and manner of life with no variation’ (i, 367). Monboddo celebrates human creativity and the flux of language but, simultaneously, is suspicious of modernity and democracy, and fearing degeneration—all trends which, it could be said, stem in part from this very fluidity and dialogic creativity.
Following Lucretius, he claims that ‘language was invented by men, after they had associated together’—out of ‘fear of wild beasts’—‘and made some progress in civility’ (i, 367).​[159]​ Monboddo argues that the ‘necessities of human life’ gave rise to ideas which ‘did also make them [that is, human beings] social and political’ (i, 382); having satisfied their basic wants, 
the want of occupation, of pleasure, and amusement [. . .] gave birth to the pleasurable arts; and, when the mind came to be cultivated, there arose a curiosity, and desire of knowledge, which produced the sciences. (i, 383)

But the necessity for self-defence also contributed to the formation of society, arising out of the natural weakness of the human body. And once this process has begun it is limitless: ‘With the alliance of language, society, arts and sciences, it is hardly possible to set bounds to the progress’ (i, 385) of that animal. The unique human anatomy, with its consequent tool-making ability, also plays a part, for man ‘has from nature an instrument of art, which may be called the instrument of instruments, as by it he both makes and uses other instruments; I mean the human hand’ (i, 385).
Monboddo now engages with Rousseau’s problem that there can be no society without language (and vice versa): ‘Nothing else is necessary than that there should be among such animals some method of communication’ (i, 416). If there are methods other than articulate sounds ‘there is nothing to hinder a society to be constituted without the use of speech’ (i, 416)—and he invokes the ‘inarticulate cries’ that convey ‘sentiments and passions’, the ‘imitative cries’ and ‘the action of the face; and the gestures of the body’ (i, 416) that other thinkers too envisaged as proto-speech and that informed their uneasy attitude to interjections.
Monboddo argues that marriage is as unnatural as language (anticipating Lévi-Strauss somewhat), but a curious argument emerges that, far from primitive man being in a constant state of lewdness, it is the growth of civilisation itself which proves dangerously libidinous:
As society advanced, when the passions of men became stronger and more ungovernable, and after other things were appropriated, it became necessary to make a property also of women.​[160]​ (i, 451-52; my emphasis)

So, here, private property, sexuality, the growth of leisure and the arts, curiosity and the senses, and, implicitly, language, are all complicit in the paradoxical upsurge of the disturbing forces of unreason and animality. Dialogue is seen as working against itself, undermining the reciprocity presupposed by language.
There were four means of communication before speech emerged: ‘Inarticulate cries, expressive of sentiments and passions’, ‘Gestures, and the expression of the countenance’, ‘Imitative sounds, by which audible things may be expressed’, and ‘Painting, by which visible objects may be represented’ (i, 461). The last two are unique to humans; the others may be shared with beasts. Monboddo wants to understand the—not facile—transition from these means to articulate, conventional speech, for these four are all ‘natural signs of what they express’ (i, 461-62). Only two of these—inarticulate cries and imitative sounds—‘which are both modifications of the human voice’ (i, 468) are suitable candidates for precursors of language. Monboddo thus concludes that language must be derived from ‘natural inarticulate cries’ (i, 474), ‘varied by tones, before they were distinguished by articulation’ (i, 477)—the admixture of music thus having played a crucial role in language’s genesis. From this, language develops its matter through articulation by the introduction of consonants, and its form by increasing abstraction and generalisation, and by the regularisation of syntax. ‘Primitive’ languages, such as that of the Huron, are, according to Monboddo, devoid of these features.
Monboddo claims that language is a product of art, and moves from there to the suggestion that men of art are needed to reinvent language in order to preserve it against degeneration:
Such is the fate of all human arts: for not being natural to man, but a kind of forced production of the soil, they must be preserved with the same care that is required to rear them; and if that is but a little remitted, down the stream we go to our natural state of ignorance and barbarity. (ii, 494)





From Volume iii, Monboddo extends this survey of the material part of language, developing his poetics. He begins by exploring style which, for him, is the combination of words in such a way as to be ‘different from ordinary discourse’ (iii, 10): 
The subject of this volume is Style, the next step in the progress of language after the grammatical part is completed [. . .] it is by style only that language is made fit to answer the great purposes of life. (iii, xvii)

Monboddo’s analysis recapitulates the actual progress of language as he has extrapolated it; thus style itself was only invented after grammar. This is a more sophisticated development of the idea that language moved from the poetic, or the natural, or the expressive, to its present state. The ancients, however, are seen as having achieved the heights of style as well as of philosophical thought; it is, then, not a continuous progression; decadence is as much a possibility as growth.
Style has a ‘certain character’ which allows us to differentiate typical styles, which can be identified as six kinds: the epistolary; the dialogue; the narrative or historical; the didactic; the rhetorical; the poetic. He considers dialogue: that style which emerges from ‘the first and most necessary use of language, conversation’ (iii, 349), which was once ‘rude and artless; but, in process of time, it was formed into a style’ (iii, 350). (‘Artless’ betrays a still-latent hesitancy about the naturalness of dialogue, but its primacy is definitely asserted here). Dialogue—as a style—should ‘appear altogether premeditated’ and have ‘no studied ornaments’ (iii, 351) (though ‘appear’ introduces its own ambiguities over artifice and immediacy). And the ornament of wit is allowed, which is ‘a more proper ornament of conversation than of more grave and serious compositions’—but not too much even of this, or it ‘ceases to be simple and natural’ (iii, 351). Therefore, dialogue should be worked at to seem natural, even if its status as the most fundamental of styles is still one of art, and still, in its turn, only succeeding the prior art of grammar. Thus, the dialogue, ‘being no other than a written conversation, must of necessity imitate the stile of real conversation’ (iv, 293-94). The ‘chief ornament of conversation’ is ‘the ethic, or the expression of characters and manners’ and ‘here comes in humour’ which adds to the pleasure of conversation (iii, 352). All this applies equally to conversation on the ‘ordinary circumstances of life, or matters of art and science’—but what must be excluded from dialogue on serious subjects is that ‘agreeable’ species of wit of ‘ambiguity or playing upon words’ (iii, 353). Nor should humour be too prominent (humour having been previously defined in Aristotelian fashion as ‘the imitation of characters ridiculous’ (iii, 345)).​[161]​
Dialogue (and dialogue as practiced in social institutions) is at the heart of invention; the origins of the arts and sciences lie in dialogic exchange, just as for Condillac et al, the invention of that first art (language being an art for Monboddo) took place in a dialogue:
Dialogue writing is nothing else but conversation in writing, not conversation however upon the ordinary affairs of life, but upon matters of art or science. It was by conversation among men of leisure, collected together in colleges, such as the priests of Egypt were, that I believe, arts and sciences were invented: And I am sure, that, at this day, they are best taught in that way, for the scholar both learns and remembers best, when, in the way of question and answer, he is made to teach himself. (iv, 308-09)

The pedagogical virtues of dialogue were often emphasised at this time. Monboddo complicates this, however, with a footnote: ‘There is a fine example of this in the Meno of Plato, where an illiterate slave is by Socrates made to teach himself a curious problem in geometry’ (iv, 309). The point here is that, for Plato, famously, the geometrical ideas are recollected rather than acquired: logic (and, by implication, language) is innate, and therefore natural, not invented, which is precisely what Monboddo is trying to disprove. 
Monboddo continues: ‘But dialogue writing must not be a mere catechism of art and science. There must be characters and manners in it, and something of a fable or story. It is therefore a kind of poetry’ (iv, 309). The best dialogues are thus fictions, significantly contrasted to monologic catechisms. Plato, the most famous of dialogists, writes ‘very compleat dramatical pieces’ (iv, 311) such as the Gorgias and Protagoras, but in some, the dialogues become improbable conversations that ‘deliver whole systems of polity and government’ and the characterisation is lost: ‘even the irony of Socrates is laid aside, and [. . .] instead of pretending to know nothing, he becomes a dogmatical teacher’ (iv, 311). (He is thinking mainly of the Republic and the Laws). Monboddo here identifies features that are often seen as essential virtues of the truly dialogic: the absence of dogmatism, the sceptical, inquiring attitude; and, following Kames, the verisimilitude of character and action. Thus, like other eighteenth-century commentators on dialogue, he favours that openness I have delineated in the introduction.
Monboddo then pays similarly detailed critical attention to Cicero’s dialogues, analysing their formal effects and debating their content in the same terms. He considers Shaftesbury’s The Moralists, which he admires greatly: ‘for it has a fable, characters, manners and scenery too, and in short, every thing belonging to a dramatic poem’ (iv, 344). James Harris—whose universal grammar was so influential upon Monboddo’s linguistics—had written two dialogues on Art and Happiness which he also admires, but with reservations:
But neither of them is a dialogue, according to my definition of that kind of writing; for they have no story or fable worth mentioning, nor characters or manners. They want too entirely those incidents and turns, with which a dialogue ought to be varied. They are, therefore, truly no more than an analogue by way of question and answer [and] therefore no more dialogues than an analysis of a geometrical proposition, carried on in the same way. (iv, 388)

(But may not geometrical proof in its way be called a type or even underlying model of the dialogic—as, in fact, in the Meno?). He goes on to say that dialogue ‘is the finest of all writing in prose: And it has the greatest beauty of poetry, namely a fable and manners’ (iv, 390). Note how these critical terms—fable, story, manners, characters—appear and reappear; these are terms that we would now associate with the novel or drama (or film and television) rather than the literature of ideas.
The centrality of dialogue in these discussions may be seen in that, although dialogue is one—the second—of his six types of style, when he turns to the third style—the narrative or history—dialogue irrupts into it: ‘One figure of composition which Homer has used very much [. . .] makes his history [. . .] as beautiful and pleasant to read as any poem. The figure I mean is dialogue’ (iv, 437). The histories of Herodotus, too, he says, are vitalised by dialogue (iv, 438-40). Monboddo’s first style—the epistolary—is equally subject to being invaded by dialogue.
We see that the fourth style—the didactic—is also subject to this process: ‘The didactic stile, as it is the most necessary of all stiles, being that by which all arts and sciences are learned’ (v, 295). And yet, the ignorance and vanity of most people is a barrier to their learning; however, ‘by way of Socratic dialogue’, a man may be ‘made to convict himself of ignorance and vanity’ (v, 298). So the dialogic insinuates itself into this style too. However (and this contradicts Monboddo’s attitude elsewhere), though ‘the most effectual of all methods of conviction’, it is ‘the most unpleasant’ (v, 298) and it is this, Monboddo thinks, that led to Socrates’ execution.​[162]​ Epictetus, too, was beaten by the Romans for his employment of the device, but not executed since, Monboddo explains, the Romans were not governed democratically. 
Now he must treat of the rhetorical and poetical styles, ‘in which the beauty of stile is most conspicuous, and produces the greatest effect’ (vi, ii). Rhetoric is 
the most ancient art of the two, and of the greatest utility. It is coeval with civil society and government; for in the first ages of society, government was carried out by public speaking, as governments by single men, by arbitrary will, were not then known. (vi, iii-iv; my emphasis)

Thus the dialogic appears within this style too and is implicated directly in a particular concrete social formation, one where absolute rule is tempered by dialogic ‘persuasion’:
for though, in the first ages of society, there were men of superior qualities, and who therefore were destined by God and nature to govern their fellow creatures, it was by council and persuasion that they governed. (vi, iii)





What then has happened to the primal dialogue as employed by Condillac and Rousseau, who were important influences on Monboddo’s thought? Has it really been discarded as Hudson asserts?​[163]​ In the introduction to Book 2 of Volume i, Monboddo confronts more openly the assumption of a divine origin for language—seemingly the only option given the difficulties in inventing the art of language. Earlier, inoculating himself against accusations of heterodoxy, Monboddo supposed that mankind originally had language naturally (that is, in an eighteenth-century context, bestowed by God) but that ‘we may suppose that he lost upon his fall; and as the curse then pronounced upon him was, that he should acquire every thing by his own labour’ (i, viii). Hence language had to be re-invented and a historical, causal account can be uncontroversially developed to describe this.
He stresses the ‘self-moving power’ which humans exert ‘which is denied to the brutes’ (i, 76). Similarly—analogously—he wants to re-assert the distinction between mind and body, ‘two things as opposite to one another, as any two things can be’ which, he feels, Locke has ‘confounded’ to the point of ‘materialism’ (and almost impiety) (i, 93). Earlier, he has made the pairings and distinctions animal-matter/human-mind clearer: ‘the essential difference between them and us consists in this, that the brute still continues as much immersed in matter as we are in the first stage of life’ (i, 74-75). The developmental methodology appears again here, and there is a hint of impiety and materialism by Monboddo himself in this evolutionary heresy that suggests that the immortal soul was not breathed into man at conception but is acquired—even created—through his own demiurge-like will.
Again, he reconciles his speculative history with Biblical authority: 
there is certainly no heresy in maintaining, that man, has, by his fall, lost this faculty [intellect], as well as many others, so far at least as to retain only the capacity of acquiring it [. . .] it seems to be our chief praise, that, by our own sagacity and industry, we have been able to improve so much the scanty stock that nature, in this our degenerate state, has bestowed on us, and to proceed, at least so far towards regaining our former more perfect state. (i, 136-37)

There are two oddities here. Firstly, it appears that, originally, intellect was a natural faculty rather than an acquired one. Through free will and the Fall, man has abandoned it—how then can it reappear as a product of labour?​[164]​ Secondly, even now, some ‘scanty stock’ of intellect is still natural. Monboddo’s thesis begins to totter a bit around this apologetic. He also indicates that animality can be cultivated towards higher levels in another area: ‘the brutes remain in the state which nature has placed them, except in so far as their natural instinct is improved by the culture we bestow upon them’ (i, 137). However, Monboddo moves towards what might be a sort of accommodation to innatism, acknowledging that ‘we have from nature a greater faculty in forming habits and acquiring faculties that are not born with us’ (i, 138).
Despite continually declaring his orthodoxy, Monboddo’s system continually threatens to subvert mainstream Christian thought. However, the evolutionary schema suggested by Monboddo (which parallels the historicism of other Scottish thinkers) can simultaneously be radical and reactionary. The universalism of Harris is undermined: in Harris there is no suggestion that some languages (and therefore peoples) are less advanced than others (though there are suggestions that some languages are richer, or more elegant). But for Monboddo, ‘man himself was originally a wild savage animal, till he was tamed, and, as I may say, humanized, by civility and arts’ (i, 144), and looking at the history of mankind, ‘there have been in the world, and still are, herds of men [. . .] more wild than [. . .] certain brutes, as they have neither government nor arts’ (i, 145). Even some of those who have ‘advanced so far as civil society and language’ may ‘have general notions, without which there could be no language’ but ‘can hardly be said to have abstracted ideas, as shall be shewn when we speak of the barbarous languages’ (i, 145).
Monboddo circumspectly avoids saying for certain that the Biblical accounts of the origins of man are allegorical, but suggests that they might be. Or, if literally true, then after the Fall, or after other calamities, the divine gift of speech might have been lost and laboriously re-invented by men themselves. A note says:
It is from the conversations, recorded in the beginning of Genesis, and from these only, that we can infer that language was revealed to the first pair. Now, those who are conversant in the oriental writings, and even in the most ancient Greek authors, know well that the dialogue introduced into these writings, is only a way of telling a story—and a most pleasant way it is, as, besides the facts, it gives us characters, and manners, and joins to the truth of history the pleasure of poetic imitation. (i, 212)






Coda: Horne Tooke and the Abbreviation of Hermes

I turn now, briefly, to John Horne Tooke at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Horne Tooke’s Diversions of Purley (1786–1805) is a deliberately polemical response to James Harris, Monboddo, and other universal grammarians, whom he holds in contempt.​[165]​ Despite certain inevitable continuities, the discussion of language seems now to be vastly different. In a climate of Romanticism and reaction against Enlightenment, Diversions of Purley is all particularity and locality; the project of a Universal Grammar has been abandoned. Yet this is a simplification, as often; Horne Tooke’s empiricism and materialism, his return to Locke and rejection of Harris’s and Monboddo’s mixture of Platonism and Aristotelianism, and his political radicalism are, of course, entirely within the Enlightenment tradition. But the study of language had dramatically changed, and this has seemed a positive move to some radically minded thinkers who discover a subversive force in Horne Tooke’s linguistics, fiercely opposed to the putative conservatism of his predecessors.​[166]​ There was no doubt about Tooke’s own political radicalism—his own grammar grew out of the ideological misuse of language in the courtroom by his conservative enemies.​[167]​ But I want to question the dialogicity of Tooke’s theories of language. Tooke himself, as much as any of the thinkers I discuss, was immersed in the dialogic activity of his age; his biographer situates him precisely in those all-important networks of exchange and influence:
More revolutionary elements were also in the habit of visiting Horne Tooke. The new London Corresponding Society leaders, John Gale Jones, Francis Place, and John Binns, were acquainted with the veteran reformer, and several United Irishmen became regular guests at Wimbledon. The weekly dinners at Horne Tooke's house were a haven for plebeian radicals, as well as popular writers such as Anna Barbauld and John Wolcot and liberal-minded literati including William Godwin, Jeremy Bentham, Joel Barlow, and Samuel Taylor Coleridge.​[168]​

‘Diversions’ itself suggests pleasures, including the social pleasures of ‘weekly dinners’ with fellow radicals, but also pleasures that turn one’s attention away from more sober tasks; it also suggests the turning away from the proper route (Hermes was a guide, but also a deceiver). And the setting of Purley is described as offering the conventional pastoral and social pleasures that are often found in the scene-setting of philosophical dialogues:
H. [Horne Tooke]—[. . .] Can you find nothing in the beautiful prospect from these windows? nothing in the entertainment every one receives in this house? nothing in the delightful rides and walks we have taken round it? nothing in the cheerful disposition and easy kindness of its owner, to make a rational man partial to this habitation? (2)

Hence, dialogue about language, and language itself, may lead one astray with its pleasurable distractions. But it has its part to play in polemical struggle too—a diversion is also a tactic to mislead an opponent. There is a hint that this is a retreat from the more urgent world of politics: those entrenched there seem to find Tooke’s vehement politics something of an intrusion and a breech of polite conversation:
T. [William Tooke]—. Sir, you are making him transgress our only standing rules. Politics and compliments are strangers here. We always put them off when we put on our boots; and leave them behind us in their proper atmosphere, the smoke of London. (2)

In Diversions, rhetoric, once more, is under trial; the hermetic slipperiness and confusion that the process of abbreviation brings has made language flexible but has corrupted a pristine original that can only be discovered by etymology
Hermes, you know, put out the eyes of Argus: and I suspect that he has likewise blinded philosophy: and if I had not imagined so, I should never have cast away and thought upon this subject. If therefore Philosophy herself has been misled by language, how shall she teach us to detect his tricks? (8)

The very thing which is being examined—language—becomes elusive, duplicitous, and invisible; problematised further, of course, by the fact that the medium of investigation must of necessity be language too. Despite the particularist, empirical approach, which might perhaps suggest an emphasis on the pleasures of language, Tooke’s utilitarianism predominates—though the utility is that of radical politics as he establishes right from the start.
Part II of the Diversions (produced a few years later in 1805), launches into an apostrophe from F (Sir Frances Burdett) to H (Horne Tooke): ‘But your Dialogue, and your Politics, and your bitter Notes—‘ (301). This gives Horne Tooke an opportunity to reclaim the aesthetic dimension, and to reunite it with the functionalism of political writing; for his notes, the melody of his dialogue, are not bitter. To F’s objections that ‘bawling out the Rights of Man, they say, is not singing’, H replies, ‘To the ears of man, what music sweeter than the Rights of man?’ (301). F warns that the antidialogic State will be provoked by such music: 
Yes. Such music as the whistling of the wind before a tempest. You very well know what these gentlemen think of it. You cannot have forgotten
	“Sir, Whenever I hear of the word rights, I have learned to consider it as preparatory to some desolating doctrine. It seems to me, to be productive of some wide-spreading ruin, of some wasting desolation.”—Canning’s Speech. (301)

This precipitates Tooke’s etymological analysis of the word, ‘right’, whereby he reclaims the notion for radical politics.
Olivia Smith makes the case that, in contrast to the grammar of Harris, ‘Tooke’s discussion of language concentrates attention on human life and public exchanges’.​[169]​ She also argues that
The use of the dialogue form, which is often cumbersome, appropriately draws attention to language as a means of communication. [. . .] the language of the Diversions always exists as an interaction between two speakers. Tooke’s method of study and the dialogue form are aligned with his ultimate intention, to direct attention towards public nature of language and its possible abuse.​[170]​

This is true with regard to Tooke’s intentions, as his retrieval of democratic discourse as music, not bawling, indicates. But Tooke’s dialogue is not just ‘cumbersome’; it is heavily monologic; Tooke’s interlocutors, apart from a few opening flourishes, are forced to submit to pages and pages of Tooke single-voicedly etymologising. I am not persuaded that Tooke’s theory is more dialogical than those of his antagonists either; there is the single, and important fact, of Diversions always being situated against State power, and thus concerned with the pragmatics of actual intercourse, but Smith does not really illustrate her thesis with examples. The dogged appeal to linguistic roots works against any sense of the diachronic effects of dialogue and the emphasis on localism as opposed to the universalism of Harris is, in one sense, monological. 

Towards the end of the eighteenth century it seems that the urbanity of what might be called classical Enlightenment dialogue is stripped away and a more nakedly polemical antagonism between poles of thought fuelled by class interest declares itself. It is not played out between the protagonists of Diversions but motivates that text’s very existence; other contemporaneous dialogues would act out the conflict between master and man. Thus, out of the struggle over the meaning of words and over the very theory of the meaning of words in which Horne Tooke participated, and in which he cast the likes of Harris and Monboddo as antagonists (although as I have shown, these were not quite the reactionaries they have been portrayed as), these struggles became dramatised in a revitalisation of the dialogue. The class-political polemic emerges (in contrast to earlier polemics, which had been largely religious in character or concerned with rivalry between factions of the ruling class), where working-class activists such as Thomas Spence vented their opposition to the prevailing system (provoking conciliatory dialogues in return from the likes of Hannah More, and bitter satire from others). Here, the confrontational mode of dialogue comes to the fore; there can be equanimous, mutual debate only among equals, or fellow radicals; reconciliation with the dialogic other is not a possibility in a divided society. This will be dealt with in Chapter Three.
In summarising these histories of theories of language and fleshing them out with my own interpretations of some aspects of these theories and then placing them on the thread of dialogue, I have, of course, constructed my own somewhat contradictory history. In stopping at Horne Tooke, it would be tempting to simplify and declare that an epistemological break had happened here. But discussions of language did continue and, by the very nature of their subject matter, they too were dialogical, but the dialogic was voiced in them in a different manner.





Chapter Two: Consuming Strange Fruit: Symposia of Knowledge and Pleasure

The feast now done, discourses are renewed,





Feasting and debate, both essential components of sociability which exemplify the eirenic side of human intercourse, have often been linked: there are, for example, the classic symposia of Plato and Xenophon and other sympotic literature throughout antiquity (the third-century Deipnosophistae of Athenaeus, for example). But in Genesis, the exchange of the strange and novel fruit of the Tree of Knowledge leads to the Fall and, ultimately, via Babel, to the distortion of that immediate and universal communication as envisaged in Enlightenment thought. In the eighteenth century, the lively and convivial exchange of food and thought can suggest a restoration of Eden; at such symposia, material prosperity, belief in human and scientific progress, and commitment to sociability might be the basis for a rebirth of society. Many eighteenth-century dialogues aspire to enacting these values, approximating to Habermas’s ideal of communicative action, where ‘the actions of the agents involved are co-ordinated not through egocentric calculation of success but through acts of reaching understanding’.​[172]​
This chapter focuses on the harmonious and hedonistic aspects of eighteenth-century dialogues, drawing on ideas already discussed in my examination of contemporaneous theorising on language. Many dialogues of this period discussed pleasure itself, usually in its refined and sublimated form of aesthetic beauty, continuing the poetics found, sometimes marginally, in the theories of language.​[173]​ Eighteenth-century Britain was, in many ways, unprecedentedly hedonistic.​[174]​ The material basis for this hedonism—the rapid growth in the production and distribution of all kinds of luxury commodities at a price affordable to many of the lower classes—is explored by John Brewer in The Pleasures of the Imagination; as the title suggests, among these commodities are the creative arts.​[175]​
The pleasures of dialogue may lie in the eirenic conduct of the participants themselves, the dialogue exemplifying that ideal speech situation of enlightened free equals engaged in reasoned, amicable discussion. This also involves the pleasures of reading the printed representation of such situations—the pleasures of language and of narrative discovery. There are thus pleasures in the sociability of the act of dialogue, simple pleasures that accompany the act—conventions of wining and dining one’s guests, for example—and pleasures involved with the representation of that dialogue; these latter, I suggest, are part of the pleasure of novel reading. 
There are the pleasures, too, of ratiocination itself, enjoyed by the participants in a philosophical dialogue or by the readers who are following the tos and fros of argument. It was a commonplace in eighteenth-century educational thought to associate intellectual improvement and enquiry with pleasure (ultimately, in aesthetic theory, from Horace and his principle of utile et dulce); it was, too, often the justification for novel writing. The Edgeworths both employed the dialogue as an educational genre and explored the actual dialogue of children in the process of learning. The preface to their major treatise on education declares: ‘The form of dialogue has been adopted, as best suited to convey instruction blended with amusement.’​[176]​ Pleasure in dialogue is involved with the desire for knowledge, and this curiosity is bound up with the delight in narrative. Greg Myers illustrates this, in a playful essay which itself employs the dialogue form, with examples from Galileo’s Two World Systems and Two New Sciences, and from Boyle’s The Sceptical Chymist:
These scientific dialogues [. . .] begin, not with, say, the setting out on a journey, or the death of a father, but with curiosity, a character’s sense of a lack, a desire to know. That is, they are about the arousal and delay of the pleasure of knowing.​[177]​

Thus narrative pleasures that are found in the novel may emerge out of the very form of dialogue. 
A significant aspect of the new ‘pleasures of the imagination’ was the unprecedentedly widespread sharing of ideas and knowledge. This not only occurred in the various arenas of the public sphere such as the coffee-houses, but also in more durable form via the rapid growth of the text as commodity, where the printed representation of dialogue—the literary genre of ‘the dialogue’—offered its own pleasures. Obviously, pleasure in dialogue is hardly new, but the eighteenth century was a significant moment: the rise of the consumer society conjoined with certain kinds of dialogic interaction and the growth of print and literacy, and this gave a new shading to such pleasure. I want to show how these various pleasures in dialogue become embedded in a particular commodity—the dialogue as published text itself—and begin to relate this to that most original and enjoyable of eighteenth-century commodities, the novel. I suggest that these pleasurably eirenic dialogues, particularly in their sympathetic characterisation and narrative appeal, have novelistic characteristics. 
In Chapter One I sketched Mandeville’s passion-driven history of human society from its original primal dialogue. I want to follow this trope of cultivation through progress that has arisen out of dialogue and conviviality, impelled by bodily desire, and see its persistence in other dialogues—though countertendencies might censor or struggle with the hedonism to various degrees. Hedonism itself can be more or less sublimated and immaterial, varying between the two poles of Epicurean and Cyrenaic hedonism identified by Marcuse, and eighteenth-century dialogues explore and participate in many shades of pleasure.​[178]​ 
The dialogues I examine below feature the openness and authentic dialogicity identified in my Introduction, though with modulations that I will highlight. Not all is light in these dialogues; I particularly want to draw attention to who is invited to or excluded from dialogue, especially women, bearing in mind the arguments about the limitations of the public sphere. Women’s public life, entwined with the pleasures and allure of romance, becomes important material for the novel and at least some of these dialogues.

I want to return first to Mandeville’s dialogues on social origins and look there at how dialogue, pleasure, and sociability interact. In Mandeville’s fourth dialogue, after Cleomenes has dispelled the animosity and prejudice of Horatio, and awakened an appetite for open-minded debate, Horatio is in conciliatory mood and invites his friend to share a day of social discourse, sweetened by a sampling of the then-exotic pineapple:
Hor. [. . .] I have a mind to run over that Essay again; it is a great while since I read it, and after that I shall be glad to resume the Discourse; the sooner the better. I know you are a lover of fine Fruit, if you’ll dine with me to-morrow, I’ll give you an Ananas.
Cleo. I love your Company so well, that I can refuse no Opportunity of enjoying it.​[179]​

On the morrow, the succeeding dialogue opens with the mutual celebration of this fruit and its cultivation:
Cleomenes. It excels every thing; it is extremely rich without being luscious, and I know nothing, to which I can compare the Taste of it: to me it seems to be a Collection of different fine Flavours, that puts me in mind of several delicious Fruits, which yet are all outdone by it.
Hor. I am glad it pleas’d you.
Cleo. The Scent of it likewise is wonderfully reviving. As you was paring it, a Fragrancy I thought perfum’d the Room that was perfectly Cordial. [. . .] This was the third I ever tasted, of our own Growth: the Production of them in these Northern Climates, is no small Instance of human Industry, and our Improvements in Gard’ning. It is very elegant to enjoy the wholsome Air of temperate Regions, and at the same time be able to raise Fruit to its highest Maturity, that naturally requires the Sun of the Torrid Zone. (v, 194-95).

Mandeville’s exotic pineapple, with its synaesthetic seduction of several senses and its many-voiced ‘Collection of different fine Flavours’ seems a miniature of the many new pleasures that have arisen in the dynamic, consumerist eighteenth-century Britain that drive the prosperity and stability of that society.​[180]​ The fruit itself is only available because of the expansion of empire and the diversity and cultural contact involved in that (and the darker side of that which led to some strange fruit indeed, and to the effacement of the actual producers of these luxury goods). It might also be an emblem of the novel—that ultimate melange of tempting varieties of flavour and sensation; the meeting-place of heterogeneous voices that developed spectacularly during this period. 
Mandeville’s fourth and fifth dialogues had set out a materialist critique of the Bible; this little episode now suggests perfectly the links between material pleasure, sociability, and dialogue. This dialogue also associates ‘Sociableness’, civilisation, and material progress through cultivation, celebrated in the miniature of the pineapple. 
This civilising is also implicitly the temperate taming of the wild and exotic as Mandeville’s pride in the nurturing of tropical fruit in ‘Northern Climates’ suggests. Hence, somewhat darkly, this culture is set in the context of a casual reference to slavery:
Hor. That there are Savages, I don’t question; and from the great Number of Slaves, that are yearly fetch’d from Africa, it is manifest, that in some Parts there must be vast Swarms of People, that have not yet made a great hand of their Sociableness: But how to derive them all from the Sons of Noah, I own, is past my Skill. (v, 199)

This demonstrates how, despite Enlightenment universalism, many groups of people were in practice not invited to the party. The apparent openness of the dialogue on the page can thus be ideological. 
Voltaire, in his admiration of capitalist, liberal Britain, drew connections between the Royal Exchange and the toleration of the public sphere; Richard Steele, too, would make this association.​[181]​ Thus, commercial exchange—the foundation of these dialogues between prosperous citizens—can be a metaphor for dialogue. However, just as Marx demonstrates that the apparent symmetry in the exchange of goods of equal value conceals the exploitation involved in the sale of labour, so the equanimous balance of the Enlightenment dialogue silences many voices. Although this chapter concentrates on the utopian, harmonious, and consensual aspects of dialogue, I want the reader simultaneously to be aware of the beggars at the feast, of those who are forbidden to speak at many of these symposia; these darker undercurrents will be explored in the following chapter. 
Horatio and Cleomenes savour their pineapple during discourse. At other feasts, from Plato’s Symposium onwards, the sharing of food (and often implicitly other pleasures—sex was on the menu at the original symposia) enhances and stimulates the dialogic situation. Bakhtin has discussed the connections between festivity, materialism, and the dissident scepticism that marks true dialogism. He explicitly links the feast with the Socratic dialogue, tracing a course from Plato’s Symposium through Xenophon, Plutarch, Athenaeus, Macrobius, Lucian, and various mediaeval texts to Renaissance humanists such as Erasmus, and, finally, Rabelais.​[182]​ Bakhtin is careful to show how the genre is modified by changes in class society, and how some of its purity is later lost, particularly in bourgeois literature. In contrast, in ‘the popular-festive tradition’, banquet images:
differ sharply from the images of private eating or private gluttony and drunkenness in early bourgeois literature. The latter express the contentment and satiety of the selfish individual, his personal enjoyment, and not the triumph of the people as a whole. Such imagery is torn away from the process of labor and struggle; it is removed from the marketplace and is confined to the house and the private chamber (abundance in the home); it is no longer the ‘banquet for all the world’ in which all take part, but an intimate feast with hungry beggars at the door.​[183]​






Fig. 4. Illustration to Shaftesbury’s Characteristicks, Vol. i, title page.

One of the principal focal points where rationality, sociality, aesthetics and pleasure converge is in the work of Shaftesbury. Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury, was the uncle of, and an influence upon James Harris.​[185]​ Shaftesbury’s work was a founding moment in the science of pleasure which became known as aesthetics and became dominant in the eighteenth century, especially in German idealism, culminating in Kant.​[186]​ His thought was a reaction to the cynical materialism of Hobbes and initiated the moral sense movement in philosophy (pursued, for example, by Hutcheson, David Hume, Adam Smith, and their followers) and the preoccupation with sensibility.​[187]​ It thus exemplified the vision of benevolence and sociability that contributed to the universalist strand of Enlightenment thought. For Lawrence Klein, this sociability coalesces in the notion of politeness, which he describes thus:
First, ‘politeness’ was situated in ‘company’, in the realm of social interaction and exchange, where it governed relations of the self with others. [. . .] Second, it subjected this domain of social life to the norm of pleasing. [. . .] Third, ‘politeness’ involved a grasp of form. It was an art of technique, governing the ‘how’ of social relations.​[188]​

Note that pleasure is intertwined with sociability, as is the aesthetic which here conditions literary taste towards the dialogic: ‘This ideal assigned conversation an exemplary role in written discourse, requiring that a polite text be not only gentlemanly but specifically conversational.’​[189]​ Shaftesbury’s anti-empiricism and neo-Platonism influenced both Harris and Monboddo. Similarly, Shaftesbury, as did Harris, owed much to the Cambridge Platonists.​[190]​ Shaftesbury was both Whiggish and aristocratic (like Harris); the political and ideological oppositions are not clear-cut, as the ruling classes struggle to find appropriate discourses both to understand and to legitimate society.​[191]​
Shaftesbury inspired and provoked Mandeville. Mandeville, though following Hobbes, was also largely directing his arguments at Shaftesbury, who posited more selfless drives as the foundation of society, whilst still incorporating a kind of hedonism; Shaftesbury was Mandeville’s antagonist, but also his ancestor in a sense; their aesthetics were both essentially comic, critical, hedonistic—though in very different ways—and concerned with the social. I want to show, too, that Shaftesbury’s text, like Mandeville’s, verges on the novelistic, in part because of these qualities.
Shaftesbury’s own emphasis on the dialogic is apparent in his Soliloquy, or Advice to an Author (1710), with its stress on inner dialogue and, indirectly, in Sensus Communis: an Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour (1709), which advocates laughter as critical thought.​[192]​ It is his discussion of inner dialogue (in the Soliloquy) which leads Robert Marsh to call him ‘dialectical’ alongside Akenside, Hartley, and Harris.​[193]​ His stance on wit was thought heterodox and caused much controversy, although Akenside poeticised the theme in Book iii of The Pleasures of the Imagination (1744).​[194]​ Shaftesbury’s carefully designed illustrations are important in this context: that to the title page of Volume i of the Characteristicks (see Fig. 4) shows Plato and Xenophon; of this, Brett says:
We can regard his philosophy, in fact, as deriving its inspiration from the teaching of Socrates, not only as expressed in what might be called its more orthodox form by Plato, but also as interpreted by Xenophon in a more popular way.​[195]​

So dialogue is announced as a central concern of the Characteristicks on opening the book.
His dialogue, The Moralists (1709), is also embedded in the Characteristicks, which is dialogic in a Bakhtinian sense, being an assembly of diverse genres including a ‘letter’, an ‘essay’, an ‘inquiry’, a ‘rhapsody’ (which is a dialogue), and a ‘miscellany’, with a legion of voices within these genres.​[196]​ The Miscellaneous Reflections is a commentary on the preceding pieces and contains, among other sub-genres, an introductory definition of miscellany, dialogues, a fable, and an anatomy. The work as a whole (if indeed it is a whole—uniformity is itself under question) is preoccupied with genre.​[197]​ The Moralists is itself a series of diverse genres and voices—often adopted as ‘parts’ by the interlocutors—all threatening to fragment the unity of the dialogue imposed by retrospective narration.​[198]​ This again illustrates the nearness of the eighteenth-century dialogue at its most sophisticated to that genre which is no genre and all genres, the novel.​[199]​ Shaftesbury takes delight in the variety of these modes: the Soliloquy uses the imagery of the Muses to represent a sharing out of genres (Calliope borrows from Clio and Urania to counteract tragedy). There is even a dialogue between different media in the Characteristicks: note the importance of the illustrations which were designed by Shaftesbury himself and which comment on the text.​[200]​


Fig. 5. Cartouche for Shaftesbury’s Wit and Humour.

Shaftesbury’s dialogic philosophy is essentially a comic philosophy, as is Mandeville’s. Shaftesbury counters the Gorgon who would freeze and silence the eloquence and music of Hermes’ sociability. In the cartouche for Wit and Humour, on the left, stands Hermes (see Fig. 5):
god of music, eloquence, and fertility. [. . .] In the opposite pilaster, supporting the right-hand room, is a bust of a gorgon with a set of chains draped around her neck. [. . .] Counterpoised against eloquence, music, and fertility is fear, death, and stone-like silence.​[201]​

For all his apparent anti-materialism, then, Shaftesbury was on the side of life, peace, and the comic as opposed to tragedy and death; I will show that, relatedly, communicative reason is favoured over monologism. Shaftesbury’s players in The Moralists put on comic masks, and, in Sensus Communis, oppression breeds satire:
If Men are forbid to speak their minds seriously on certain Subjects, they will do it ironically. [. . .] ‘Tis the persecuting Spirit has rais’d the bantering one: and want of Liberty may account for want of a true Politeness, and for the Corruption or wrong Use of Pleasantry and Humour. [. . .] The greater the Weight is, the bitterer will be the Satir. The higher the Slavery, the more exquisite the Buffoonery.​[202]​

Thus satire, for Shaftesbury as much as Mandeville, is an instrument of emancipation, though in a free society (such as England, for Shaftesbury, as opposed to Italy, where ‘Buffoonery and Burlesque are in the highest vogue (i.iv, 47)), it is unnecessary—free public discourse replaces it.​[203]​ This is why the ‘Antients’:
chose to give us the Representation of real Discourse and Converse, by treating their Subjects in the way of Dialogue and free Debate. The scene was commonly laid at Table, or in the publick Walks or Meeting-places; and the usual Wit and Humour of their real Discourse appear’d in those of their own composing. And this was fair. For without Wit and Humour, Reason can hardly have its proof, or be distinguish’d. (i.v, 47)

In this celebration of the formal dialogue, Shaftesbury brings together key motifs: the pleasures of social dining, public communicative spaces, and critical wit. The issue of wit, and particularly satire, will recur throughout these discussions of dialogue, and the often problematic status of satire (which can be oppressively monologic as well as critically dialogic) will be expanded on in Chapter Three below.
Shaftesbury, despite his wariness towards certain strands of modernity, in particular the new philosophy of his tutor, Locke, shared some of its critical tendencies. He despises the contemporary (but declining) literature of patronage, where the ‘Coquetry of a modern Author; whose Epistles Dedicatory, Prefaces, and Address to the Reader’ (i.iii, 125) are a false and over-eroticised distortion of dialogue where rational exchange becomes a ‘pretty Amour and Intercourse of Caresses between the Author and Reader’. This is contrasted to authentic and mutual dialogue where ‘here the Author is annihilated; and the Reader being no way apply’d to, stands for Nobody. The self-interesting Partys both vanish at once’ (i.iii, 125).
Shaftesbury’s The Moralists is a ‘Philosophical Rhapsody’ [my emphasis]; the implied association of intellection and ecstasy could be intentional. A rhapsody was, from 1602 onwards, ‘A literary work consisting of miscellaneous or disconnected pieces, etc.; a written composition having no fixed form or plan’ (OED).​[204]​ By 1639 it had also acquired the meaning ‘An exalted or exaggeratedly enthusiastic expression of sentiment or feeling; an effusion (e.g. a speech, letter, poem) marked by extravagance of idea and expression, but without connected thought or sound argument’ (OED). There is, of course, a musical sense, and Shaftesbury was as concerned with music as with the visual arts.​[205]​ A more apt musical genre might be the symphony, for The Moralists is carefully composed and structured, incorporating different genres and playing them against each other, and employing development and recapitulation. A philosophical rhapsody would thus seem to be contradictory in a way that Shaftesbury might well be employing deliberately; the ‘exalted [. . .] enthusiastic expression of sentiment’ of the rhapsody becoming philosophical through the introduction of ‘connected thought’ and ‘sound argument’. (Johnson, in his Dictionary, only mentions the disconnectedness of rhapsody, it being, following Bentley and Locke, ‘dispersed pieces joined together [. . .] without necessary dependence or natural connection’).​[206]​ 
The Moralists begins, as do many of Plato’s dialogues, as a retrospective account of an earlier dialogue. Philocles good-humouredly berates his friend Palemon for, in a discussion the day before, turning away from fashionable concerns to philosophy. He is puzzled by his friend’s passion for this when they are in the midst of beautiful women who present more obvious attractions. He links the passion for philosophy to the charms of women and suggests that Palemon ‘admire Beauty and Wisdom a little more moderately’ (i.i, 104).​[207]​ All infatuation is seen as dangerous, whether the object is ‘Poetry, Musick, Philosophy, or the Fair’ (i.i, 104). Philocles at this point adopts the un-rhapsodic character; that of the moderate, temperate man who is not ‘enamour’d’ and does not share the ‘extravagant’, ‘Romantick passion’ for philosophy of his friend. Palemon is represented as dangerously anti-social and disruptive of polite norms.​[208]​ Philocles also seems to suggest that philosophy is both a substitute for sexual passion and derived from it. Philocles intends now to record the previous day’s ‘Philosophical Adventures’ ‘as a Monument of that unseasonable Conversation, so opposite to the reigning Genius of Gallantry and Pleasure’ (i.i, 104) (and here a discrimination between two types of pleasure is hinted at).

Fig. 6. Cartouche for Shaftesbury’s The Moralists.

Philocles complains about the current state of philosophy, which has been ‘degraded’ by ‘Moderns’ and ‘is no longer active in the World’ but has been ‘immur’d’ in ‘Colleges and Cells’ and set ‘serviley to such Works as those in the Mines’ (i.i, 105). Shaftesbury’s advocation of a public philosophy is characteristic of Enlightenment modernity, despite his hostility to ‘Moderns’, and will be echoed in Addison’s famous ambition of bringing philosophy ‘out of Closets and Libraries’.​[209]​ Klein points out that the cartouche which illustrates The Moralists (Fig. 6) illustrates Shaftesbury’s sense of the public nature of philosophy:
The engraving is a tryptych representing three venues for philosophic practice. On the left is a schoolroom with a master and scholars, engaging in a verbal exercise. On the right is a solitary alchemist in his laboratory, surrounded by experimental equipment and natural curiosities. In the middle, Philosophy herself stands, alone, on a stage, the public stage before the audience of the world—where Shaftesbury thought philosophy should be.​[210]​

Thus again, philosophic reason is essentially communicative, though there are moments of introspective retreat—a movement discernible in the narrative of The Moralists itself.
By disregarding philosophy (here conventionally gendered as ‘she’), ‘our modern Constitutions’ have become ‘effeminate’: ‘Our Sense, Language, and Style, as well as our Voice, and Person, shou’d have something of that Male-Feature, and natural Roughness, by which our Sex is distinguish’d’ (i.i, 106). Women, ‘in whose favour we pretend to make this Condescension’ (i.i, 106) (in favour of delicacy and lightness) actually despise and laugh at men who mimic their softness. From the beginning of the dialogue, with its interlocutors idly watching the fair women in the park, philosophical argument is placed in a sexualised setting, always aware of the potential distractions of pleasure with the female sex, of the dangers of feminine smoothness rather than the ‘good Muscling’ (i.i, 106) proper to philosophical discourse, of the reaction—pleasured or scornful—of the women in whose presence ideas are being aired. Hence the auditors—passive or otherwise—of dialogue play a significant role; however, women as active interlocutors are clearly excluded from the dialogue.
Philocles notes that the dialogue—valued by the Ancients—is out of favour (yet Shaftesbury is taking part in the boom in this genre). He points out that the philosophy of the past was disseminated in a dialogic manner; nowadays, however, the dominant culture of partisanship would be threatened by such openness; indeed, reason itself is deeply unsettling:
You know, too, that in this Academick Philosophy I am to present you with, there is a certain way of Questioning and Doubling, which no-way sutes the Genius of our Age. Men love to take party instantly. They can’t bear being kept in suspense. The Examination torments ‘em. They want to be rid of it, upon the easiest terms. ‘Tis as if Men fansy’d themselves drowning, whenever they dare trust to the Current of Reason (i.i, 107).

I hope that this study will show that Shaftesbury—or Philocles—was, in part, wrong here; that ‘Questioning and Doubling’ does precisely suit the ‘Genius’ of the age. 
Foreshadowing Kant somewhat, Philocles claims: ‘We are too lazy and effeminate, and withal a little too cowardly, to dare doubt’ (i.i, 108).​[211]​ Academic philosophy had formerly been agonistic—and public: 
not only Horsemanship and Military Arts had their publick Places of Exercise; but Philosophy too had its Wrestlers in repute. Reason and Wit had their Academy, and underwent the Trial, not in a formal way, apart from the World; but openly, among the better sort [. . .] Hence that way of Dialogue, and Patience of Debate and Reasoning, of which we have scarce a Resemblance left in any of our Conversations. (i.i, 109)

So Shaftesbury mourns the lack of the genuinely dialogic, which is defined as public and questioning, despite the apparent explosion in openness and communicativeness granted by modernity.
Palemon, according to Philocles’ account of this dialogue, had burst out into a ‘romantick’ disparagement of mankind on a day when ‘the Kind itself [. . .] never appeared fairer’ (i.ii, 110). The beauty of nature, ‘The Verdure of the field, the distant Prospects, the gilded Horizon, and purple Sky, form’d by a setting Sun’ still moves Palemon, but all Philocles’ pleading for ‘the Cause of the Fair’, and attempts to ‘advance their Charms above all those other Beautys of Nature’ are to no avail. Neither can he persuade his friend of the virtues of modern poetry which is, for Palemon, full of ‘Gallantry’ rather than ‘Truth and Nature’ (i.ii, 110).​[212]​ Palemon had dismissed ‘even our Favourite Novels; those dear sweet natural pieces writ most of ‘em by the Fair Sex themselves’ (i.ii, 111). Feminine discourse is disparaged again, as in the earlier characterisation of philosophy. However, modern literature is attacked from a perspective that is fundamentally modern in itself, showing the complexity and ambivalence of Shaftesbury’s stance, and this critique favours the more novelistic manifestations of fiction. For the ‘gallantry’—a feudal concept—of modern writing is ‘Gothick’ and ‘sprung from the mere Dregs of Chivalry and Knight-Errantry’ (i.ii, 111). This,
in a Country where no She-Saints were worship’d by any Authority from Religion, ‘twas as impertinent and sensless [sic], as it was profane, to deify the Sex, raise ‘em to a Capacity above what Nature had allow’d, and treat ‘em with a Respect, which in the natural way of Love they themselves were the aptest to complain of. (i.ii, 111)

Here, Shaftesbury clearly shows little interest in women’s emancipation, yet this association of feudalism with a debilitating femininity would be harnessed by Wollstonecraft in her response to that conservative descendant of Shaftesbury, Edmund Burke.​[213]​ Palemon’s attack on the ‘Licentiousness’ that this gallantry had prompted causes the two friends to be abandoned by their company. 
In Part ii, Philocles sets out on the difficult—and isolated—task of being ‘an Author, and Historian’ (as opposed to the ‘agreeable Part of a Companion, sustained by ‘Conversation’ (ii.i, 125) (note ‘part’ here). Conventional exposition, it seems, is dependant on dialogue but removed from its pleasures and comforts—this is a tension which persists throughout the work. Philocles, aided by the previous night’s dreams, recollects his previous dialogue with his friend, Theocles, which seems at first to be dreamlike indeed and somewhat in the unparticularised style of mediaeval romance or allegory (undermining Shaftesbury’s anti-feudalism elsewhere):
I found my-self transported to a distant Country, which presented a pompous rural Scene. It was a Mountain not far from the Sea, its Brow Adorn’d with antient Wood, and at its foot a River and well-inhabited Plain: beyond which the Sea appearing, clos’d the Prospect. (ii.i, 125-26)

Like Dante, Theocles is accompanied by ‘his belov’d Mantuan Muse’ (ii.i, 126), that is, Virgil, and like Virgil and Horace, has retired from the world to rural life since, Theocles says, ‘Society it-self cannot be rightly enjoy’d without some Abstinence and separate Thought’ (ii.i, 127). Thus dialogue again depends upon periods of social isolation, paradoxically, though it is in this state that inner dialogue can best be practised. This uncertainty about sociality pervades the text.
Thus, in one example, the sympotic mood is disturbed; Philocles is interrupted over dinner and the equanimity of dialogue is disrupted as a hostile guest ‘in an angry Tone’ accuses him of atheism and libertinism, connecting his ‘Principle of Liberty’ and ‘Freedom of Thought’ with ‘a Liberty from all Principles’ (ii.ii, 144). Theocles comes to his aid, defends his freedom of speech and asserts that it is not freedom of thought, or atheism, that endangers virtue but institutionalised religion, which thinks of Reason as a enemy (ii.ii, 145). Philocles entreats the others to hear Theocles on the foundation of virtue and orthodox opinion on it, eagerly anticipating his words as a prelude to their talk the following day, and not much caring whether what he has to say is rational or is pleasurable:
If his Speculations prov’d of a rational kind, this previous Discourse, I knew, wou’d help me to comprehend ‘em; if only pleasing Fancy, this wou’d help me however, to please my-self the better with ‘em. (ii.ii, 146)

Reason and pleasure, as often in the eighteenth-century dialogue, are here woven together.
Theocles claims that the defenders of religion often wrote badly since, of their opponent, ‘They may safely provoke him to a Field, where he cannot appear openly, or as a profess’d Antagonist’. Philocles interrupts, saying that what was once said by a religious zealot may then be true: ‘That none wrote well against the Atheists beside the Clerk, who drew the Warrant for their Execution’ (ii.iii, 146). Theocles forcefully defends unconstrained discourse:
If this were the true Writing [. . .] there wou’d be an end of all Dispute or Reasoning in the Case. For where Force is necessary, Reason has nothing to do. But on the other hand, if Reason be needful, Force in the mean while must be laid aside: For there is no Enforcement of Reason, but by Reason. And therefore if Atheists are to be reason’d with, at all; they are to be reason’d with like other Men, since there’s no other way in nature to convince ‘em. (ii.iii, 146-47)

Thus Shaftesbury, through Theocles, carefully separates communicative reason from coercion and strategic action, displaying a secular and democratic modernism where free dialogue and rationality are entwined.
Theocles distinguishes between the atheist who ‘absolutely denies’ and the one who ‘only doubts’ (ii.iii, 147). The former ‘sets up an Opinion against the Interest of Mankind, and Being of Society’ and is ‘punishable’ (ii.iii, 147). The second type, as Philocles understands, is to be engaged in philosophical dialogue with. So the open rationalism of free debate is defended but qualified, much as Kant drew limits to the public incarnation of Enlightenment: free speech that is malicious and harms social order must be constrained.​[214]​ Yet at the same time, Shaftesbury makes disturbingly clear how reactionary opposition to dialogue always has the coercive powers of the State at its disposal, as the military imagery and Theocles’ contrasting of magisterial and philosophical language makes clear:
as there are two sorts of People who are called Atheists, so there are two ways of writing against them, which may be fitly us’d apart, but not so well jointly. You wou’d set aside mere Menaces, and separate the Philosopher’s Work from the Magistrate’s, taking it for granted, that the more discreet and sober part of Unbelievers, who come not under the dispatching Pen of the Magistrate, can be affected only by the more deliberate and gentle one of Philosophy. Now the language of the Magistrate, I must confess, has little in common with that of Philosophy. [. . .] A Mixture of these must needs spoil both. And therefore, in the Case before us, ‘If any one besides the Magistrate can be said to write well; ‘tis He [. . .] who writes as becomes Philosophy, with Freedom of Debate, and Fairness towards his Adversary. (ii.iii, 147-48)

There is much equivocation here, and Shaftesbury’s evasive metonymy of ‘dispatching Pen’ for a more deadly weapon could be seen as veiling the constant threat of power. Yet simultaneously, Shaftesbury seems here, through the reasoned debate of Philocles and Theocles, to be implicitly critical of state and clerical authority and to be advancing the superior value of philosophy. The argument is a linguistic one; the style of philosophy (which, for Shaftesbury, subsumes dialogue) is superior to that of the magistrate.
Theocles argues for the charitable basis of countering atheism by rational debate—rather than ‘repeated Exclamations and Invectives’ (ii.iii, 150): ‘For to such Persons as these, ‘tis to be fear’d’ (he says, with a certain irony), ‘’twill always appear, “That what was never question’d, was never prov’d”’ (ii.iii, 150); Theocles, and Shaftesbury, are perhaps more sympathetic to this appeal to dialogic testing than they should be. Other authors ‘found it necessary [. . .] to shew all manner of Detestation both of the Persons and Principles’ of atheists. ‘Our Author’, instead, ‘offers to conclude nothing positive himself, but leaves it to others to draw Conclusions from his Principles’ (ii.iii, 150). This is a model for modern philosophical enquiry but also a style guide to authors of dialogue. Theocles sums up this defence of rationalist ethics by declaring that any further insistence would no longer be the ‘ordinary way of Conversation’ but would force him ‘to make some new Model of a Sermon upon his System of Divinity’ and to ‘Preaching’—a monologic genre, or style, that he evidently has some distaste for (ii.iii, 158). 
Philocles and Theocles then set out, humorously, to play parts in an anti-dialogue of sermoniser and infidel—as at the dinner table, despite Shaftesbury’s austerity, there is a lot of fun in these scenes, particularly linguistic fun. This play-acting, perhaps, replicates the splitting of the dialogue writer’s consciousness that has to take place. Note, too, how frequently Shaftesbury portrays interruptions—a frictional component in dialogue, yet psychologically realistic, novelistic, of course, and as often associated with hasty excitement as disagreement.​[215]​
Theocles’ guests urge him to develop ‘in his theological way’ (ii.iv, 158) such a sermon. Theocles is reluctant but does so on condition that, if he is to ‘sustain the part of the Divine’, Philocles must ‘bear the Part of the Infidel’ (ii.iv, 159). ‘Bearing a part’ may be as much a musical term—singing a melodic line that is in choral harmony with another—as a dramatic one. This emphasis on role-playing—which is resumed elsewhere in the dialogue—turns the text into the reportage of an amateur drama and blurs the delicate boundaries between the dialogue proper and theatre, but also highlights both the sense of play involved and the detached adoption of different perspectives that the objective thinker—or writer of dialogue—must practice.
The ‘old Gentleman’ hostile to Philocles is blind to the strategic masquerades that the latter adopts and thinks that his ‘Part’ is in fact his essence: ‘the Part you have propos’d for him is so natural and sutable that, I doubt not, he will be able to act it without the least Pain’ (ii.iv, 159). He is immune, too, to the pleasures or insights offered by debate, consciously seeking out the lawful, the monologic, free from dialogic response or contradiction. Philocles, according to his opponent:
wou’d have been apt enough of his own accord to interrupt your Discourse by his perpetual Cavils. Therefore since we have now had Entertainment enough by way of Dialogue, I desire the Law of Sermon may be strictly observ’d; and ‘That there be no answering to whatever is argu’d or advanc’d. (ii.iv, 159)

One gets a vivid impression of the old gentleman’s disdain for ‘Entertainment’ and for dialogue; Shaftesbury would have met many such fervently puritan theologians. Shaftesbury’s theorising on genre positions dialogue here in opposition to monologic sermons.
Theocles praises Philocles for his virility, wit and politeness as much as his open-mindedness; this is again engaging in stylistic recommendations for dialogue:
I see, said Theocles, you are not one of those timorous Arguers, who tremble at every Objection rais’d against their Opinion or Belief, and are so intent in upholding their own side of the Argument, that they are unable to make the least Concession on the other. Your Wit allows you to divert your-self with whatever occurs in the Debate: And you can pleasantly improve even what your Antagonist brings as a Support to his own Hypothesis. (ii.iv, 172)

Thus Shaftesbury constantly reflects on the method and style of argument as he writes it. Theocles’ mask is allowed to slip to undermine the rigidity of the role of the divine that he is playing and to gently satirise monologic conventions of debate:
And were I not afraid of speaking with an Air of Compliment, in the midst of a philosophical Debate; I shou’d tell you perhaps what I thought of the becoming manner of your Scepticism, in opposition to a kind of Bigot-Scepticks; who forfeit their Right to the philosophic Character, and retain hardly so much as that of the Gentleman or Good Companion. (ii.iv, 172)

Thus the ‘Bigot-Scepticks’ are not gentlemen but neither, it is suggested, are some orthodox theologians.
Theocles’ argument, stimulated by his engagement with Philocles’, pretended or otherwise, sceptical materialism is actually more persuasive than his rapturous sermon—or perhaps reinforces it. It culminates in Shaftesbury’s central motif—the association of sociability, rationality and virtue—being found to be the essence of humanity and generated by that species’ weakness, the ‘Defect’ that it has compared to other animals:
Does not this Defect engage him the more strongly to Society, and force him to own that he is purposely, and not by accident, made rational and sociable; and can no otherwise increase or subsist, than in that social Intercourse and Community which is his natural State? (ii.iv, 174)

This naturalism spurs Philocles’ ‘Adversary’, the old gentleman, fooled by his role-playing, to attack him as a disciple of Hobbes, initiating a debate about the origins of society that echoes those more definitely linguistic ones discussed in my previous chapter, and prefiguring and perhaps influencing Rousseau, for Shaftesbury, through his personae, aims to deny that ‘there can naturally be any Human State which is not social’ (ii.iv, 176).​[216]​ The ensuing dialogue, with its elenctic question-response format, imitates the Socratic mode far more closely than any other part of The Moralists. Shaftesbury—or Theocles—considers language and society to be inseparable (again in dialogue with those other thinkers such as Monboddo); the argument rests on the premise, ‘That there was ever such a Condition or State of Man, when as yet they were unassociated, unacquainted, and consequently without any Language or Form of Art’ (ii.iv, 176).
The philanthropism of Theocles’ origins myth here, with its benign primitive state, contradicts the darker historiography of Philocles earlier, where the recently gained sociality is precarious and threatened by a reversion to an unsocial primitiveness. Theocles vehemently, and convincingly, argues for the natural sociability of humanity, and the absurdity of the position that man in an ‘imaginary State of Nature’ (ii.iv, 179) would be like the wolf, as Hobbes had said. Yet he then advocates the use of such a myth as an inducement to social order—the underlying fear of anarchy appearing again, but placing constraints on openness and rationality by substituting fear and myth. ‘Let’ the state of nature be represented, he says, as:
A State of War, Rapine, and Injustice. [. . .] Since ‘tis unsocial, let it e’en be as uncomfortable and as frightening as ‘tis possible. [. . .] The greater Dread we have of Anarchy, the better Country-men we shall prove, and value more the Laws and Constitution under which we live. (ii.iv, 180)
 
Here, the text betrays an uncertainty about that innate sociability for why, if sociability be innate, should such disciplinary storytelling be necessary? Having demolished the myth, Theocles wants to make ideological use of it, appealing paradoxically to innate sociality whilst denying the exercise of human dialogicity. Theocles denounces the ‘virulent Maxim’ of Hobbes, but in a manner that seems tolerantly to understand its genesis in human nature: 
’Tis here, therefore, in Philosophy, as in the common Conversations of the World. As fond as Men are of Company, and as little able to enjoy any Happiness out of it, they are yet strangely addicted to the way of Satir. (ii.iv, 181)

Theocles thus recognises the dialectical tensions whereby we are necessarily, compulsively conversational, yet just as prone to the inversion of the dialogic capacity of language towards satire. Shaftesbury’s humanist—even democratic—impulses motivate a certain levelling of philosophy here and its closeness to ordinary conversation is demonstrated with a suspicion of rhetoric by this master of crafty wording in both kinds of discourse:
as a malicious Censure craftily worded, and pronounc’d with Assurance, is apt to pass with Mankind for shreud Wit; so a virulent Maxim in bold Expressions, tho without any Justness of Thought, is readily receiv’d for true Philosophy. (ii.iv, 181)

Shaftesbury’s point is to show how easily the manipulative rhetoric of strategic action can be mistaken for authentic discourse. Yet it seems that the natural impulse to converse in society and to be delighted by language and narrative is at the heart even of the slanders against humanity of a Hobbes.
In Part iii, Philocles sets out on his promised walk with Theocles. This is the section of The Moralists that is most often discussed as it contains the famous ‘rhapsodic’ passages; I will dwell on it briefly as, for the most part, there is a retreat from authentic dialogue; between Theocles’ bouts of meditation, he mostly delivers his theodicy in ‘sermon’ mode. Theocles and Philocles, in the absence of an audience, no longer seem to be playing and this, unexpectedly, sabotages the dialogue. However, there are still interesting irregularities.
The rhapsodies themselves (iii.i, 193-94, 208-09) are distinguished by emphatic punctuation—just glancing at the pages one can see how they are highlighted typographically (dashes; marked ejaculations). The sentimental novel would employ these same devices. The rhapsodies are full of such rhetorical ornaments as apostrophes to Nature and, rhythmically, continually fall into iambic incantation.​[217]​ These passages are passages celebrating the order of nature and all aspects of the Creation, including a passionate foray into speculative astronomy which exults in the infinite plurality of worlds​[218]​ and the pleasures of discovery:
‘Besides the neighbouring Planets,’ (continu’d he, in his rapturous Strain) ‘what Multitudes of fix’d Stars did we see sparkle, not an hour ago, in the clear Night, which yet had hardly yielded to the Day? How many others are discover’d by the help of Art? Yet how many remain still, beyond the reach of our Discovery! Crouded as they seem, their Distance from each other is as unmeasurable by Art, as is the Distance between them and us. Whence we are naturally taught the Immensity of that BEING, who thro’ these immense Spaces has dispos’d such an Infinite of Bodys, belonging each (as we may well presume) to Systems as compleat as our own World. (iii.i, 207-08)

After each effusion, Theocles breaks off in fragrante delecto—interrupting his own pleasure—with apparent embarrassment at his excess. In one of these moments, he is bemused that Philocles has ‘suffer’d’ him ‘thus to run on, without the least Interruption’ allowing him to ‘range thus at pleasure thro’ these aerial Spaces and imaginary Regions’ where his ‘capricious Fancy’ has led him (iii.i, 209). He says to Philocles that he ‘had never trusted my-self with you in this Vein of Enthusiasm, had I not rely’d on you to govern it a little better’ (iii.i, 209). His discomfort seems to be not just because of the fanciful, capricious and enthusiastic quality of his speech but its solipsistic, monological nature, ungoverned by social interaction. This need to return from the peaks of the sublime to sociability is declared by Theocles in a ‘familiar’ voice returned to him by whatever exotic forces had possessed him as they advance towards noon, and Section 2 of Part II commences:
METHINKS, said he, Philocles! (changing to a familiar Voice) we had better leave these unsociable Places, whither our Fancy has transported us, and return to our-selves here again, in our more conversable Woods, and temperate Climates. [. . .] Nor need we here be afraid of our own Voices; whilst we hear the Notes of such a chearful Quire, and find the Echoes rather agreeable, and inviting us to talk. (iii.ii, 219)

This return to polite reason, to conversation echoed in social interchange, is a return to Englishness, for Theocles previously had been transported on a vast geographical survey of the globe. For Philocles, the ‘foreign nymphs’ of the lands Theocles has described to him ‘were much too awful Beautys to please me’ (iii.ii, 219). This leads into a once-more dialogic exchange on the allure of beauty and the dangers of over-indulgence. ‘Suppose’, says Theocles:
that being charm’d, as you seem to be, with the Beauty of these Trees [. . .] you shou’d long for nothing so much as to taste some delicious Fruit of theirs; and [. . .] you shou’d afterwards, as oft as you revisited these Groves, seek hence the Enjoyment of them, by satiating your-self in these new Delights. (iii.ii, 222)

This temptation Philocles finds ‘sordidly luxurious’ and ‘absurd’, but what Theocles is really hinting at—very coyly, with the ‘delicious Fruit’—is the analogous beauty of woman. Philocles says he was:
apprehensive you wou’d force me at last to think of certain powerful Forms in human Kind, which draw after ‘em a set of eager Desires, Wishes, and Hopes; no way sutable, I must confess, to your rational and refin’d Contemplation of Beauty. (iii.ii, 222)

Elsewhere in the Characteristicks, Shaftesbury extends his benevolent tolerance even to these most irrational of desires. In one odd moment—a symptom of Shaftesbury’s liberal generosity—he admits the material and the erotic in a surprising way:
The very notion of a Debauch [. . .] carrys with it a plain reference to Society, or Fellowship. It may be call’d a Surfeit, or Excess of Eating and Drinking, but hardly a Debauch of that kind, when the Excess is committed separately, out of all Society [. . .] The Courtizans, and even the commonest of Women, who live by Prostitution, know very well how necessary it is, that every-one whom they entertain with their Beauty, shou’d believe there are Satisfactions reciprocal; and that Pleasures are no less given than receiv’d.​[219]​

Ultimately, enthusiasm, inspired by beauty, tempered with rationality, is the source of human creativity and nobility:
all sound Love and Admiration is Enthusiasm: ‘The Transports of Poets the Sublime of Orators, the Rapture of Musicians, the high strains of the Virtuosi [. . .] Even Learning it-self, the Love of Arts and Curiositys, the Spirit of Travellers and Adventurers; Gallantry, War, Heroism (iii.ii, 223-24)

There are intermediate, post-ecstatic episodes which begin as rational discussions on the rhapsodies, such as the discussion on the elements—but then Theocles gets heated again, the language of science becomes intermingled with enthusiasm; puns—on flames, conflagration and flight—are exchanged between the two (another species of dialogue, recalling the improvised wordplay at the dinner table) (iii.i, 211-14). 
Finally, Shaftesbury celebrates pleasure—the pleasures of sociability, of imagination and knowledge, and of the texts which represent these pleasures. And the pleasures of these texts, which involve the juxtaposition of genres, a modern reaction against romance, and a qualified democratic invitation to shared discourse, makes them distinctly novelistic. Yet this representation remains a bodiless, Epicurean hedonism, without the appetite that Mandeville sees as the foundation of both sociability (as in his account of language) and intellectual curiosity (his discussion of virtuosi below). Shaftesbury famously initiated the dominant tradition of disinterested aesthetics that culminated in Kant. Mandeville himself briefly outlined an earthier alternative, and I return to his dialogues now.

Mandeville’s Aesthetics of Dialogic Materialism

Having already examined Mandeville’s speculations on the origins of language and sociality, I now want to examine his aesthetics, which theorise about pleasure in a similarly materialistic and sceptical manner. Mandeville, briefly, introduces a third interlocutor as Cleomenes and Horatio turn to aesthetics. Mandeville (whose feminism is evident elsewhere) depicts in Fulvia a woman whose communicative competence in intellectual discourse matches that of her male interlocutors.​[220]​ Fulvia adopts a no-nonsense, almost Philistine position, and mocks the pretensions of art in a way that shocks Horatio; a Dutch nativity scene, for her, is ‘an admirable Piece; sure nothing in the World can be more like Nature’ (i, 33). Cleomenes retorts, ‘It is not Nature, but agreeable Nature, la belle Nature, that is to be represented; all Things that are abject, low pitiful and mean, are carefully to be avoided, and kept out of Sight’ (i, 33). Given the typical subject matter of Dutch painting, ‘Things’ here suggests that the lower classes should be unrepresented (and the political overtones of ‘representation’ are not accidental). It is appropriate, too, that Cleomenes counterpoints a French phrase against Dutch roughness (with Italian painting being loosely associated with French as English plainness is linked to Dutchness; the English and French tongues will later be contrasted). Horatio is shocked by Fulvia; as much, one suspects for her forthrightness as for her opinions; he is shocked, too, by any ‘vile abject Things’—the subject of realism—that are ‘not capable of entertaining Persons of Quality’ (i, 34). Fulvia, on the other hand, aligns taste with intellect and is more shocked by false pictorial rhetoric: ‘no body can please my Eye that affronts my Understanding’ (i, 34).
Horatio’s aesthetic is undemocratic—openly so, as where he attacks the theatre for the lowliness of its audience (i, 39)—but also because he can only see art as overwhelming the judgement. Good art elevates and persuades one to noble acts; it is valued for its ideological force while bad art is condemned for being equally effective at inculcating vice. This is a monologic attitude which cannot envisage free intersubjectivity between artist and audience. The spectator is mechanistically denied agency in a very familiar anxiety towards various media that, over the centuries, has featured novels, cinema, television, comic books, video games, and the Internet. In the introduction to these dialogues, Mandeville had already ridiculed this idea of malign influence and the passive victim in the attacks on his own work (Horatio thinks that  has been ‘bewitched’ by the Fable (i, 6)), comparing the similar attacks made on Gay’s The Beggar’s Opera:
I have seen, that Man could be serious in apprehending the Encrease of Rogues and Robberies, from the frequent Representations of the Beggar’s Opera, I am persuaded, that there really are such Wrongheads in the World, as will fancy Vices to be encouraged, when they see them expos’d. (‘Preface’, 6)

There is some disingenuousness here, of course, since the ambiguity in the Fable is over how much or how little Mandeville actually condemns vice. Ironically, the malign influence here comes from opera—though this is English, demotic opera; realistic and satirical. For Horatio, Italian opera ‘forcibly inspires us with those noble Sentiments, which to entertain the most expressive Words can only attempt to persuade us’ (i, 38) [my emphasis]. Rational persuasion is distrusted. Horatio dislikes satire, too. The art that Horatio admires is like the badly written dialogues that Mandeville rejects as a model in the preface, where ‘Philalethes’ who, ‘which Side soever he has fought on, has hitherto [. . .] been Conqueror’ (‘Preface’, 9-10), always winning the debate due to manipulation by the author. Fulvia’s musical aesthetic, in contrast, is either social and formalist—finding pleasure in the opera because of ‘the Company, the Lights, the Musick, the Scenes, and other Decorations’ (i, 37), or realistic. Music never throws her into ‘Raptures’ (i, 38), and she is on the verge of laughing at some of the more excessive, fantastic features of opera. Laughter here is critical (compare Shaftesbury on raillery). This irreverence offends Horatio deeply and he interrupts her, as he has done before.​[221]​ Dialogue here is polemical; the participants are estranged from each other and exhibit hostility. But Mandeville will modulate subtly between this mode and the eirenic manner as his conversants move towards agreement, giving the dialogue a novelistic sense of emotional dynamics.
Horatio opposes ‘Richness and Splendour of Dress’, ‘Variety of Colours’, ‘the lustre of the Fair’ to the ‘ill Manners’, ‘Ribaldry, Libertine Wit, and detestable Satire’ of realist theatre (i, 40). Fulvia’s arch response equates taste, ‘the grand Gout’ and politeness to uncritical blindness ‘where it is an Incivility strictly to examine and over-curiously to look into Matters’ (i, 40). Fulvia’s brief intervention into masculine discourse comes to an end; after offending Horatio, provoked by his patronising dogmatism, she says with heated sarcasm: ‘I am convinced of the Narrowness of my own Understanding, and am going to visit some Persons, with whom I shall be more upon the Level’ (i, 41). Thus Mandeville satirically draws our attention to the limits of Enlightenment inclusivity and of the public sphere.
Cleomenes suggests his own literary principles concisely, acidly, in a critique of the kind of writing dependent upon pre-capitalist patronage that was still prevalent: 
I have a strong Aversion to Satyr, and detest it every whit as much as you do: The most instructive Writings to understand the World, and penetrate into the Heart of Man, I take to be Addresses, Epitaphs, Dedications, and above all the Preambles to Patents, of which I am making a large Collection. (i, 43)

Cleomenes, despite this supposed ‘Aversion’, clearly relishes satire and burlesques Shaftesbury in order to employ the latter’s contention that noble things are invulnerable to raillery against him:
There is, generally speaking, less Truth in Panegyricks than there is in Satyrs. When all our Senses are soothed, when we have no Distemper of Body or Mind to disturb us, and meet with nothing that is disagreeable, we are pleased with our Being: it is in this Situation, that we are most apt to mistake outward Appearances for Realities, and judge of Things more favourably than they deserve. (i, 59)

Cleomenes upholds the democracy and healthy vigour of the agora against the corruptions of the Opera, despite the assault therefrom on the senses, against Horatio’s almost pathological distaste for the lower classes:
The Entertainment in general is abominable, and all the Senses suffer. I allow all this. The greasy Heads, some of them bloody, the jarring Looks, and threatning, wild, and horrid Aspects, that one meets with in those ever-restless Assemblies, must be very shocking to the Sight, and so indeed is every thing else that can be seen among a rude and ragged Multitude that is inoffensive: But after all, Vice and what is criminal are not to be confounded with Roughness and want of Manners, no more than Politeness and an artful Behaviour ought to be with Virtue or Religion. (i, 60)

This is aesthetic criticism in the literal sense (that is, as pertaining to the senses) and seems, too, to be deliberately aimed at Shaftesbury’s notions of politeness. Together, Cleomenes, and Fulvia with her preference for Dutch realism, have suggested a novelistic aesthetic that is critical, democratic, and multi-voiced, and which is acted out in Mandeville’s own practice. Towards the end of this first dialogue, through an argument centred on aesthetics, Cleomenes has gone some way to overcome Horatio’s refusal to converse with him, to look again at the Fable, and to persuade him into accepting his own dialogic principle of deciding debate; that is: ‘No Men, nor their Works, ought to be condemn’d upon Hearsays, and bare Surmises, much less upon the Accusations of their Enemies, without being examin’d into’ (i, 57). This is certainly a specification for juridical practice as well as textual critique.​[222]​ 
In Mandeville’s final dialogue, the naïve Horatio is left unpersuaded that vice is the foundation for the highest moments of civilisation, convinced that there are ‘Men, who act from Principles of Virtue and a publick Spirit’ who ‘take Pains with Alacrity to attain the Accomplishments that will make them capable of serving their Country’ (vi, 341). On the contrary, says Cleomenes, even the pursuit of knowledge is motivated by ignoble urges:
Every Science will have its Admirers, as Men differ in their Tastes and Pleasures; and there is no Part of Learning but some Body or other will look into it, and labour at it, from no better Principles, than some Men are Fox-hunters, and others take delight in Angling. Look upon the mighty Labours of Antiquaries, Botanists, and the Vertuoso’s in Butterflies, Cockle-shells, and other odd Productions of Nature; and mind the magnificent Terms they all make use of in their respective Provinces, and the pompous Names they often give, to what others, who have no Taste that way, would not think worth any Mortal’s Notice. Curiosity is often as bewitching to the Rich, as Lucre is to the Poor; and what Interest does in some, Vanity does in others; and great Wonders are often produced from a happy mixture of both. (vi, 342)

There is here a covert admission that the forces that promote dialogism and civilisation can become unstable, causing language to become idiolectal and uncommunicative (as ‘magnificent Terms’ and ‘pompous Names’). Those same forces that drive productivity can lead to that destructive inversion, or counterpart, of dialogue which is antagonism and discord:
Ostentation and Envy have made more Authors than Virtue and Benevolence. Men of known Capacity and Erudition are often labouring hard to eclipse and ruin one another’s Glory. What Principle must we say two Adversaries act from, both Men of unquestionable good Sense and extensive Knowledge, when all the Skill and Prudence they are Masters of are not able to stifle, in their study’d Performances, and hide from the World the Rancour of their Minds, the Spleen and Animosity they both write against one another? (vi, 343)





Dialogic pleasure in the eighteenth century is often mingled with the sexual as in the oldest models; Love features strongly, of course, in both Plato’s and Xenophon’s symposia. However, such commingling comes to the fore in Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle’s widely disseminated scientific dialogue, Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes (1686). Whilst Shaftesbury’s pleasures are dematerialised and Epicurean, and constantly contrasted with more earthly, less sublimated pleasures, Fontenelle collapses the divisions between the different strands of hedonism, quite deliberately conflating the charms of the flesh with the passion for abstract knowledge. By suggesting an erotic foundation for scientific thought he shares with Mandeville a materialist understanding of the pleasures of sociality but without the latter’s cynicism and without his apprehension of the imminent collapse of dialogue into socially disruptive conflict. He also explores a theme which becomes manifest in many eighteenth-century novels—the conjunction of mutual intellectual commerce with amatory attraction (a theme I pursue in Chapter Four below).
Fontenelle’s text, though earlier than most of those I have been examining, is a creature of that same enlightened world as Mandeville and Shaftesbury.​[223]​ There is a sense, too, in which it is their contemporary, for it was constantly being revised, retranslated, and reprinted throughout the following century.​[224]​ (Mandeville’s and Shaftesbury’s texts similarly resist being pinpointed chronologically; as I have said, they too were fluid texts, being continually revitalised and expanded in response to the dialogues they generated.) 
The new materialistic science had been communicated in dialogue form before: Galileo’s Dialogues Concerning the two Chief World Systems (1632), defending the Copernican view, was probably an important influence on Fontenelle (though his Lucianic New Dialogues of the Dead show his interest in the genre); later scientific dialogues include Robert Boyle’s The Sceptical Chymist (1661).​[225]​ Aphra Behn’s translation, A Discovery of New Worlds, originally made in 1688, was popular throughout the eighteenth century, as were other translations, and the ideas therein were taken up by Addison, whose Spectator was always the showcase for the latest ideas, and other journal editors—journals being a key instrument for the promulgation of new ideas.​[226]​ The work became the model for many further scientific dialogues for women, for children, and for those in general avid for the new knowledge.​[227]​ 
Fontenelle’s Entretiens, like others among the most sophisticated Enlightenment dialogues, shows not only some of the structural features of the early novel but also its concerns and anxieties. Fontenelle, in his preface, tells those with some prior scientific knowledge that he has not ‘pretended to instruct, but to divert them, in presenting to them in a more agreeable manner, that which they already know solidly’ (88).​[228]​ To novices, he says ‘I believe it will at once instruct and please them’ (88). As I note above, this Horatian aesthetic was something of a commonplace but, especially in the phrasing here, it is also reminiscent of the prefaces to many early English novels.
And with Fontenelle’s particular incarnation of the dialogue form, we too read for more narrative excitement than we might get from pursuing the linear development of an idea through debate—we participate in the dangerous pleasure of speculative fancy, in the postulating of characters in other worlds, and empathise with the character sketches of the two interlocutors. The characterisation is highly nuanced; the motivation and development convincing and engaging, as I hope will be apparent from the extracts quoted here.​[229]​ So the pleasures of the novel are very much present in this text. Alongside the tension between seriousness and pleasure is the concern—again a prime concern of the novelist—that the narrative be accepted as truthful.​[230]​ Behn herself, in the prefaces to her own short fictions, is insistent upon this as are, again, other early novelists.​[231]​
Fontenelle is also explicitly democratic with regard to his audience. He sought a broad reading public for the work, having ‘endeavoured to bring it to a Point not too rough and harsh for the Capacity of the Numbers, nor too light and trivial for the Learned’ (87); the novel, sharing this ‘middle style’, would circulate later among such a public.​[232]​ This inclusiveness stretches to women. And it is for them primarily that the sweetening of the rough diet is made:
I have introduced a fair Lady to be instructed in Philosophy [. . .] imagining, by this Fiction, I shall render my Work more agreeable, and to encourage the fair Sex (who lose so much time at their Toylets in a less charming Study) by the Example of a Lady who had no supernatural Character, and who never goes beyond the Bounds of a Person who has no Tincture of Learning, and yet understands all that is told her, and retains all the Notions of Tourbillions and Worlds, without Confusion.​[233]​ (88)

The Enlightenment concept of the universal educability of human beings is evident here (though this will be qualified, as it so often was; some cultures were not seen as developed enough to participate, as will be seen below).​[234]​ In addition, women can learn science via Fontenelle’s text by situating themselves in their imagination with the female character in the dialogue. Such characters must therefore be rendered novelistically, with ‘no supernatural Character’, to enable this identification:
‘tis only to read, and to represent to your selves at the same time what you read, and to form some Image of it that may be clear and free from perplexing Difficulties. I ask of the Ladies (for this System) but the same Attention that they must give the Princess of Cleve, if they would follow the Intrigue, and find out the Beauties of it. (89)

Thus women’s prior education in the pleasures of narrative through their reading of romance will predispose them to engage with philosophy. Fontenelle here assimilates the Cartesian method of formulating clear and distinct ideas to the novel readers’ participation in exciting narrative ‘Intrigue’.
Fantasy, too, is restrained by this novelistic realism:
I would not have any Imagination of the Inhabitants of the Worlds that are entirely fabulous, but have endeavoured to relate only that which might be thought most reasonable; and the Visions themselves that I have added, have something of a real Foundation in them; the True and the False are here mixed, but they always are very easie to be distinguished; yet I do not undertake to justifie a Composure so fantastical: This is the most important Point of this Work, and ‘tis this only that I cannot give a Reason for; but the publick Censure will inform me, what I ought to think of this Design. (90)

This is the tone of a novelist’s apology, particularly in the appeal to public debate to validate the art. The newly democratic intentions of both Fontenelle and Behn are further shown by the work’s having, as Behn says in her preface, ‘the Novelty of the Subject in vulgar languages’ (73).​[235]​ Her concern with translation is itself another aspect of dialogic cosmopolitanism, of course.​[236]​ Behn thinks that Fontenelle lacks verisimilitude in parts—in his speculative population of other worlds, he ‘hath urged this Fancy too far’—and attributes to him the sort of ‘wild Fancy’ (77) that the proto-novelists would distance themselves from. Fontenelle, on the other hand, is concerned to assert the realism of the text and employs novelistic devices to establish the setting of the dialogue—and to suggest an eroticism which is, playfully, something of a teasing deception. Line Cottegnies detects significant nuances in Behn’s translation that declare her radicalism, exploiting ambiguities in the original to make Fontenelle (who was subversive enough) even more heterodox.​[237]​







Fig. 7. Frontispiece to Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes (1707).

On the first of these five nights, the air is ‘cool and refreshing’ and the setting is idyllic, lush, and conducive to erotic thought:
The Moon was about an hour high, which shining through the Boughs of the Trees, made a most agreeable Mixture, and checker’d the Paths beneath with a most resplendent white upon the green, which appeared to be black by that Light; there was no Cloud to be seen that could hide from us, or obscure the smallest of the Stars, which lookt all like pure polisht Gold, whose Luster was extreamly heightened by the deep Azure Field on which they were placed. 

The frontispiece (Fig. 7) does indeed show these moonlit bowers, and the almost conventional representation of a couple’s assignation, but the depiction of the sky departs from novelistic realism, and from the prose description; instead, we see a scientific schema, showing the bright planets with their moons and their orbits, suspended in Descartes’ vortices made manifest and rendering the scene electrifying with potential revelation rather than serenely contemplative. The picture reveals the underlying structures yet to be discovered through conversation. The Philosopher continues:
These pleasant Objects set me thinking, and had it not been for Madam la Marquiese, I might have continued in that silent Contemplation; but the Presence of a Person of her Wit and Beauty hindered me from giving up my thoughts intirely to the Moon and Stars. (93)

Thus the introduction of a second person, and particularly one with the erotic appeal of the Marquiese, appears to distract the scientific mind from its true object, and pleasure and knowledge are at odds; however, the dialogue progresses in such a way as to make knowledge delightful, and both sociality and eroticism a spur to discovery. The beauty of the setting gives the narrator and principal interlocutor the opportunity to engage in flattery and flirtatious dialogue with the Marquiese, likening her blonde beauty to the day and comparing her favourably to the night, which she has personified as a brunette; she is also associated with the blonde ‘Heroines in Romances’ (94). At the same time, the setting enables the Philosopher to conduct the discourse along a path that is simultaneously scientific and speculative by pointing out that the night, as well as being a stimulus to lovers, who ‘do always address themselves to the Night, in all their Songs and Elegies’ (94), facilitates astronomical observation: passion, imagination, and knowledge become fused. The day, by contrast, keeps hidden the secrets that inspire the philosopher:
Ah, cry’d I, I cannot forgive [the Sun] his taking from me the sight of all those Worlds that are there. Worlds, said she, what Worlds? And looking earnestly upon me, asked me again, what I meant? I ask your Pardon, Madam, said I, I was insensibly led to this fond discovery of my weakness. (95)

His weakness is the fancy that there may be many other worlds, which he believes to be true ‘because that Opinion is pleasant’ and gives him ‘very diverting Idea’s, which have fixed themselves delightfully in [his] Imaginations, and ‘tis necessary that even solid Truth should have its agreeableness’ (95). His weakness, in other words, is that of the novelists’ intended readers, for whom pleasure and truth are one.
The Marquiese indignantly claims an equal share in this passion for knowledge, and the Philosopher, playing hard to get, has to be persuaded into initiating her into these same delights:
Well, said she, since your Folly is so pleasing to you, give me a share of it; I will believe whatever you please concerning the Stars, if I find it pleasant. Ah, Madam, said I, hastily, it is not such a Pleasure as you find in one of Mullier’s [Molière’s] plays; it is a Pleasure that is—I know not where, in our Reason, and which only transports the Mind. What, replied she, do you think me then incapable of all those Pleasures which entertain our Reason, and only treat the Mind? I will instantly shew you the contrary, at least as soon as you have told me what you know of your Stars. (95)

She thus has also to persuade him, in turn, that she can engage in intellectual pleasures; the dialogues are as much a dialogic struggle for women’s recognition as they are an uncovering of astronomical mysteries, a movement that will be enacted in many of the novels of the period. Throughout the dialogues, the Philosopher treats the Marquiese as an intellectual equal, though having less knowledge, and she responds to his demonstration with agility, easily following his argument, and anticipating and constructing much of it herself.​[238]​ The participation of women in dialogue is a crucial index of the commitment to communicative reason. The relationship between the Marquiese and the Philosopher is akin to those explored by eighteenth-century novelists with feminist inclinations, whom I discuss in Chapter Four.
The Philosopher feels an affront to his manly amour propre at the idea of being ‘in a Grove at ten a Clock of the Night’ and talking of ‘nothing but Philosophy, to the greatest Beauty in the World’ (95). But the Marquiese is ‘already but too much prepossest with’ the excitement of ‘Novelty’: ‘There was a necessity of yielding, and all I could do was to prevail with her to be secret, for the saving of my Honour’ (95-96); Fontenelle wittily reverses the roles of seducer and seduced. The Philosopher tries to ‘perswade her that ‘twas much better to pass the time in another manner of Conversation, which the most reasonable People in our Circumstances would do’ (96). In other words, the conventional, strategic notion of rationality, where a man and woman alone at night are concerned, would be to converse of love, or even to ‘converse’ in another sense of the word and engage in sexual activity. But he is forced to surrender his virtue and induces the Marquiese into the mysteries of natural philosophy; an avatar of Hermes, he uses language to guide her dialogically between worlds.
The Philosopher invites her to share his intellectual pleasures: ‘I need only draw the Curtain, and shew you the World’ (98). This latter image has heretical undertones too, conjuring up Satan’s temptation of Christ.​[239]​ There is a suggestion that knowledge is transgressive as well as fun. And according to the Philosopher, ignoble or at least hedonistic passions can motivate the search for knowledge: ‘Astronomy is the Daughter of Idleness, Geometry is the Child of Interest; and should we inquire into the Original of Poetry, we should in all appearance find, that it owes its beginning to Love’ (99). This anticipates the materialism of Mandeville, where the motivation behind scientific curiosity may be less than disinterested. Displaying an anti-utilitarian, aesthetic, and hedonistic ethos, the Marquiese declares, ‘I must content my self with Astronomy’, for Geometry, according to the Philosopher’s ‘Genealogy’, requires ‘a Soul more interested in worldly Concerns’; as an aristocrat, she has ‘all the leisure and time to spare that Astronomy requires’, and the erotic drive has now apparently been sublimated into this, for poetry is only fit for ‘those of a more Amorous Inclination’ (99). 
The Philosopher makes occasional sly attempts to turn the conversation away from natural philosophy to romance but, utterly seduced now by science, she rejects his moves, putting forth intelligent questions that advance the discourse:





Though open-heartedly admitting women to dialogue, Fontenelle’s universalism breaks down in places. This is not uncommon in Enlightenment texts, especially in travel narratives and other proto-ethnological works; hence a common humanity may be asserted at one moment and denied at another, as here, with the Moon’s inhabitants:
I do not believe there are Men there, Madam, but some other odd sort of Creatures: Pray, Madam, consider but how much the Face of Nature is chang’d betwixt this and China; other Faces, other Shapes, other Manners, and almost quite different Principles of reasoning, from this to the Moon the difference ought to be more considerable. When one travels towards the new discovered World of America, &c. and finds the Inhabitants there to be hardly Men, but rather a kind of Brutes in humane shape, and that not perfect neither, so that we could travel to the Orb of the Moon, I do not think we should find Men and Women there. (121)

Earlier, it had been suggested instead that different peoples might have common ‘Principles of living’ that would allow them to participate in scientific debate at some future point. Here, those native Americans that before could acquire astronomical knowledge through pedagogic dialogue have become bestial.​[240]​ Yet, as suddenly, this position is undermined as the Marquiese embraces the idea of a universal human rationality; she cannot imagine the moon creatures, yet can:
look upon the Inhabitants under the South-Pole, as a People known to us, because they are most certainly very like us; and that we may see them if we please to give our selves the trouble; they will continue still where they are, and cannot run away from our knowledge; but we shall never know what these Inhabitants of the Moon are; ‘tis that that vexes me. (121-22)

It is not difficult to see here Fontenelle’s unformulated doubts over the equality of his fellow human beings being projected onto his imagined plurality of beings.​[241]​
Dialogicity is qualified in another sense; the Philosopher’s position is open to question and he makes an intriguing parallel between scientific debate and political polemic:
I concern my self no further in these Matters, than Men use to do in Civil Wars; where the Uncertainty of what may be, makes People still entertain a Correspondence with the adverse Party: As for me, tho’ I see the Moon inhabited, I live very civilly with those that do not believe it; and [. . .] I may, upon occasion, with Honour go over to their side who have the better; but still they gain some considerable Advantage over us. (111)

This displays either a certain opportunist cynicism which undermines dialogicity or a genuinely disinterested openness.​[242]​ The open-ended mode of dialogue, as characterised in my introduction, thus acquires further shades that are not immediately apparent on a first analysis of this mode. 




In fact, the Philosopher’s rejection of speculation does become qualified: overnight, the Marquiese has become seduced into believing in lunar inhabitants despite herself. The Philosopher warns her against being persuaded into dogmatism, and to hold to a critical, dialectical position on knowledge, ever-open to revision through dialogue (including self-dialogue): ‘You go too fast, said I, Madam; one ought to give but one half of ones Thoughts and Belief to Opinions of this nature, reserving the other half free for receiving the contrary Opinion, if there be occasion’ (125). 
Invoking images from romance (the shipwreck is a key motif in many of the Graeco-Roman fictions​[243]​), the Marquiese yearns for both narrative excitement and dialogic contact with the other—the syntax and imagery well convey her passion:
Oh, but I shou’d be glad, cry’d the Marquiese, that some great Ship-wreck, occasion’d by a mighty Tempest, wou’d throw a good many of these People upon our World, that we might at leisure consider their extraordinary Shape and Figure. (128)

Caught up in the fun of discovery, she pluckily has no fears of being abducted by these aliens to sate their reciprocal curiosity: 
if they had Skill enough to fall upon the external Surface of our Air, and that from thence they shou’d catch us, like Fish, out of a Curiosity of seeing us, wou’d that please you, Madam? Why not, said she, laughing? I wou’d go of my self into their Nets, to have the satisfaction of seeing those that had caught me. (128-29)

This reciprocity humanises what in practice, in many Enlightenment ethnological encounters, would have a darker side. 





The couple turn their speculative energies to the planet Venus, whose associations, of course, lead naturally to talk of love once more. For the inhabitants of Venus, our moon could play the role that their planet plays for us. The moon ‘is exactly cut out to be the Source of their Amours, and the lucky Star of their Intrigues; which Titles are most agreeable to the pretty, clear twinkling Planets, which have in ‘em a certain Air of Gallantry’ (138). They playfully imagine that the planet of erotic pleasure is a planet, too, of characters from romantic fiction, conversing in an aesthetically heightened form of dialogue: ‘the very Mobile of Venus are all made up of Celladons and Silvanders, and their most ordinary Conversations excel the finest in Clelia’ (138). On a democratic impulse, ordinary people (the ‘Mobile’) have become romantic heroes and heroines, akin to those of Madame de Scudéry’s fictions. 
This passage, too, invites cultural relativism of a kind that came to fruition in Montesquieu; the Venusians are compared to Spaniards, whose supposed libidinous nature is determined by climate—this ‘knowledge’ comes to the Marquiese as a direct empirical apprehension, she claims, interrupting spontaneously, though it is clearly the work of her own erotic fancy:
I perceive very well, interrupted the Marquiese, what kind of People the Inhabitants of Venus are; they are, like our Moors of Granada, a sort of little Sun-burnt Gentlemen, always in Love, full of Life and Fire, given to making Verses, and great Lovers of Musick, and every Day inventing Feasts, Balls and Masquerades, to entertain their Mistresses. (138)

Fontenelle may be subtly undermining her relativism: those who interrupt in dialogue are very often invalidated by that very act, for it indicates a certain irrational haste and a revocation of the conditions of polite debate. The freewheeling fantasy then spins off to Mercury, applying the same relativistic principle there to discover that those who dwell there—like ‘our Negroes’—must be mad, acting with unrestrained spontaneity, ‘by Chance, and by the suddain Impulses’ (138).


Fig. 8. Illustration to Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes (1707) (facing p. 1).

This breathless whirling through the Solar System, which so enraptures the Marquiese, is a central component of the Cartesian physics that the Philosopher expounds. Yet it also symbolises the erotic pleasure of discovery that overwhelms the Marquiese:
Let my Brains turn round, said she, laughing, if they will; I long to know what these Tourbillions are; make haste therefore to satisfie me, I’ll manage my self no longer, but henceforth abandon all my Thoughts to Philosophy, without Reserve, let the World talk what they please, but let me understand these Whirlings. I did not think you capable of such Transports, said I, Madam; and I am sorry they have not a fitter Object. (143)

The illustration graphically conveys the dizzying exhilaration of the Commerce of Light that mirrors the planets whirling in their vortices (Fig. 8). The loss of self, the abandonment ‘without Reserve’ despite society’s disapproval, in these ‘Transports’ of ecstasy over knowledge again suggests equally both the ‘daring to know’ without restraint of Enlightenment thirst for knowledge, and an erotic undercurrent. Vortices, both in Fontenelle’s language and in this image, are a metaphor for the energy involved in commerce—in all of the senses that the word held during this gestation of modernity.​[244]​ However, centrally, ‘commerce’ is dialogue; other writers that I examine were attracted or repulsed by this in varying degrees. But Fontenelle wholeheartedly celebrates it, and invites women into the conversation. For women, seeking to participate in masculine scientific discourse is as much an affront to ‘the World’ as sexual misbehaviour.
Fontenelle also draws political implications which, as with the hesitancies which emerge over cultural difference, show the limits Enlightenment universalism often placed upon itself. This time, there is a suggestion that there are class barriers to extending scientific dialogue outwards. The first hint of this is an uncharacteristic nervousness over, and a retreat from, the instability that the new system invokes. The Marquiese has enquired into the dependency of smaller planets—satellites which orbit other planets rather than the Sun. Chance, or the fact that Jupiter, for example, is ‘happier or stronger’ than its satellites dictates that ‘he subdu’d ‘em all four’ (144). Earth could have undergone this fate, being weaker than Jupiter, but ‘Chance of Situation has decided our Fortune’ (144). This apparent lack of design (subtly heretical) causes apprehension in the Marquiese that may also resemble apprehensions over sexual relationships—the talk of subduing (amplified by the role of seducer that Jupiter played in myth) has these overtones as well as more narrowly political ones:
Pray, what Assurance have we, said the Marquiese, that our Earth shall always remain in the same Situation? I am afraid we may make a Trip one Day or other, towards some Planet as dangerous as Jupiter, who may sweep us round with it self; or that some stronger Planet may approach nearer to us; for I fansie, that the violent Motions of the heavenly Matter you speak of, may agitate and shake the Planets so irregularly, that it might sometimes bring ‘em nearer together, and at other times remove ‘em farther from one another. (144)

The suggestion that this planetary system of dominance and subversion is due to chance and the unrestrained power of strong over weak has a certain critical force, but the Marquiese will draw from this celestial hierarchy conservative principles for the terrestrial world:
I understand very well, said the Marquiese, how these different Weights are regulated, according to their several degrees: Wou’d to God, there were some such Order amongst us Mortals, to confine every Man to the Station that is fit for him. (145)

Yet despite the sympathy that Fontenelle elicits from us for the Marquiese, this is not all; the force of the dialogic exchange between the aristocrat (who naturally would favour the preservation of hierarchy) and the philosophical commoner, plus the implication that the hierarchy is instituted randomly, all tend to subvert her position. It is undercut too, with some irony by the fact that the very dialogic initiation into science that she is eagerly pursuing would be seen as the breaking out of the confines of her station. Her apologetic conservatism continues in the further discussion of Jupiter’s moons which the Philosopher has populated for their joint imagination; the Marquiese sees them as necessarily colonised, owing a feudal, even patriarchal, subservience:
I wou’d, says the Marquiese, have the Inhabitants of these four Moons to be Colonies of Jupiter, and receive their Laws and Manners from thence, and pay Homage and Respect to Jupiter, and not to look upon that great Planet, but with Veneration. (146)

Yet the Philosopher exposes such domination as based on fear rather than reason and so, implicitly, as unbefitting the kind of communicative rationality they are engaged in:
For my part, we having no Authority over the Inhabitants of our Moon, makes me think that Jupiter has no more over the Inhabitants of his four; and I believe, one of the Advantages he has most reason to brag of, is, that he frightens ‘em. (146)

Knowledge should be a source of pleasure rather than fear. Earlier, the fear of eclipses felt by primitive peoples had been disparaged (116-17); the Philosopher repeats the theme again just prior to the Marquiese’s homage to Jupiter: ‘Eclipses are so familiar to that World, they must certainly be a Divertisement to them, whereas they frighten the inhabitants of our Earth’ (146). Fontenelle suggests via that superstitious fear that ‘Veneration’ of political domination is equally unenlightened.
The Philosopher—though seeking to charm her once more—reminds her of her privileges, and how profoundly these too rest upon chance:
You ought to thank [Nature] for being young, and not old, young and handsome, and not young and ugly, young, handsome, and a French Woman, and not a young and Handsome Italian. You have abundance of other Reasons of Gratitude, than those of the Situation of your Tourbillion, or the temperate Qualities of your Country. (152)





On the following, final night the Philosopher fulfils his promise and astounds the Marquiese even more by telling her that the fixed stars are suns like our own, suggesting a vast universe teeming with planets orbiting these suns and each, in their turn, inhabited like Earth. As in Hume’s sceptical interrogations, Fontenelle’s dialogism reaches the limits of rationalism, questioning its own foundations in its eagerness to be receptive to every voice.​[245]​ The Marquiese is satirically sceptical (in truly philosophical fashion) both towards the Philosopher’s amorousness and science itself, suspecting that the latter is without foundation and is as anthropocentric and relative as she considers love to be:
It is a strange thing, said the Marquiese laughing, that Love saves himself from all Dangers, and there is no Systeme or Opinion can hurt him: But tell me frankly, are Systemes certainly true? Do not dissemble, for I promise to keep it secret: I fansie ‘tis founded upon a very small bottom, a fix’d Star enlightened of it self, as the Sun is, and therefore it must be a Sun, the Soul and Centre of the World having Planets turning round it as that also has. Is this absolutely necessary, says she? (155-56)

She suggests that this knowledge, founded in ‘a fix’d Star enlightened of it self’, is solipsistic and asocial, despite the dialogic activity out of which this has arisen. The Philosopher concedes that love and science are indeed closely aligned, but in a different sense, and here he reaffirms that passionate pleasure principle which is common to the two discourses, and which drives scientific discovery. Nonetheless, scientific argument is irresistible because of its truth as well as the addictive pleasures it offers:
I fear, Madam, said I: Since we are always in the humour of mixing some little Gallantries with our most serious Discourses, give me leave to tell you, that Mathematical reasoning is in some things near a-kin to Love. (156)

The link between the narrative of dialogic education and that of seduction, which the dialogues emblemise, is made explicit: 
you cannot allow the smallest Favour to a Lover, but he will soon perswade you to yield another, and after that a little more, and in the end prevails entirely; so if you grant the least Principle to a Mathematician, he will instantly draw a consequence from it, which you must yield also, and [. . .], in a short time, he will lead you so far, that you cannot retreat. These two sorts of Men, the Lover and Philosopher always take more than is given ‘em. (156) 

This syllogistic eroticism encompasses sociality. The Philosopher employs an image of each heavenly body as ‘like a Balloon’ (160), constantly inflating and deflating. This image alone enchants the Marquiese and, in telling imagery of her own, inspires her with a vision of a perpetual competition between bodies that is, at the same time, co-operative and social—and perhaps, in its ‘swell and fall’, somewhat erotic:
I am extreamly in love, said the Marquiese, with these Idea’s you give me of the Balloons, which swell and fall every Moment; and those Worlds, which are always jostling together: But, above all, I am pleas’d to consider, that this Strife amongst ‘em produces a Commerce of Light, which is the only Traffick they can have. (160)

The pleasure she takes in this suggests both the pleasures and contradictions of Enlightenment sociability itself, and that ideological defence of individualistic commercial interchange (the ‘jostling together’ of the market-place) as benevolent, generating Enlightenment in the form of a ‘Commerce of Light’ that is typical of the age—here, positioned somewhere in between Shaftesbury and Mandeville.
But this leads to the suggestion of a darker, more fearful kind of interchange between peoples: ‘No, no, said I, Madam; that is not the only Traffick [. . .] We have Comets from thence too, who are always adorn’d with shining Hair, a venerable Beard, and a Royal Train’ (160). Note that fear is associated with monarchist tyranny again. But the Marquiese dispels this fear with the raillery of her newly acquired rationalism; as with eclipses, the superstitious views of the unenlightened masses are excluded from the Philosopher’s dialogue:
Good God! said the Marquiese, laughing; What Ambassadors are these? We cou’d easily dispence with their Visits, for they do nothing but fright us. They fright only Fools and Children, Madam, said I; but of these Ignorants, I confess, there are a great number. (160)

Thus even Fontenelle’s graceful and generously open dialogue acknowledges the contemporary constraints on communicative reason. 
Shaftesbury nervously expunged the erotic from knowledge, sensing its potential to disrupt polite society (though it lurks there in disguise). Paradoxically, too, society itself can undermine it—but so can enthusiasm, eroticism, and asceticism. Mandeville, in turn, critiques Shaftesbury for the expulsion of material drives, but sees dogmatism as a threat to sociability. In Fontenelle, eroticism both inspires and endangers civility. Fontenelle also explores a model of dialogue between the sexes which suggests the possibility of a rational love affair, where communicative reason coexists with and is inspired by attraction. As my final chapter will show, this will emerge frequently in novels of the period where the subject matter deals with romance but where, both formally and materially, the developing novel absorbs the dialogue; at this point, perhaps, emerges the most fully realised version of eirenic dialogism.

Hume’s League of Reason and Beauty

The serene even-handedness in the dialogues above (though not without qualification as I have shown) is also found in David Hume, who exemplifies these ideals of urbane modernity quintessentially.​[246]​ Shaftesbury’s benevolence was inherited in some ways by Hume, both in politeness of tone and in the content, with Hume pursuing a version of sensibility.​[247]​ Hume is noted for his free-thought and his scepticism—traits that might suggest a taste for dialogue.​[248]​ His dialogic concerns are signalled in his ‘On Essay-Writing’, clearly aligning him with that Enlightenment culture of dialogism that I have been describing. Here, Hume famously calls for a reconciliation between the ‘learned’ and the ‘conversible’ factions of polite society; that is, ‘The elegant Part of Mankind who are not immers’d in the animal Life, but employ themselves in the Operations of the Mind’ (533).​[249]​ Note that here, he is already hinting at the exclusion of the masses from dialogue. He goes on to characterise these two factions:
The Learned are such as have chosen for their Portion the higher and more difficult Operations of the Mind, which require Leisure and Solitude [. . .] The conversible World join to a sociable Disposition, and a Taste of Pleasure, an Inclination to the easier and more gentle Exercises of the Understanding [. . .] Such Subjects of Thought furnish not sufficient Employment in Solitude, but require the Company and Conversation of our Fellow-Creatures [. . .] And this brings Mankind together in Society, where every one displays his Thoughts and Observations in the best Manner he is able, and mutually gives and receives Information, as well as Pleasure. (533-34)

The sense of mutual commerce among the ‘conversible’, and its imbrication with pleasure could not be clearer. He notes that the sociable portion of mankind are avid observers ‘of the Blemishes and Perfections’ around them, making them akin to novelists, or at least novel readers, in their attention to human detail and their evaluation of social behaviour. And this observation yields narrative pleasure; Kant, who was woken by Hume from his dogmatic slumbers, will make similar remarks.​[250]​ But, Hume asks, is this sociable pleasure enough? ‘Must our whole Discourse be a continued Series of gossiping Stories and idle Remarks? Must the Mind never rise higher [. . .]?’ (534). The contrary faction, that of the learned, has produced a literature made ‘barbarous’ by its cultivation in solitude by ‘Men without any Taste of Life or Manners, and without that Liberty and Facility of Thought and Expression, which can only be acquir’d by Conversation’ (534).
Hume’s solution is to dialogise culture by placing these two fragments of humanity themselves in dialogue, which he explicitly describes in the metaphors of international trade, conflating two senses of commerce:
I shall give Intelligence to the Learned of whatever passes in Company, and shall endeavour to import into Company whatever Commodities I find in my native Country proper for their Use and Entertainment. The Balance of Trade we need not be jealous of, nor will there be any Difficulty to preserve it on both Sides. The Materials of this Commerce must chiefly be furnish’d by Conversation and common Life: The Manufacturing of them alone belongs to Learning. (535) 

Thus the learned, again like the novelist, must give intellectual form to the matter of quotidian life. This barter of dialogic commodities, bearing pleasures of the imagination across boundaries, implies a universal humanity yet, as we have seen, Hume begins his analysis by excluding a large part of humanity, and the reality of capitalist trade, too, is far more brutal than this idealised internationalism; such are the contradictions that lurk beneath even the most even-handed of dialogists. However, in spite of this, women, ‘who are the Sovereigns of the Empire of Conversation’ (535), and who are ‘much better Judges of all polite Writing than Men of the Same Degree of Understanding’ (536), are considered valuable citizens of this ‘Union’ he has ‘projected betwixt the learned and conversible Worlds’ (537)—a realm of novelised intellectual discourse and pleasures, ‘a League, offensive and defensive, against our common Enemies, against the Enemies of Reason and Beauty’ (536). 
Hume prefaced his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (c. 1751; pub. posthumously 1779) with a frame-dialogue; a dialogue about dialogicity, and displays there the same concern to maintain politeness and also to avoid any hint of pedagogical hierarchy. There, Pamphilus, who will relate the central, nested dialogue, begins by suggesting that dialogue and philosophical enquiry—at least, as it is currently practiced—are inimical, which is interesting, and quite un-Socratic.​[251]​ Despite the proliferation of dialogues in his time, dialogue, he says:
has been little practiced in later ages, and has seldom succeeded in the hands of those who have attempted it. Accurate and regular argument, indeed, such as is now expected of philosophical enquirers, naturally throws a man into the methodical and didactic manner.​[252]​

But if a writer does attempt to convey systematic philosophy in dialogue form ‘to give a freer air to his performance, and avoid the appearance of author and reader, he is apt to run into a worse inconvenience, and convey the image of pedagogue and pupil’ (29). Thus, if Pamphilus is indeed Hume’s spokesperson on dialogue, he does not want to be seen to preach. And, again, he is concerned to preserve the politeness and sociality that guarantees mutual exchange:
if he carries on the dispute in the natural spirit of good company [. . .] preserving a proper balance among the speakers; he often loses so much time in preparations and transitions, that the reader will scarcely think himself compensated, by all the graces of dialogue, for the order, brevity, and precision, which are sacrificed to them. (29)

Despite the potential pitfalls of dialogue, Pamphilus does see two types of subject ‘to which dialogue-writing is peculiarly adapted.’ Any ‘important’ but uncontroversial and ‘obvious’ point of theology can benefit from the aesthetic, rhetorical strengths of dialogue: the ‘novelty of manner,’ the ‘vivacity of conversation’ and the ‘variety of lights, presented by various personages and characters’ (29). What is already socially uncontentious, then, can be adorned with all the tropes of sociality that dialogue can offer. But also:
Any question of philosophy [. . .] which is so obscure and uncertain, that human reason can reach no fixed determination with regard to it  [. . .] seems to lead us naturally into the style of dialogue and conversation. Reasonable men may be allowed to differ, where no one can reasonably be positive: Opposite sentiments, even without any decision, afford an agreeable amusement: And if the subject be curious and interesting, the book carries us, in a manner, into company; and unites the two greatest and purest pleasures of human life, study and society. (30)

So, unresolved questions can be investigated through dialogue, and this is both pleasurable and conducive to social harmony. He adds: ‘Happily, these circumstances are all to be found in the subject of natural religion.’ In Pamphilus’ voice, this could be a naively optimistic utopianism but it is almost certainly irony on Hume’s part—or perhaps an ironic regret that conditions prevent this utopianism being realised in contemporary religious discourse. The emphasis on pleasure is shared with many of these texts; the book as commodity, as luxury good, reproduces the pleasures in sociability that institutions such as the coffee-house had made a prominent part of eighteenth-century life. The self-consciousness here about reasonable men being allowed to differ is itself revealing of a concern to mimic the life of true conversation, but Hume in practice goes on to undermine monologic tendencies as much as possible (whilst still attempting to persuade, of course). 
In the central part of the Dialogues, modelled on Cicero’s The Nature of the Gods, Hume sets forth, through Cleanthes, Demea, and Philo, respectively, a posteriori (the argument from design), a priori (arguing cosmologically from the necessity of a first cause), and sceptical positions concerning the existence of a deity.​[253]​ One established tradition has Hume concealing the full extent of Philo’s, and his own, heterodoxy in order to avoid persecution.​[254]​ This is an important recognition of the strategic forces that arraign themselves in particular historical circumstances against a potential pure dialogism.​[255]​ Other dialogists display this same wariness through various devices—irony, ambiguity, contradiction, the redistribution of viewpoints among interlocutors, and so on. Thus, Mandeville, whose mouthpiece is usually Cleomenes, allows some of his more heretical religious opinions to be voiced by the normally orthodox Horatio; this is, of course, as much a tactic to defuse hostile criticism, hinting at another of the darker boundaries to free debate in eighteenth-century society. 
Yet this division of voices is also not unlike the polyphony valued by Bakhtin as a feature of the novel. Against many older interpretations, which sought to present Philo unequivocably as the sceptical voice of Hume, some commentators now see the Dialogues as a far more elusive—and thus dialogic—text, where Hume detachedly allows the dialectic embodied in unconstrained discourse have its way.​[256]​ These unresolved debates are not only about who, if any, of the characters can be said to represent Hume, but about the very status of dialogue itself, and range from W.B. Carnochan, who detects some highly undialogic traits alongside a vision of Ciceronian friendship, to Prince arguing that, with Hume, we meet the end of dialogue in the eighteenth century altogether.​[257]​ Part of this dispute is over the framing dialogue which, through Pamphilus, makes claims for dialogue which Prince claims are incoherent. Prince argues that the dialogue (in, for example, Shaftesbury and Berkeley) became dominant because it mirrored the form of a rational, neo-Platonic Christianity. Hume, says Prince, subverted this project, undermining the very force of dialogue (though this rests again on identifying Philo with Hume). 
The modality of the Dialogues is thus complex. The discourse is mostly open-ended, with apparently little of the manipulation and setting up of straw men that was castigated; yet Carnochan detects subterfuge and strategic action, with Philo and Cleanthes virtually conspiring against Demea and manipulating the dialogue accordingly, but with the narrative resolving comically and Philo and Cleanthes conversing amicably. Prince, conversely, has Demea and Cleanthes in an unwitting alliance. The tone is mostly eirenic, yet Demea is excommunicated from the Ciceronian friendship posited by Carnochan and leaves on what seems to be a sour note. But each interpretation discovers different shades in this text.
Jonathan Dancy talks of Hume’s ‘skill at the art of concealment’; he refers to how the ‘choice of the dialogue form inevitably raised expectations in the minds of contemporary readers’ whereby they could ultimately discern the author, in a way which required the author’s views to be identical with the views that emerged dominant in the discussion’.​[258]​ Hume subverts these expectations, much as Jauss sees such generic ‘horizons of expectation’ being continually revised.​[259]​ But there was equally, and in tension with those expectations, an expectation, or at least an aspiration or claim that dialogues were open-ended representations of unconstrained discourse. Dancy remarks that some interpretations have seen Philo as the dominant voice, where others see a harmonious, undecided polyphony (as in Simpson), but for him, no voice dominates; this is a text where (recalling Shaftesbury) ‘it is possible for the author to disappear’.​[260]​ It is a limit point that other dialogues approach, particularly during this period as I have argued above, and that the novel, too, approaches, culminating, Bakhtin again would have us believe, in Dostoevsky.​[261]​




Chapter Three: Balances of Deceit: Logomachy, Revolt, and Reaction






Fig. 9: Thomas Rowlandson, The Breaking up of the Blue Stocking Club (1815).
The polemical dialogue

In the previous chapter, I explored the eighteenth-century ideal of the balanced, consensual dialogue, whose interlocutors practice a disinterest qualified only by the pleasures of sociality and the pursuit of enlightenment through debate. Thus I showed how the dialogue expresses the more utopian conception of dialogue as mutual, benign exchange amongst equals, where Habermas’s communicative action is at work. This utopianism is often universalist in scope, particularly towards women. I showed, too, how the broadest and most generous of these works involve a textual richness and humanist appeal that approaches that of the novel at its best. In addition, there is, in Fontenelle, a fusion of amorous, even erotic pleasures with intellectual ones in conjunction with the inclusivity towards women. By contrast, in this chapter I want to explore dialogues as logomachy: exchanges that are not harmonious, or consensual; dialogues that disagree even on the conventions and ideals of dialogue. There, I chose the pineapple, shared by Mandeville’s discoursers, as a symbol of social, commercial harmony; here, the presiding fruit might well be the golden apple of Eris, goddess of discord, which divided the gods and set humans at war with each other. Dialogue here is adversarial and contentious, at times abusively hostile. This is the polemical mode of dialogue, as outlined in the introduction; it may, however, be realised in varying degrees of openness. Here, opposed opinions do not necessarily become reconciled, or mutually transcended; argument does not always lead to enlightenment. 
Richard and Maria Edgeworth neatly sum up how many in the eighteenth century saw their age as a serene interplay of ideas; the civilised intercourse contrasted with a more barbarous age where the duelling sword took the place of the harmonious encounter that print technology enabled:
In fact, this is a dispute merely about words, and as the extension of the art of printing puts it in the power of every man to propose and to defend his opinions at length, and at leisure, the best friends may support different sides of a speculative question with mutual regard, and the most violent enemies with civility and decorum. Can we believe that Tycho Brahe lost half his nose in a dispute with a Danish nobleman about a mathematical demonstration?​[263]​

This is in a chapter on geometry, which has served as the model and theme of dialectical thought in philosophical dialogues from Plato’s Meno to Imre Lakatos’s revival of the genre, Proofs and Refutations.​[264]​ The backward glance at duelling, and its links to feudalism, is a commonplace: novels such as Burney’s Evelina (1778), Godwin’s Caleb Williams (1794), and Robert Bage’s Hermsprong (1796) among many other texts, including Mandeville’s and Shaftesbury’s, engage with this theme.​[265]​ The Tatler features a dialogue on duels, where the two modes of engagement, feudal violence and modern rationalism, are neatly juxtaposed.​[266]​ 
However, some were not as sanguine as the Edgeworths were about the possibility of rational discourse in post-feudal times. For many conservatives in the eighteenth century, the modern ideal of polite conversation was impossible or even undesirable, and they were, perhaps, more aware of the latent hostility that can be concealed behind the often ideological facade of reasoned, balanced debate. The geometrical calm of the Edgeworths often concealed latent swordplay. Hence Rowlandson’s caricature of the Bluestockings (Fig. 9), whose civilised intellectual meetings explode here into barbaric discord. Elizbaeth Eger illustrates how Rowlandson depicts the circle of dialogue among the Bluestockings spatially as a ‘violent vortex’; dialogue has become distorted, recalling Sarah Fielding’s Turba rather than the exhilarating process of discovery represented by Fontenelle’s tourbillions.​[267]​ Of course, this catfight is wishful thinking, fuelled by misogyny, but it still captures the repressed counterlife of Enlightenment dialogue.

Berkeley’s demotic monologue of vision

David Hume was, in his development of a philosophy of sensibility, a successor to Shaftesbury, and provides perhaps the best example of Shaftesburian benevolence in the actual practice of his dialogues; I explored this equanimity in the previous chapter. There were dissenters from this ideal, however: George Berkeley, for example, responded vehemently to both Shaftesbury and Mandeville. He, too, chose the dialogue form for his critique of modern thought, Alciphron (1732).​[268]​ John Richetti convincingly argues that Berkeley’s thought is dialogic in that it is both inwardly self-questioning and an incitement to the reader to think critically.​[269]​ Yet, this dialogism must be qualified: I will show Berkeley as practicing a discourse that polemicises monologically against modernity, yet that is not untouched by that dialogism which has been identified. 
Hume took Locke’s materialist empiricism to the point where it undermines not only itself but also the reasoning consciousness, whereupon he famously abandons speculation, retires from the contest, and restores himself by re-entering the pleasurable world of social intercourse.​[270]​ Berkeley, however, saw Locke’s theories and what they spawned as undermining social stability, as he did the modern world from which they arose, and this will heavily qualify his attitude to the dialogue. This antipathy to modernity, in particular to certain kinds of literature and discourse, and the associated mistrust of dialogism, will be seen in all its vituperousness in Berkeley’s suite of seven dialogues.
		
Fig. 10: Frontispiece to Alciphron, Volume i.

Alciphron; or, The Minute Philosopher, written in 1728 and published in 1732, was conceived amid the disappointment over the exploded fertility of that mercantile utopia, the South Sea Company (which collapsed c. 1721). He wrote it in Bermuda whilst launching the project for the academy celebrated in his poem, ‘On the Prospect of Planting Arts and Learning in America’ (1726; pub. 1752); this, too, was doomed to disappointment.​[271]​ The personal involvement in the crisis of financial modernisation must have enhanced Berkeley’s aversion to modernity and its accompanying doctrines.​[272]​ The fertile waters (‘Fountain of living waters’) depicted in the frontispiece to Volume i of Alciphron (Fig. 10) could counter the sterility and ‘broken cisterns’ of materialist philosophy. 


Fig. 11: Frontispiece to Alciphron, Volume ii.

We can, too, if fancifully, take the biblical caption to the frontispiece of Volume ii (Fig. 11) as a hint that Berkeley is sceptical of the equanimous balanced debate that Enlightenment ideology espoused and that Hume would enact: ‘The balances of deceit are in his hand’ (Hosea, 12:7). That balance, for Berkeley, can be deceitful; Berkeley would make his (unbalanced) position quite clear in his polemic against ‘free-thinkers’, particularly Mandeville (in Dialogue ii) and Shaftesbury (in Dialogue iii). It is significant, too, that the biblical context is one of cheating merchants: the corruption of the idealised process of honest commercial exchange. Conservatives such as Berkeley and Swift tended to stand outside the new vigorous market place and its speculative financial mechanisms with distaste and suspicion.
Berkeley’s earlier Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (1713) had been an attempt to clarify and popularise the thesis expounded in A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710).​[273]​ These dialogues are much more harmonious—but precisely because they involved humble participants, compliant in the dialogic educational process, rather than, as in Alciphron, disputants who consider themselves of equal status, who actually posit and defend opposing arguments. In Three Dialogues, Berkeley appeals to an idealised democratic forum, undistorted by the solipsistic speculations of the elite, and so rests his epistemology on a sort of dialogism where ‘the general opinion of the world’ is that ‘the end of speculation be practice or the improvement and regulation of our lives and actions’.​[274]​ And he senses a lack of balance in the dominant philosophical debates that ensued from Locke; his immaterialist intervention is meant to correct the unbalanced prejudices of a philosophical elite against common sense:
Phil. When a man is swayed, he knows not why, to one side of a question, can this, think you, be anything else but the effect of prejudice, which never fails to attend old and rooted notions? And, indeed, in this respect I cannot deny the belief of matter to have very much the advantage over the contrary opinion with men of a learned education.
Hyl. I confess it seems to be as you say.
Phil. As a balance, therefore, to this weight of prejudice, let us throw into the scale the great advantages that arise from the belief of immaterialism, both in regard to religion and human learning.​[275]​

Berkeley poses here as enlightened modern facing ancient prejudice, and as spokesman for the common man. But despite the harmonious, consensual vision here, where eirenic and open dialogue counters the balances of deceit, Berkeley’s thought is not always so whole-heartedly dialogic.
Alciphron was Berkeley’s polemical onslaught on materialism and free-thinkers, and is very different in tone from the Three Dialogues, and more complex in its modulations. In Alciphron, both free thought and orthodoxy have their polite interlocutors (Alciphron and Euphranor), but also their rude, even clownish, counterparts (Lysicles and Crito), as if Berkeley wants to personify the always immanent polarities of dialogue. Euphranor and Crito are Berkeley’s advocates for religious orthodoxy; Alciphron and Lysicles are the materialist ‘minute philosophers’ whose positions he wants to demolish. 
If Hume is equanimity at its most elegant, Berkeley’s Alciphron might be the most elegant display of contestation of the period. There is a profound ambivalence towards free dialogic enquiry that is apparent in both the matter and the technique. Berkeley demonstrates quite markedly underlying antagonisms that are only occasionally glimpsed in those other writers and which show the precarious nature of the social compromise of Enlightenment sociability. Habermas’s public sphere was very brief in duration and very fragile.​[276]​ I begin with Berkeley as a foreshadowing of what emerges far more nakedly at the end of the period, when an emerging radicalised working-class faces a defensive and anxious ruling class fuelled by fears of revolution. We then see openly polemical dialogues being produced from both reactionary and radical quarters. Yet I hope to show also that Berkeley, too, is not untouched by the dialogic spirit abroad: Alciphron, despite its hostile caricaturing and suspicion of demotic trends, does have genuinely dialogic moments. Thus overall, I will argue that Berkeley distrusted the dialogic (associated as it is with the modernity of free exchange and limited social levelling that he fears) as it undermines traditional society. And yet, throughout, he is unwittingly a child of the Enlightenment that he struggles against and we find him appealing to ideas of common sense and championing free debate and open dialogue.​[277]​ He characterises his opponents as abusing these values, but he too abandons them at crucial moments—opportunistically at times, but also from an aestheticism and espousal of rhetoric that eschews dialectic.
Berkeley lays claims to an authentic dialogism, based on the common sense of ordinary people; for him, the minute philosophers (named for their reductionism) are elitist and non-consensual. As support for a dialogic Berkeley, we see his often subtle characterisation—a characteristic of novelisation: there is the wise unworldliness of Euphranor, the sarcastic clowning of Crito, Alciphron’s veneer of polite rationality, Lysicles’ arrogant asociality.​[278]​ The clashes between the interlocutors become, not just representations of ideas, but of characters. In addition, he argues for the human subjectivity that is an essential component of authentic dialogism, asserting free will against the mechanism of the materialists. 
The text also encroaches upon the novel through the incorporation of other speech genres; of modes of arguing or persuading other than the strictly dialectical one of the formal philosophical dialogue (which the Three Dialogues, for instance, largely confines itself to).​[279]​ So, when not constrained by Euphranor’s Socratism, Alciphron pontificates at length and Lysicles rants; Crito tells fables or gives barely polite, even abusive, accounts of their guests. Yet in spite of all this, I will show too how Berkeley has a hidden contempt for free discussion and derives his philosophy from a monologic authority. 
In Alciphron, Berkeley apparently commits himself to the Socratic programme of dialogic enquiry. He characterises his materialist opponents as those who breach the conventions of communicative reason and who evade authentic dialogue. Thus Lysicles, the more blatantly heterodox of the two free-thinkers, becomes frustrated at the entanglements of the Socratic elenchus and almost chooses silence rather than dialogue: ‘If I say yes, you will make an inference; and if I say no, you will demand a reason. The best way is to say nothing at all. There is, I see, no end of answering’ (ii. 7, 80). Such sulks are common, too, with the sophists of Plato’s dialogues; Euphranor in reply makes the case that only free discussion can lead to rational conclusions: ‘If you give up the point you undertook to prove, there is an end at once: but, if you hope to convince me, you must answer my questions, and allow me the liberty to argue and infer’ (ii. 7, 80). Here, then, Berkeley is committed to dialogic enquiry, and his free-thinkers appear not to be. But elsewhere, more and more qualifications and exceptions to this emerge.
Berkeley, throughout his work, appeals to a sort of democratic populism, and this appears in his characterisation of Alciphron’s positioning of ‘minute philosophy’ above everyday discourse:
It is a true maxim—That a man should think with the learned, and speak with the vulgar. [. . .] The tenets of our philosophy have this in common with many other truths in metaphysics, geometry, astronomy, and natural philosophy, that vulgar ears cannot bear them. All our discoveries and notions are in themselves true and certain; but they are at present known only to the better sort, and would sound strange and odd amongst the vulgar. (i. 12, 56)

Berkeley had spent much of the Treatise and Three Dialogues trying to show that concepts such as matter in natural philosophy declared their erroneousness precisely because to the ‘vulgar’ they sounded ‘strange and odd’. Lysicles—as both Euphranor and Berkeley himself do elsewhere—has appealed often to common sense and received opinion, insisting that one should ‘consult the multitude if you would find nature and truth’ (ii. 11, 87). But here, though the materialists ‘make men relish the world’, he then admits ‘that there is something gross and ill-bred in the vices of mean men, which the genteel philosopher abhors’ (ii. 13, 91). Berkeley also makes Lysicles confess to the conspiratorial, and far from public, programme of the materialists: ‘we have carried on this work for many years with much art and industry, and at first with secrecy, working like moles under ground, concealing our progress from the public’ (ii. 23, 111). And this has included the fermenting of antagonistic dialogue among the orthodox: ‘blowing the coals between polemical divines, laying hold on and improving every incident which the passions and folly of churchmen afforded to the advantage of our sect’ (ii. 23, 111). Thus the freethinkers are no friend to either eirenic consensus or open dialogue; they promote logomachy purely as a destructive weapon aimed at sociality.
On the other hand, through Crito, we perceive that Berkeley’s hostility to materialism is deeply motivated by his antipathy to broadening the public sphere. The subversiveness of Lysicles’ thought is revealed in all its horrors: ‘now even women and children have right and sound notions of things’ (ii. 24, 113); the benefits ‘extend to the tenderest age and the softer sex: our principles deliver children from terrors by night, and ladies from splenetic hours by day’ (ii. 24, 114). But this enlightened notion that women might engage with the new thought which then might challenge the boredom of the activities assigned to them, and especially that it may encourage their indulgence in modern luxury affronts Crito enormously:
Instead of these old-fashioned things, prayers and the Bible, the grateful amusements of drams, dice, and billet-doux have succeeded. The fair sex have now nothing to do but dress and paint, drink and game, adorn and divert themselves, and enter into all the sweet society of life.​[280]​ (ii. 24, 114)

So Berkeley’s spokesman for the common people is not over keen that women may enter the ‘sweet society’ of modern life (though, in his defence, the public space depicted here is not apparently one of rational discourse). Elsewhere, Berkeley had ambiguously praised the untroubled minds of the ignorant, employing a common conservative manoeuvre which warns that democratic critique harms the lower orders by disturbing their natural serenity.​[281]​
The novelistic tactics that I observed in the dialogues of Chapter Two do appear at moments in Alciphron. For the materialists, like Hume at his backgammon, doubt and superstition are dispelled in the convivial dialogue and illuminated arena of public reason:
When half-a-dozen ingenious men are got together over a glass of wine, by a cheerful fire, in a room well-lighted, we banish with ease all the spectres of fancy and education, and are very clear in our decisions. (iv. 3, 157).

However, during ‘a solitary walk before it was broad daylight’ (iv. 3, 157), Alciphron is not so sure of his atheism; Berkeley has him confess to lurking doubts in his materialism that tempt him when in darkness and in solitude. He resists this intuitive doubting, believing it to be the resurgence of prejudice from his early education (iv. 3, 157). This is an extremely well-observed moment of inner conflict being rationalised (in the psychoanalytic sense), and depicts Alciphron with more complexity than the simple monologic representation of a straw man for materialism. 
Alciphron rejects Euphranor’s arguments from common sense, defending the necessity of critical dialogue against common sense (which he sees as received opinion that has not been subjected to critique), retorting:
It has been always an objection against the discoverers of truth, that they depart from received opinions. The character of singularity is a tax on free-thinking: and as such we most willingly bear it, and glory in it. A genuine philosopher is never modest in a false sense, to the preferring authority before reason, or an old and common opinion before a true one. (vii. 21, 356)

To this, Crito, with open hostility, accuses Alciphron of not adhering to the basic rules that lie behind dialogic discourse:
Your schemes, and principles, and boasted demonstrations have been at large proposed and examined. You have shifted your notions, successively retreated from one scheme to another, and in the end renounced them all. (vii. 21, 357)

And Alciphron’s attack on common sense is nothing more than an unpatriotic slur that displays contempt for pious, ordinary people: ‘Make your countrymen ever so vicious, ignorant, and profane; men will still be disposed to look up to a Supreme Being’ (vii. 21, 357). 
All the conservative anxieties over empiricism, novelty, luxury, and modern thought coalesce in Euphranor’s interrogation of materialism; one suspects that, unlike Mandeville’s interlocutors, the faddish pineapple would not tempt Berkeley’s palate: ‘Pray tell me, Lysicles’, says Euphranor, ‘suppose you saw a fruit of a new untried kind; would you recommend it to your own family to make a full meal of?’ (ii. 7, 81). Consumerism and the exchange of goods are equated with the instability of the commerce of ideas and the associated democratic processes, as Lysicles reveals:
We have cleared the land of all prejudices towards government or constitution, and made them fly like other phantasms before the light of reason and good sense. Men who think deeply cannot see any reason why power should not change hands as well as property; or why the fashion of a government should not be changed as easy as that of a garment. The perpetual circulating of wealth and power, no matter through what or whose hands, is that which keeps up life and spirit in a state. (ii. 8, 83)

This amoral ‘circulating’ is, of course, that which Mandeville defends. And democratic criticism of government, or the critique in dialogue of ‘prejudices’, is reduced to fashion and neophilia, and equated with the circulation of commodities. ‘Commerce’, in this sense, is not liberating, but its associated sense of dialogue is equally dark in Berkeley’s vision. Here, condensed, is a summary of Berkeley’s antipathy to the modern: the coffee-house—almost a cliché as trope for the public sphere since Habermas; the democratic mingling of classes (with that damning final ‘groom-porter’); the animus against the ‘fashionable’; a contempt for the lax conversation that is now considered ‘polite’, and the distrust of ‘wit and raillery’.​[282]​ Yet Crito himself employs raillery in the very act of denouncing the new ‘improvement’, which is acquired:
in a drawing-room, a coffee-house, a chocolate-house, at the tavern, or groom-porter’s. In these and the like fashionable places of resort, it is the custom for polite persons to speak freely on all subjects, religious, moral, or political. So that a young gentleman who frequents them is in the way of hearing many instructive lectures, seasoned with wit and raillery, and uttered with spirit. (i. 11, 50)

Lysicles readily accepts the characterisation of him as democratic. The materialist ‘sect’ is not made up solely of ‘fine gentlemen’, and democratic commingling with ‘contemplative spirits of a coarser education’ (i. 11, 52), such as ‘apprentices, watermen, porters, and the assemblies of rabble in the streets’, has led them to ‘a profound knowledge of human nature’, and to make ‘great discoveries’ which have ‘demolished the received systems, and done a world of good in the city’ (i. 11, 53). But they are not merely a disturbingly classless collective. Berkeley’s vision of the supposed extent of free-thinking has a flavour of paranoia and conspiracy to it:
Alc. I tell you we have men of all sorts of professions, plodding citizens, thriving stock-jobbers, skilful men in business, polite courtiers, gallant men of the army; but our chief strength, and flower of the flock, are those promising young men who have the advantage of a modern education. These are the growing hopes of our sect, by whose credit and influence in a few years we expect to see those great things accomplished that we have in view.
Euph. I could never have imagined your sect so considerable.
Alc. There are in England many honest folk as much in the dark about these matters as yourself. (i. 11, 52-53)

There is a very real sense of secret and organised subversion of society here, and that ‘honest folk’ are ‘in the dark’ would seem to undermine the free-thinkers’ declared commitment to the enlightened public exchange of ideas.​[283]​ Berkeley is obviously anxious about the classless and indiscriminate nature of this dissemination of ideas and about the corruption of the young through ‘modern education’; ironically, Alciphron is guilty here of Socrates’ crime.
Lysicles conjures up a vision of Lucretian atomism at large in society, of revolution and anarchy, which is obviously meant to chill the reader’s blood:
The wheels of government go on, though wound up by different hands; if not in the same form, yet in some other, perhaps a better. There is an endless variety in nature. Weak men, indeed, are prejudiced towards rules and systems in life and government; [. . .] but a man of great soul and free spirit delights in the noble experiment of blowing up systems and dissolving governments, to mould them anew upon other principles and in another shape. [. . .] Pull a state to pieces, jumble, confound, and shake together the particles of human society, and then let them stand awhile, and soon you shall see them settle of themselves in some convenient order, where heavy heads are lowest, and men of genius uppermost. (ii. 21, 107-08)

Again, this is devoid of any of the ‘publick benefits’ that Mandeville had used to justify his ‘private vice’; it is simply the unfettered competitive individualism of capitalist society. Human beings are random ‘particles’, subject to Newtonian forces as with Swift’s mechanical atoms and Sarah Fielding’s inchoate mob, The Cry (as described in my Chapter Four). Yet this is ambivalently seductive, too, promising meritocratic levelling and the celebration of energy and ‘endless variety’. It calls to mind the dialectical characterisation of modernity by Marx: ‘All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned’.​[284]​ Crito identifies Lysicles’ doctrine as, indeed, a public discourse, promulgated by ‘spontaneous lecturers in every corner of the streets’, but which aims to undermine ‘prejudices about religion, loyalty, and public spirit’ (ii. 21, 109). Thus Crito in turn reveals his own distrust of the discourse of the common man and the circulation of modern ideas in public spaces.
Alciphron, by contrast, defends free-thought in Shaftesburian terms, adopting the latter’s coupling of ethics and aesthetics, and insisting ‘that there is an Idea of Beauty natural to the mind of man’ and that:
A man needs no arguments to make him discern and approve what is beautiful; it strikes at first sight, and attracts without a reason. And as this beauty is found in the shape and form of corporeal things; so also is there analogous to it a beauty of another kind—an order, a symmetry, and comeliness, in the moral world. (iii. 3, 125)

It is natural, and thus pre-social, and is irrational. He develops this notion; but contradictions emerge since, here, the aesthetic sense has become social and involved with reason: ‘All rational beings are by nature social. They are drawn one towards another by natural affections. They unite and incorporate into families, clubs, parties, and commonwealths by mutual sympathy’ (iii. 3, 126). ‘Commonwealths’, though implying sociality, is, of course, a suspicious term for conservatives like Berkeley, and ‘parties’ hints at the factionalism that he detests and that is bound up with the Civil War divisions and the consequent establishment of the Commonwealth.
In Alciphron’s version, ‘minute philosophy’ is intuitive and ineffable and, by escaping linguistic definition, closed to public critiques. It is not subject to rational inquiry and is founded in aesthetics:
Some things are better understood by definitions and descriptions; but I have always observed that those who would define, explain, and dispute about this point make the least of it. Moral beauty is of so peculiar and abstracted a nature, something so subtle, fine, and fugacious, that it will not bear being handled and inspected, like every gross and common subject. (iii. 5, 128)

He exempts the aesthetic from Euphranor’s Socratic technique, refusing to allow him ‘some hold whereon to cavil, and infer, and raise doubts, queries, and difficulties about a point as clear as the sun, when nobody reasons upon it’ (iii. 5, 128). Here, it is Alciphron’s discourse that appears authoritarian and monological, closed to public critique. Ironically, though, Berkeley’s own championship of rhetoric over rational discourse renders him equally monological, as I suggest below.
Berkeley’s refutation of Shaftesbury is achieved at the cost of making aesthetic discourse impossible. Euphranor focuses on the very idea of beauty as a universal concept, asking ‘are all mankind agreed in the notion of a beauteous face?’, appealing to the dialogic and consensual nature of language to initiate the argument; if there is no agreement, the concept is empty. He leads Alciphron to admit that beauty cannot be apprehended sensuously, but only judged rationally and, that ‘It is, therefore, one thing to see an object, and another to discern its beauty’ (iii. 8, 134). From this, he demonstrates that aesthetic judgements reflect the interests and usefulness of the creatures who make them, and then that they are historically relative. 
Alciphron tries to establish conventions of rational debate in the sphere of religious discourse in order to validate his scepticism, by which the evident absurdity of supernatural accounts would disqualify them. But Crito lays claim to a dialogic foundation for his argumentation, suggesting that both the looser and the more refined versions of common sense can accommodate the divine:
No, Alciphron, your positive airs must not pass for proofs; nor will it suffice to say, things are contrary to common sense, to make us think they are so. By common sense, I suppose, should be meant, either the general sense of mankind, or the improved reason of thinking men. (vi. 12, 267-8)

He claims, too, that Alciphron’s position is deeply partisan whereas Crito’s is universal and ‘common’ to all people: ‘the minute philosophers, when they appeal to reason and common sense, mean only the sense of their own party’ (vi. 12, 269).
Euphranor again declares the demotic nature of his thought, positing free-thinking as the product of a corrupt elite, and appealing to common sense:
while the Christian religion is considered an institution fitted to ordinary minds, rather than to the nicer talents, whether improved or puzzled, of speculative men; and our notions about faith are accordingly taken from the commerce of the world, and practice of mankind, rather than from the peculiar systems of refiners. (vii. 10, 338)

So it would appear that Berkeley is committing himself to dialogism via a rationality that derives from exchange and ‘the commerce of the world’. Yet, as elsewhere, that commerce comes under suspicion; he reveals its underside as he has Euphranor talk of ‘controversy, the mother and nurse of heresies’ (vii. 10, 338), suggesting that, after all, Church doctrine should not be subject to public scrutiny.
This debate over reason and common sense rests on theories of language. Alciphron attempts to discredit the tenets of religion by showing that the words involved do not signify any clear and distinct ideas (after Descartes and Locke), claiming that the capitulation of the vulgar to the sway of a language without referents is what causes faction and the discord between people (vii. 2, 320). There is, then, a theory of dialogue, and of logomachy, buried here, and a suggestion that the disagreement of Alciphron itself is founded on chimeras and, therefore, that a close analytical attention to language can resolve disputation.
However, Euphranor counters this Lockeian view of language in a way that suggests a more dialogic approach (for Locke’s perspective can be seen as individualistic and monologic).​[285]​ Berkeley’s theory of language, as voiced through Euphranor, is in fact a more pragmatic one, one that implicitly pays attention to the social contexts of discourse, with its recognition of non-constative, performative functions:​[286]​
It seems also to follow, that there may be another use of words besides that of marking and suggesting distinct ideas, to wit, the influencing our conduct and actions; which may be done either by forming rules for us to act by, or by raising certain passions, dispositions, and emotions in our minds. A discourse, therefore, that directs how to act or excite to the doing or forbearance of an action may, it seems, be useful and significant, although the words whereof it is composed should not bring each a distinct idea into our minds. (vii. 5, 327)

Yet this also recapitulates the emphasis of the Sophists on rhetoric as against Plato’s advocacy of dialectic; Berkeley has dangerously privileged the ‘raising of passions’ over the appeal to public consensus. This is not so different from the relativism that Euphranor had exposed in Alciphron’s aestheticised ethics.
One of the areas where Berkeley’s dialogism becomes qualified is in this theory of language. For Berkeley, the only solution to the wild anarchy of individual judgements, all interested and formed in isolation from one another, is the unifying principle of God:
wherein each particular agent shall not consider himself apart, but as the member of a great City, whose author and founder is God: in which the civil laws are no other than the rules of virtue and the duties of religion: and where every one’s true interest is combined with his duty. (iii. 10, 139)

Individuals are united here socially in a sense, but this is not a society that permits dissent, doubt, or dialogic questioning: 
In a system of spirits, subordinate to the will, and under the direction of the Father of spirits, governing then by laws, and conducting them by methods suitable to wise and good ends, there will be great beauty. (iii. 11, 139)

Here, sociality is imposed monologically by the omniscient author, God, just as in Berkeley’s epistemology the only unifying substrate of particularised perceptions is the Divine Mind.
Euphranor has Alciphron admit that the existence of other people’s souls can be inferred from outward signs, and from a similar perception of order in the universe wants him to infer the existence of God. Alciphron, then demands a stricter proof, since ‘nothing so much convinces me of the existence of another person as his speaking to me’ (iv. 6, 162). God does not speak to man in this manner, he says. Pressed for clarification he continues:
What I mean is not the sound of speech merely as such, but the arbitrary use of sensible signs, which have no similitude or necessary connexion with the things signified [. . .] No matter whether these signs are pronounced or written; whether they enter by the eye or ear: they have the same use, and are equally proofs of an intelligent, thinking, designing cause. (iv. 7, 163)

And Euphranor must therefore convince him ‘that God speaks to men by outward sensible signs’ (iv. 7, 163) of the kind he has outlined. It is this dialogic interaction that refutes solipsism and only dialogue with God could overcome a similarly sceptical atheism. Therefore Euphranor initiates another Socratic exchange to persuade Alciphron that the visible world does indeed evidence God’s signs, using a demonstration derived from optics, recapitulating Berkeley’s New Theory of Vision. The relation between visual perceptions and spatial ordering becomes radically arbitrary, since ‘We perceive distance, not immediately, but by mediation of a sign, which hath no likeness to it, or necessary connexion with it, but only suggests it from repeated experience, as words do things’ (iv. 8, 165).
Crito and Euphranor, in harmony, enthuse lyrically on the beauties of this Visual Language.​[287]​ Crito discourses—very persuasively—on the infinite variety and creativity of language, in opposition to mechanistic explanations (iv. 14, 174). This critique of the denial of human autonomy by materialism is significant and recurs throughout the text. Euphranor derives human language from this primal one and thus accounts for the dialogic principle of translatability between tongues, and discourse between humans, through this foundation. Yet it is notably monologic in origin; as I have noted, this language is dictated downwards from God, who ‘takes care of our minutest actions and designs throughout the whole course of our lives, informing, admonishing, and directing incessantly, in a most evident and sensible manner’ (iv. 14, 175). Perhaps there is something fundamentally undialogic at the heart of Berkeley’s philosophy itself.​[288]​ His profoundly radical attack on universals and the complete relativism of all perceptions, whose coherence is only guaranteed by the arbitrary authority of God’s will, works against any idea of a mutual discovery of truth through dialogue and universal human reason.
Lysicles, Alciphron’s cynical sidekick, in the second dialogue represents a heavily caricatured Mandeville. He hints at a theory of language that is far from being founded in a single authority. For Lysicles, the ‘ingenious’ and the ‘people of fashion’ deploy a ‘polite’ language which serves to redefine vice to make it acceptable. This is a language system which is radically arbitrary:
Thus, in our dialect, a vicious man is a man of pleasure, a sharper is one that plays the whole game, a lady is said to have an affair, a gentleman to be a gallant, a rogue in business to be one that knows the world. By this means, we have no such things as sots, debauchees, whores, rogues, or the like, in the beau monde, who may enjoy their vices without incurring disagreeable appellations. (ii. 3, 74).

Thus, despite the critics of Berkeley’s immaterialism, it is the fashionable materialists who deny the existence of real entities in the world, by their refusal to legislate the bond between signifier and signified with any authority.​[289]​ Berkeley’s whole Visual Language is an antidote to this slippage, for God guarantees the correspondence between Word and Object. For Lysicles, by contrast, ethical discourse is purely rhetorical; sophistical, rather than truly philosophical, in service to the powerful, in the tradition of Callicles as characterised by Plato.​[290]​ 
The abstraction that Berkeley deplores, together with intellectual elitism, is linked to another vice: determinism. Alciphron argues against free will, adopting a naturalism that conveniently excuses the behaviour of the licentious and the powerful (Plato’s Callicles is again in the background of this debate). As Euphranor points out, ‘This is an ingenious thought, and must be of great use in freeing men from all anxiety about moral notions; as it transfers the principle of action from the human soul to things outward and foreign’ (vii. 16, 347-48). Euphranor refutes Alciphron’s position by appealing again to common sense: ‘But, if I take things as they are, and ask any plain untutored man, whether he acts or is free in this or that particular action, he readily assents, and as I readily believe him—from what I find him’ (vii. 18, 352).
Now this assertion of human autonomy against a mechanical materialism that was a dominant strand of Enlightenment thought does place Berkeley on the side of dialogism once more—communicative reason presupposes full subjectivity among its participants; mechanical determinism, by contrast, negates the possibility of meaningful debate towards consensus. And Euphranor points out to Alciphron how contradictory his position—as a supposed defender of liberty—actually is: ‘I need not observe, what every one must see, the ridicule of proving man no agent, and yet pleading for free thought and action—of setting up at once for advocates of liberty and necessity’ (vii. 19, 354). Euphranor does not need to resort to raillery: the ‘ridicule’ of Alciphron’s doctrine is self-evident and emerges through dialogic exposure. Berkeley’s defence of subjectivity through idealism explicitly connects freedom (of will) with dialogicity—the mind is an active, deliberating, critical force:
You take it for granted that the mind is inactive, but that its ideas act upon it: as if the contrary were not evident to every man of common sense, who cannot but know that it is the mind which considers its ideas, chooses, rejects, examines, deliberates, decrees, in a word acts about them, and not they about it. (vii. 20, 355)

Berkeley, the conservative, curiously parallels that other master of dialogue, the iconoclastic Diderot, translator of Berkeley’s target Shaftesbury, who would also subject mechanical materialism to a thorough questioning, though without recourse to idealism.​[291]​
Crito summarises ‘the tenets of a minute philosopher’, among them being ‘that man is a machine actuated according to the laws of motion: that consequently he is no agent’ (ii. 25, 115). And, again, that:
this curious piece of clock-work, having no principle of action within itself, and denying that it hath or can have any one free thought or motion, sets up for the patron of liberty, and earnestly contends for free-thinking. (ii. 25, 115-16)

Thus the application of Newtonian mechanics to the human sphere negates the very idea of rationality; the ‘free-thinkers’ are imprisoned in a paralysing contradiction. Machines cannot reason or be free; this, despite Berkeley’s distinctly conservative agenda, is the radical component of eighteenth-century idealism that Marx later wished to salvage in contrast to the ‘vulgar materialism’ of thinkers who were otherwise progressive.​[292]​ 
Berkeley advocates open, rational discourse, and attacks raillery as a perversion of the conditions of such discourse. But the force of his polemic relies heavily on Crito who, in counterpoint to the polite and sober argumentation of the orthodox Euphranor, defends orthodoxy through raillery directed at the two free-thinkers, Alciphron and Lysicles. The satirical impulse strays into monologic caricature, undermining the polyphonic tendencies elsewhere. Lysicles and Crito abandon decorum for open abusiveness and reject dialectical argument for satire and invective (though this too may be considered dialogic: according to Bakhtin, Socratic irony and mockery exemplified the critical spirit that, for him, is dialogic​[293]​). Raillery can be antidialogic, bringing debate to an abrupt closure, refusing to take the other participant seriously, and deliberately misrepresenting or parodying their speech. Yet it can have a critical, rational role, that strips bare pretensions, levels the powerful, and exposes distorted communication—again, perhaps, through parody. Numerous writers take sides on this: Shaftesbury favours a refined raillery; Swift, too (though he would practice something more savage than what he preached). Shaftesbury considers it to be part of the rational-critical process, and Mandeville clearly embraces it. Berkeley’s position, as we will see, is complex and contradictory, reflecting the similar contradictions in his attitude to the democratic component of dialogue.
Thus Berkeley swiftly has Lysicles reveal his true colours—those of a railler (Berkeley is in part continuing his attack on Shaftesbury, who saw mockery as a legitimate critical tool):
We have thought of another method—the bringing religion to the test of wit and humour: this we find a much shorter, easier, and more effectual way. And, as all enemies are at liberty to choose their weapons, we make choice of those we are most expert at. (vi. 32, 315-16)

The duelling analogy (often used as a trope for reaction by radical dialogists, as in the Edgeworths’ quote above), shows the open animosity of the free-thinkers; from the outset, Lysicles has not accepted the conventions of the disinterested and mutual search for truth. (By contrast, Alciphron adopts what seems a more considered and rational front, and is confident that he can defend his irreligion through sound argument alone.) The minute philosophers’ use of raillery as argumentative technique is particularly illegitimate because of their own farcical incoherence over free will; ‘can anything be more ridiculous’, mocks Crito,  
than to see the most unmeaning men of the age set up for free-thinkers, men so strong in assertion, and yet so weak in argument; advocates for freedom introducing a fatality; patriots trampling on the laws of their country; and pretenders to virtue destroying the motives of it? (vii. 21, 357)

Alciphron, like Shaftesbury, endorses ridicule as a critical faculty. In doing so, he confesses his own relativism, and reveals that, far from being universal and democratic, taste is class-stratified:
the various taste of readers requireth various kinds of writers. [. . .] To proselyte the graver sort, we have certain profound men at reason and argument. For the coffee-houses and populace, we have declaimers of a copious vein. [. . .] Then, for men of rank and politeness, we have the finest and wittiest railleurs in the world, whose ridicule is the surest test of truth. (iii. 15, 148)

Euphranor has Alciphron admit that what is ridiculous is as relative as what is beautiful and that ‘ridicule is no such sovereign touchstone and test of truth’ (iii. 15, 149); thus both the aesthetic and the comic spirit are irrational. 
Yet Crito’s role remains paradoxical, for he has employed raillery throughout and thus assumed that the ridiculousness that he has exposed in his opponents’ thought is a valid proof of its falseness. Thus Berkeley, it seems, cannot trust to Euphranor’s dialogic arguments alone; Crito, with his distrust of ‘this most wise and happy age of free-thinking, free-speaking, free-writing, and free-acting’ (ii. 6, 79), must intervene constantly with exemplary fables and sarcastic, even abusive, remarks. Thus Crito critiques the conversational style of the materialists and mocks the delusions of persecutions that they conjure up: 
I [. . .] have often observed those of his sect run into two faults of conversation, declaiming and bantering, just as the tragic or the comic humour prevails. Sometimes they work themselves into high passions, and are frightened at spectres of their own raising. In those fits every country curate passes for an inquisitor. At other times they affect a sly facetious manner, making use of hints and allusions, expressing little, insinuating much, and upon the whole seeming to divert themselves with the subject and their adversaries (i. 4, 39)

Berkeley will use Crito to turn the free-thinkers’ rhetorical methods against them when dialogue breaks down; he himself becomes guilty of the ‘sly facetious manner’ and of issuing ‘hints and allusions’.​[294]​ 
As the dialogues draw to an end, Alciphron voluntarily unmasks himself, virtually admitting he is a sophistic, scheming dissembler; a rather sinister subversive, even: ‘We have among us moles that dig deep under ground, and eagles that soar out of sight. We can act all parts and become all opinions, putting them on or off with great freedom of wit and humour’ (vii. 23, 358). Their polyvocal skill is akin to that of the actor—or even the novelist. All along Alciphron has had no intention of abiding by the conventions of rational discourse, as Euphranor complains:
But, I remember, you set out with an open dogmatical air, and talked of plain principles, and evident reasoning, promised to make things as clear as noonday, to extirpate wrong notions and plant right in their stead. Soon after, you began to recede from your first notions, and adopt others; you advanced one while and retreated another, yielded and retracted, said and unsaid. (vii. 23, 358-59)

Alciphron replies: ‘Did we not tell you the gentlemen of our sect are great proficients in raillery?’ (vii. 23, 359). Their raillery here is thus skilful play-acting rather than critical unmasking.
Berkeley, somewhat unfairly, has the minute philosophers leave after this confession, allowing Euphranor and Crito to triumph and to dissect them behind their backs. This move not only breaks the conventions of the formal dialogue (though some of Plato’s disputants also leave in a huff) but breaches the protocols for consensual debate and judgment, highlighting once more Berkeley’s ambivalence towards dialogue. And now Berkeley’s own faith in persuasive reason seems to crumble somewhat; there are natures that dialogue is powerless to move:
The philosophers being gone, [says Dion, the narrator] I observed to Crito how unaccountable it was that men so easy to confute should yet be so difficult to convince.
This, said Crito, is accounted for by Aristotle, who tells us that arguments have not an effect on all men, but only on them whose minds are prepared by education and custom, as land is for seed. [. . .] So weak a thing is reason in competition with inclination. (vii. 26, 361)

This essentialist position comes uncannily close to the rejected views of the materialists themselves, and of Shaftesbury, that ‘Appetite [. . .] is elder brother to Reason’ (Shaftesbury, quoted on vii. 17, 349). Berkeley has concluded that some natures are not endowed with the freedom that would make them reasonable partners in discourse.






Ye Swinish Multitude who prate,
		What know ye ‘bout the matter?
Misterious are the ways of state,




[Chorus] Then hence ye Swine nor make a rout,
		Forbearance but relaxes;
We’ll clap the muzzle on your snout,
		Go work, and pay your taxes. 

Ye apron men to labour bred,
		How dare ye thus to quarrel;
We’ll take your children’s beer and bread,
		And you shan’t smell the barrel.
‘Tis ours to take your needful scot,
		When e’er we lack assistance;
Passive obedience is your lot, 
And humble non-resistance. 

How dare ye rail at noble lords,
	Remember Richmond’s power;
To bind you neck and heels in cords,
		Bastille you in the Tower.
Stormount and we shall break your hearts
		With writs and declarations;
And Fox no longer takes your parts,




Equality, that crime abhor’d,
		Of this you dare to prattle. (lines 37-38)​[295]​


This is the radical Thomas Spence’s angry rejoinder to Edmund Burke’s notoriously insulting characterisation of the labouring classes.​[296]​ However, it was also Berkeley who advocated the ‘passive obedience’ of line 19, and he too would consider that the ‘Swinish Multitude’ should not ‘chatter’, ‘nor make a rout’, or ‘prattle’—that is, engage in political dialogue.​[297]​ Spence exposes the pretences to dialogism of the bourgeois public sphere: the ‘ways of state’ should remain ‘misterious’, shrouded in Burke’s sublime obscurity and not illuminated by public debate. And Pitt, Richmond, and Stormount would soon ‘clap the muzzle’ on those who dare to oppose the monologic discourse of aristocratic power.​[298]​ 
As we have seen, Berkeley’s peevishness towards democratic dialogue breaks through in Alciphron, but social tensions were largely concealed behind the gentlemanly exchanges of his own earlier dialogues, and those of Shaftesbury and—ambiguously—of Hume. But at the end of the century the social contradictions are generally visible on a scale not seen since the Civil War. Democracy is argued about vigorously in the 1790s, and often in dialogue form, but the dialogue cannot maintain its polite veneer and it moves towards its logomachic pole. Habermas explains the deterioration of the public sphere in terms of the commodification of discourse, but this perhaps would not have happened had it not already been prone to fissure.​[299]​
From a background of the threat, or at least fear, of revolution the shared gentlemanly consensus of the public sphere is now shattered. For some of Habermas’s critics, this always was illusionary, but Habermas himself suggests something that was always more of an ideal limit anyway, and his later writings on communicative rationality imply that dialogicity is more like a permanently potential, always necessary but never fully realised, aspect of language and hence society. Berkeley’s Alciphron and even moments in Shaftesbury and Mandeville hint that among the bourgeois demarcators of the public sphere themselves, antagonism was not absent (as befits a class which is essentially atomistic and competitive), but as a rising working class became more vocal (and as some argue, creates an alternative public sphere​[300]​), then dialogue became blatantly adversarial.
Amidst these tensions of class politics towards the end of the century, the dialogue as a genre is invigorated by being employed by radical writers and their opponents.​[301]​ Here, however, the utopian—or ideological—mode of an eirenic debate among calm-minded, disinterested equals, is abandoned; these dialogues are fiercely antagonistic.​[302]​ Fictional narrative often becomes a sweetener to their polemical or didactic content. As well as overlapping in this manner with the novel, the dialogue as a speech genre once again enters into many of the novels of this period, contributing to the vigour and stylistic reinvention of these texts, as will be seen in the following chapter. 
From the right, those such as the Evangelical Hannah More and the Association for the Preservation of Liberty, concerned that the labouring classes should not be seduced by any ideas of democracy that could shatter the presumed harmony between the orders of English society, or disturb the contentment of the English labourer, issued many polemics structured as formal dialogues. Many of these dialogues are highly undialogic, catechistic, and unambiguously propagandistic, though More’s dialogues have been seen as more subtle, more prepared to engage sympathetically with labouring people.​[303]​ (The anti-Jacobin novels which responded dialogically to those texts labelled as ‘Jacobin’ are another matter; despite their hostility to a dialogic politics, they often incorporate the dialogue into their text in an interesting fashion, as I will show, again, in the following chapter.) The radicals targeted here themselves employed the dialogue form to broadcast their ideas. By the very nature of these ideas they were less estranged from the form and their dialogues are more genuinely mutual, though they were not averse to ridiculing an opponent or an opposing view.
So both sides in this war of ideas favoured the dialogue, and almost the full range of dialogic style is essayed there. Reflexivity lies at the heart of dialogue; many of these texts display various attitudes towards dialogue itself, just as many of the novels of the period are highly self-conscious about conversation and sociality.​[304]​ And with the fictional dialogues we have here before us, we can attempt to assess to what extent they display genuine dialogism—Habermas’s communicative action—or are examples of ‘strategic action’ where the other participants are ‘objects to be manipulated rather than subjects’.​[305]​ To some extent, too, our appraisal of their dialogicity rests on how much autonomy we judge the speakers are given; this in turn rests on how ‘real’ the characters are, and this relates to the novelistic once more: the concerns over not depicting straw men are akin to those of the novelist intending verisimilitude of character.
Thus many of the dialogues of this section are not eirenic; their participants are not always committed to good-temperedly uncovering a shared truth (as in Shaftesbury and Mandeville); their authors might not allow each viewpoint equal space (as in Hume)—there are, perhaps, no common, universally accepted outcomes that can be agreed upon. Some dialogues display an extreme scepticism towards the communicative presuppositions of dialogue themselves. Others are committed to dialogic reason but make it clear that this is set against a context that blocks that reason; their polemicism is thus directed outwards from the dialogue.
In this war of words, stakes were high; there was the one correct position which had to be affirmed by defeating that held by the other voice. There are three modes (at least) whereby this is performed. In one, the least dialogic in any sense, the speaker who is in error or ignorance simply responds catechistically to the other and finally espouses the ‘correct’ opinion. Thus many of the anti-Jacobin dialogues portray their lower-class participants as little more than children, resembling a type of pedagogical dialogue.​[306]​ Here, the labouring man who toys with radical ideas absorbed from meddling agitators comes submissively to accept the child-like limitations of his intellect and his inferior place in society as being natural and not subject to dialogic critique at all. More and her allies do not accept the dialogic principle or its democratic implications—at least across class boundaries—so it is not surprising that their texts take this form, which is eirenic but hardly open. Akin to this strategy in its monologism is the complete demolition or ridicule through caricature of the opponent, in dialogues whose strategies recall the politico-theological polemics of the Civil War period.​[307]​ 
A second mode is where, as finally in Alciphron, there is a complete impasse. Dialogue takes place in a sense; both sides are granted a roundedness that almost subverts the propagandist aims of the dialogue, yet ultimately one side is shown to be decidedly mistaken, or even malicious, and they cannot be won over despite all the dialectical subtlety of the ‘right’ side: Berkeley’s foes storm out abruptly. The universal pragmatics of Habermas illustrates this possibility of retreat from dialogue:
Everyday communicative action normally operates on the assumption that the reasons supporting the validity claims raised are good ones. When this background consensus is shaken—as will happen more frequently in posttraditional societies—communicative action cannot continue routinely. Participants then have three options: they can switch to strategic action; they can break off communication altogether; or they can recommence their communicative action at a more reflective level—namely, argumentative speech.​[308]​

Thus Berkeley’s materialists adopt the second option and excommunicate themselves. But a variant of the first, more coercive, possibility is threatened in some of these dialogues; the dissident troublemaker who has been stirring up discontent will, it is hinted, be reported to the authorities; Thomas Day’s Justice threatens this below. Many of the radical dialogists were themselves victims of this sort of strategic action. Anti-Jacobin texts betray their antidialogic component by their frequent threats to inhibit speech or by warnings about the toxicity of the exchange of ideas; Berkeley’s insouciance about English liberties is here undermined and his free-thinkers’ paranoia justified.
Then there are those rare dialogues which take a third route, moving to Habermas’s ‘more reflective level’ of ‘argumentative speech’ or discourse. These are often genuinely Socratic after the model of the earlier Platonic dialogues where a Sophist becomes confused and embarrassed, his arguments in disarray, on encountering the mock humility of Socrates’ questions.​[309]​ There is a subtle difference between such dialogues and those that merely distort and ridicule the opponent; authentic ‘argumentative speech’ is being represented here and it is arguable that the opposing view is more under scrutiny for its flaws rather than being dismissively caricatured, though obviously one technique may shade into the other. Thomas Day’s A Dialogue Between a Justice of the Peace and a Farmer (1785) is exemplary and of a mode rarely found elsewhere in the political dialogues of the 80s and 90s.​[310]​ The added modulation from Socrates is that Day portrays a lower-class interlocutor befuddling a magistrate—that is, one who is expected to be in skilful command of disputative, judicial rhetoric.​[311]​ I examine Day’s dialogue at length below.
In addition, there are dialogues which are not logomachic in the above ways, though situated against a background of a fervid struggle for hegemony, such as Sir William Jones’s The Principles of Government (1783).​[312]​ These are rarer still, and more in the spirit of both eirenic and open dialogue. They approach the less combatative Socratic, maieutic approach of, say, Plato’s Meno, where a truth is uncovered through dialectic, and a previously ignorant participant becomes enlightened in a way that grants the autonomy of his intellect and treats him as an equal. They are, too, more purely in the spirit of Habermas’s discourse. Again, it is a matter of shading; More would argue that her labouring pupils are being led rationally back towards truth through dialogue. However, there is a much stronger sense of the Peasant’s intellectual autonomy in Jones’s dialogue, and the tone adopted towards him is far less condescending. But the background of class discord has not been suppressed: Jones’s dialogue stands out for its endorsement of political violence when the limits of dialogue have been reached—startlingly, for one who was to become a key establishment figure.
Jones was a member, with John Horne Tooke, of the radical grouping the Westminster Alliance, which was endorsed by the Society for the Promotion of Constitutional Information (which Thomas Day, Jones’s friend, belonged to: the radicals had their own communicative networks).​[313]​ In The Principles of Government, Jones’s Peasant, unlike Day’s Socratic Farmer, begins in a state of ignorance like those befuddled yokels of the anti-Jacobin dialogues.​[314]​ However, his native intellectual faculties can be awakened through dialogue, like the slave in the Meno. And such exposure to dialogic reason does not cause anxiety and confusion as in those misguidedly radicalised swains of More but leads them to the point of armed insurrection.
Jones’s Scholar, though from the middling ranks (like Jones and Day themselves), has aligned himself with the democratic cause in the manner of Gramsci’s organic intellectuals. He inducts the Peasant to generalised thought from the quotidian particulars of his own situation. The Peasant initially accepts his social position and, alongside it, his exclusion from democratic activity and even political knowledge: ‘Why should humble men, like me, sign or set marks to petitions of this nature? It is better for us to peasants to mind our husbandry, and leave what we cannot comprehend to the King and Parliament’ (5).
The Scholar then demonstrates what the Peasant already knows intuitively—that all compacts can be derived from rational and mutual agreement (like language itself in some of the theories of dialogic origin I looked at in Chapter One), and that violations of this communicative solidarity deserve retribution. The Scholar questions his interlocutor about the principles of a social compact that he is familiar with, ‘a club in the village’ (5) where the members ‘meet after work every Saturday to be merry and happy for a few hours’ (6) but which also provides relief from hardship through voluntary contributions; this can then be generalised to the wider society:
S. What should you do, if any one member were to insist on becoming perpetual master, and on altering your rules at his arbitrary will and pleasure?
P. We should expel him.
S. What if he were to bring a serjeant’s guard, when the militia are quartered in your neighbourhood, and insist upon your obeying him?
P. We should resist, if we could; if not, the society would be broken up. (6-7).

From these basic principles, the Peasant is led on to political theory and its contemporary application:
S. Did it never occur to you, that every state or nation was only a great club? 
P. Nothing ever occurred to me on the subject; for I never thought about it.
S. Though you never thought before on the subject, yet you may be able to tell me, why you suppose men to have assembled, and to have formed nations, communities, or states, which all mean the same thing?
P. In order, I should imagine, to be as happy as they can, while they live. (9)

The Peasant’s responses are not merely passive replies to a catechism but volunteer radical positions actively from the propositions laid before him, deducing the rightness of deliberative democracy from his own experience and from the dialogic exchange he is engaging in:
S. Suppose, however, that a multitude of men, assembled in a town or city, were to chuse a King or Governor, might they not give him high power and authority?
P. To be sure; but they would never be so mad, I hope, as to give him a power of making their laws.
S. Who else should make them?
P. The whole nation or people.
S. What if they disagreed?
P. The opinion of the greater number, as in our village-clubs, must be taken and prevail. (10)

The conclusion is astonishingly seditious, leading to an open recognition of both the virtues of communicative reason and its blockage by the violence of the state, necessitating an equal resort to non-dialogic force on behalf of ‘the whole nation’:
S. You talk of fighting, as if you were speaking of some rustick engagement at a wake; but your quarter-staffs would avail you little against bayonets.
P. We might easily provide ourselves with better arms.
S. Not so easily: when the moment of resistance came, you would be deprived of all arms; and those who should furnish you with them, or exhort you to take them up, would be called traitors, and probably be put to death.
P. We ought always, therefore, to be ready; and keep each of us a strong firelock in the corner of his bed-room.
S. That would be legal as well as rational. Are you, my honest friend, provided with a musket?
P. I will contribute no more to the club, and purchase a firelock with my savings.
S. It is not necessary—I have two, and will make you a present of one with complete accoutrements. (13-14)

The Peasant is grateful for his enlightenment, and anticipates further dialogic education: ‘I accept it thankfully, and will converse with you as before on other subjects of this kind’ (14). He concludes by validating the dialogic process and recognising his innate legitimacy as an autonomous social subject: ‘You have made me wiser and better than I was yesterday; and yet, methinks, I had some knowledge of this great subject, and have been a politician all my life without perceiving it’ (15).

Some of these dialogues try and summon up the lost harmony of earlier dialogists in order to warn off revolutionary faction. However, the harmony now is not the concord of equals but the placidity of passive obedience. Hannah More’s Jack Anvil in the verse dialogue, The Riot, persuades his workmate, Tom Hod, who is inflamed by insurrectionary passion, that consensus is superior to discord:
A dinner of herbs, says the wise man, with quiet
Is better than beef amid discord and riot,
If the thing can’t be help’d, I’m a foe to all strife,
And pray for a peace every night of my life;
But in matters of state not an inch will I budge,
Because I conceive I’m no very good judge.​[315]​ (lines 50-55)

Though Jack has assumed the convention of rational dialogue, telling Tom he will ‘shew thee how passion thy reason does cheat’ (line 12), the consensual stance he takes means he is passively resigned to accepting that the working man has no place in the public sphere, that in ‘matters of state’ he is ‘no very good judge’.​[316]​
Many of these interventions against radicalism are simply condescending, but some do attempt more inclusivity. Particularly interesting here is when women who—though they may be misguidedly radical—are granted some qualified respect as dialogic subjects. Thus, though Louisa, in A Dialogue between Clara Neville and Louisa Mills, has ‘caught the epidemical distemper’ and ‘opened [her] pretty mouth against our government’ (3), she and her friend (and, by the subtitle, ‘Every Female in Great Britain’) are unexpectedly allowed to participate in the public sphere and discuss matters of state.​[317]​ Clara, who grants that some moderate political reform is needed, fails to win over the unfortunately ‘contaminated’ (3) Louisa, and ends on a dogmatic note; the arguments are fairly specious and Louisa is caricatured as naïve, but there is still some sort of allegiance to the possibility of mutual rationality.
Despite this concession, however, persuasive dialogue is persistently seen in terms of disease; Louisa is urging her brother to go to America. Louisa asks, with urgent concern about the misuse of performative language:
What means do you make use of to induce him to go? Why do you endeavour, directly and indirectly, to sow the seeds of discontent in his mind; and you hope to see a fine crop of rebellion grow up in a little time, I suppose. (8-9)

The ease by which the print medium enabled the rapid dispersal of Thomas Paine’s writings was a common bugbear of the anti-Jacobins. The author here vividly shows the chain of contagion of the exchange of radical ideas:
You would never have seen Paine’s writings, if they had not been put into your hands by some of your friends, whose minds have already been corrupted. Paine corrupted your friends; he, and your friends have corrupted you; and you are trying to corrupt your brother. Is it not necessary that our government put a stop to such corruptions? (9-10)

Responding to this, Louisa undermines her own radicalism and shrugs off the burden of opinion maker and active participant in public life: ‘But, child, you know women can do no harm, and what does it signify whether we are patriots, loyalists, or republicans?’ (10). Clara’s response is ambiguous; she may be the one upholding the value of women’s voices, but she invokes too the conventional fear of female rhetoric as seductive toxin:
if women are badly disposed they may influence men to act wrong. They may poison the minds of their husbands, sons, and brothers. ‘Ahab told himself to work iniquity,’ observe, ‘whom Jezebel his wife stirred up.’ (10-11)

Louisa again suggests that women should not engage in dialogue: ‘Had not you be better be at your needle than talking about politics, and things you do not understand?’ (26). The author here is deliberately making Louisa out to be foolish by unwittingly confessing her own inappropriate discourse. Clara suggests (and the dialogue reveals) that dialogue has failed; truth will not emerge from dialogue in any case: people must be guided by the monologic word of God rather than human communicative reason: ‘I am very sorry I can make no impression on your mind. I know if you are not under the direction of the word of God, “neither would you be persuaded though one rose from the dead”’ (26-27).
Clara ends the debate by asserting the necessity for women to intervene in public affairs, despite their bashfulness, but only in the realm of morality and religion:
I have oft sat in pain, to hear people talk against our government, and have not had courage to contradict them, but this was not right. It was a false modesty. Women ought to have courage to assert what is right; and to discountenance whatever is wrong; and also to endeavour, to teach people, so far as comes within their province, to Fear God, and HONOUR THE KING. (27)


In A New Dialogue between Monsieur Francois and John English, Monsieur Francois proclaims to his ‘good friend, John English’ that ‘we are now all Citizens of the World’ and that he has come over to promulgate revolutionary thought and ‘advise you what you should do’.​[318]​ The name of its publishers, the Association for Preserving Liberty and Property against Republicans and Levellers, make its aims clear, but it is not so unsympathetic to radical thought as one might think. Yet it does firmly limit the universalist potential of dialogue. Though attentive to concerns over pre-Revolutionary excess and tyranny in France, it proclaims that common ideology of British difference, England having its age-old liberties that preclude the need for revolution. English common sense derides the French nonsense of world citizenry along with its wooden shoes, trouserless costume, and its black bread, which ‘would soon turn sour on an Englishman’s stomach’ (4).​[319]​ This dialogue displays mutual incomprehension; no consensus is possible between French and English identity. Monsieur Francois’s author makes him confess that equality is maintained through bloodshed; John ingeniously argues that society, rather than being underpinned by Monsieur Francois’s ‘natural Rights of Man’, is an artifice founded on equality, so that
When we enter into society, we exchange our natural rights for civil rights. The first are the rights of a savage, to prey upon the weak and the helpless; the latter are the rights of society, uniting us for our general happiness, and mutual assistance, and protection. (12)

Thus the preconditions of mutuality exclude equality. It seems, too, that they severely limit the possibilities of dialogue, at least between cultures.
Dialogists, on both sides of the argument, were keenly alert to the dangers of the distorted speech of sophistic rhetoric. In the patronising A Dialogue between Mr. Worthy and John Simple, Simple has been stirred up by an agitator at the aptly-named inn, the Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing, of whom he says, ‘he is one of the prettiest-spoken men in the world’.​[320]​ The text’s author clearly demonstrates that working men like John Simple are too swayed by rhetoric and, mired in domestic particulars,​[321]​ do not possess the capacity for abstract thought that would admit them to the public sphere:
he told us, that all bloody tyrants were to come down, that the proud were to be made humble, and that the poor were to live like gentlemen. I never was so pleased in all my life. I said to my wife, when I got home, that we should soon have every thing just as we could wish; and I gave her money to buy the pink skirt which she had been teasing me about that day for our little girl. (2)

But Mr Worthy’s superior reasoning, of course, cleanses John’s Jacobin infection: ‘Good day to you, Sir’, says John, touching his forelock, we imagine; ‘I am much obliged to you for your discourse. You may be sure I shan’t go to the Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing again’ (8). 
A similar suspicion of rhetoric is found in Dialogue between a Labourer and a Gentleman.​[322]​ A ‘fine spoken gentleman’ has given John, kindly, he thinks, a copy of Paine’s viral Rights of Man. But the Gentleman of the dialogue generously puts John right:
Gent. Very unkind, John.
John. How so, Master?
Gent. Because, John, he gave you that book, in hopes it might make you dissatisfied with your situation, which is not doing kindly by you, John.

The repetition of ‘John’ here reinforces the paternalistic tone of those who are so concerned for the well-being of their workers; this tone pervades these texts. The Gentleman invites John into dialogue, ‘a little conversation’, but again this is not the mutuality of true dialogue but a corrective, disinfecting discourse, delivered from on high:
But come, John, let you and I have a little conversation about what this man has said to you; you and I have known each other many years; I have always endeavoured to serve you; you know nothing of that fine spoken gentleman, as you call him, but from what he says; and I’ll prove to you he has told you a great many lies. In the first place, he talked, you say, about all mankind being equal. (2-3)

The Gentleman helpfully disabuses John of this fallacy by probing him in pseudo-Socratic manner. He asks in particular, ‘Do you think, John, you could speak as well as Justice Worthy did the other day from the bench?’ (3). Thomas Day’s labouring dialogist below will prove that he is as equally proficient in judicial language as a justice, but John knows his place:
No, Master, to be sure not, though I had studied all my life; why he spoke for a full hour without a book—when I want to jobe the children, I can hardly find words to do it, or remembee [sic] what it is I want to say. Our Joan beats me there; she can talk almost as fast as his Worship did, though not so much to the purpose. (3)

To ‘jobe’ is ‘To rebuke, reprove, or reprimand, in a long and tedious harangue; to “lecture”’ (OED). Thus Joan’s womanly eloquence, along with the fine-spoken Painite’s, seems suspect (but so, curiously, does the Justice’s, compared to whom she talks ‘almost as fast’). 
Conversely, the radical dialogue A Dialogue between one of Mr. Burke’s 320,000 Sound Ones, and one of his 80,000 incorrigible, pure Jacobins follows Mary Wollstonecraft and Thomas Spence in alerting participants to the sophistry of reactionary rhetoric, particularly its chief exponent, Burke.​[323]​ Reversing the strategy of the honest but simple labourers seduced by Painite fluency, the author casts one of Burke’s ‘Sound Ones’ (‘Supporters of Mr. Pitt and the present war’ (5)) as the deceived simpleton (though a propertied and easily bribed one). It celebrates rational dialogue, despite the very real contemporary threat of the silencing of dialogue by the State with its use of willing informers; the Jacobin believes he can awaken the Sound One’s conscience and intellect through this exchange:
Sound One.
Bring it home to me; what, bring war here? Treason I declare; I will have your mouth stopped.

Jacobin.
Not so hast, my conscience is clear, I do not mind your threats. What I mean by bringing it home to you, is to convince you, that you have been accessory to all the misery and destruction that the scourge of war has brought on mankind, by your aiding and abetting it. (13)

The radical utopianism of the time is dramatised as Burke’s sublime clouds of obscurantism are dissolved by the persuasiveness of consensual reason, which
may be the means of your peaceably uniting with all Englishmen for a redress of grievances, and, instead of force of arms, be firm in the force of calm and impartial reason; and endeavour to dispel the clouds of ignorance and vice [. . .] This may be productive of an individual reform; then a political reform, will, of course, follow, as naturally as the swelling bud bursts forth to the beautiful blossom. (13)

But though the Jacobin maintains his faith in communicative reason, his disputant is unmoved by it and remains ‘Sound’.

Thomas Day’s dialogic education of justice

Thomas Day, a friend of the Edgeworths, shared their interest in education and in Rousseau. Day was a member of the Lunar Society—a perfect example of the networks of interrogative, collaborating individuals that flourished in this period which enacted the processes dramatised in the dialogue as a genre and demonstrates why the form was so apt for the age.​[324]​ He is known mostly for the immensely popular pedagogical novel, Sandford and Merton, written partially in dialogue form, which concerned itself with the development of an ethical understanding in young people.​[325]​ Sandford and Merton was highly critical of wealthy landowners and the way their children were educated. In his A Dialogue between a Justice of the Peace and a Farmer, Day’s Farmer presumes to educate the adults of that class by engaging their representative in Socratic dialogue.​[326]​
Thomas Day’s Justice is a parody of the spokesmen of the ruling class in conservative dialogues who is fond of dominating the debate with over-long speeches, breeching the conventions of polite, reasoned discourse. These speeches rest monologically on the received opinion of authorities in print. The Farmer is being prosecuted under one of many new obscure and arbitrary laws; in particular, one of those that increased the revenue burden on such small landholders as the Farmer. He questions the justice of being ‘severely punished, because [he] did not understand all the quirks of the law as well as our attorney or his clerk; and yet this is a land of liberty!’ (3). The Justice confirms the obscurity of the law by quoting extensively from Blackstone on English liberty, rather than being able to show its rationality through debate. But the Farmer instead employs dialectic to entangle the Justice in the irrational consequences of English law and, by extension, the economic system it protects. With Socratic faux naivety, he exposes, for example, the sterility of finance capital, leading the Justice into unwittingly endorsing his argument:
Far. That [financiering] is a word I do not exactly understand; will your worship please to explain it?
Jus. A financier is a person, that when a nation is so loaded with debts and taxes, that you would think it impossible for it to bear any new ones, shall yet contrive to load it with fifty or an hundred millions more, and find out taxes to pay the interest.
Far. And does the ingenious person invent any method of making the earth more productive than it was before, or of enabling those who cultivate it, to live without food? (9)

Day’s satirical double-voiced representation of the Justice almost makes us wonder if the Justice himself does not harbour discontented, radical urges;​[327]​ as in this Swiftian passage:
Jus. [. . .] As it is generally war time, [money] is paid away to contractors of all sorts, for the army, the navy, the ordnance; to send a fleet, perhaps, three hundred leagues off, in order to pick up cockle shells, or make the fortune of an admiral; to send a couple of brave fellows to catch the rot, and die like sheep in foreign ditches, or, perhaps, to maintain ten thousand more abroad for several years, doing nothing but playing at all-fours, or acting farces. (21)

But the Justice’s prevailing voice is an antidialogic deference to power and wealth; like Callicles in Plato’s Gorgias, language for great men is not a consensual window on truth but a vehicle for strategic action in their own interests, although the Justice tries to conceal this with the romantic veil of ‘honour’:
Jus. You are not to suppose, that great men of superior understandings and immense abilities, will be fettered down to their words in the same slavish manner with a farmer or a mechanic.
Far. What, then, am I to trust to, if I must not even credit their own assertions?
Jus. Trust to! Have you forgotten a parliamentary control! The honour, the dignity, the wisdom, the integrity of that illustrious body, will never permit a Minister to injure the public. (24)

Day’s treatment of the Justice’s speech is laden with ironies. The Farmer initiates another line of argument in order to elicit an acknowledgment of the rightness of majority rule. Again, rather than engage in consensual reasoning, the Justice can only resort to citing bookish authority:​[328]​
Far. Why, I should think, if elections were more frequent, and representatives more equally chosen, it might have a wonderful effect.
Jus. ‘Reason does not persuade me that electors, the most ignorant and profligate, the most necessitous and venal, would return members more uncorrupt than the present.’ (41)

The irony here is in the Justice quoting ‘reason does not persuade me’, for this conclusion of reasoning is second-hand and neither his own conclusion nor one that can emerge from the debate with the Farmer. Day reveals that the ruling class are hostile to both democracy and the communicative reason that is entwined with it.
Further probing follows. The response is more monologic parroting of Jenyns, with a Burkean tinge:
You would have ‘labourers and manufacturers of every kind, above and under ground, weavers from their looms, and miners from their tinneries and coal pits, sailors from their ships, and soldiers from their quarters, to which we must add, thousands of thieves, smugglers, rogues, vagabonds, and vagrants.’ (41)

But the Farmer shows that this ‘swinish multitude’ of rascals is actually the body that creates wealth, asking ‘would you gentlemen take the trouble of digging the earth, and making cloaths and houses for yourselves?’ (42). The Justice’s double-voiced justification of the lives of the rich again inadvertently supports the Farmer’s case: ‘Their dinners are composed of every thing most costly, rare, and stimulative to the palate; the produce of earth, air, water; of every country and of every sea’ (43-44). In addition, they are often employed ‘in public business; that is, giving their votes for or against questions which they have never considered, and, frequently, which they have not taken the trouble of hearing debated’ (44). This ‘public business’ is far from the deliberative commitment to the public sphere that Habermas valorises and that the Farmer and his peers are excluded from.
The Justice casually admits that his view of language is entirely manipulative.​[329]​ The Farmer has used the American rebels as an illustration of the possibility of democracy in practice; for the English ruling class, reveals the Justice, ‘it was necessary to represent them as the vilest scoundrels and ragamuffins in the universe’ (48). Representation, in the dual senses of linguistic and political, is a crucial theme of this dialogue, and the Justice’s notions of political representation are as arbitrary as the unstable signification in his war propaganda. For Day’s farmer, honest, dialogic representation is the essence of language and the goal of political activity; for the Justice, language is monologic—distorted representation, or the uncritical reception of static texts—and political representation is ‘virtual’, as will be seen below.
In an impassioned speech, the Farmer denounces the corrupt Parliamentary system in a way that emphasises the pragmatics of language involved. ‘Prate and chatter’, so often used to contemptuously stigmatise the discourse of the lower orders (or women), now designates ruling-class speech. The common people are not, however, fooled; ‘common sense’ rather than the dogma of prescribed authors will prevail, despite the direct attempts of the ruling class to corrupt political debate by material practices but also, significantly, strategic uses of language. But the Farmer has the temerity to participate in language critically and ‘judge’ the dominant discourse:
Do you imagine, then, that because you learn to prate and chatter in town, and that idly and ignorantly enough, God knows, if I may pretend to judge of your speeches, that the rest of the world have even lost their common sense, and will see no further than a few of your conceited, self-sufficient authors chuse they should? (51)

The Farmer exposes the corruption of electoral politics: ‘What election do we ever see, that the gentlemen have not recourse to the most dishonest arts’ (52). These ‘arts’ include direct intervention through ‘setting open public houses’ and ‘calling the industrious from their work’, but it is noteworthy that the Farmer pays attention to strategic action through linguistic corruption, to the illocutionary and perlocutionary acts that the ruling classes commit: ‘lying, promising, persuading, canting, inveigling, threatening, bribing’ (52).​[330]​
Neither the agreeable tone of Hume’s gentlemanly conversations nor the proper subservient responses of servant to master appear here. The Justice is astonished at the Farmer’s intemperance; ‘Farmer, where did you learn all this acrimony?’ (56), he cries. But the Farmer’s wrath is rational, for politeness is not an option when, as he reveals, the full might of Pitt’s state apparatus is encroaching more and more into the public sphere:
Under one pretence or another, every thing which is most inimical to the spirit of a free country is daily gaining ground; the most trifling offences are made acts of felony, and punished with death; every new session brings with it not only some new imposition, but some capital offence. (56)

As I have said, the theme of representation dominates this dialogue. The Farmer has several times already raised the common grievance about being taxed without proper representation (and the American secession was, of course, still in people’s minds) and that ‘the present inequality of representation violates every principle’ (54) of the constitution. Now the Farmer denounces the current government, the people’s ‘pretended representatives’ (61). The Justice glibly invokes the sophistic concept of ‘virtual representation’, whereby:
It is true that we cannot defend the present elections as really representing the people; and therefore we think it better to say that representation is no part of the constitution; or that it is only a kind of fiction. (62)

This fiction (‘the most convenient thing in the world’ (62)) even allows the Justice to justify the tyranny over Ireland and America. The Farmer’s Socratic teasing leads him into absurdities; the fiction collapses, and to this romance the Farmer counterpoises the plain-speaking ‘common sense’ of the constitution:
Yet when we look back to the English history, we find at the earliest period of its records, that the House of Commons was called the representative of the nation; not from some fanciful play of words or fiction [. . .] but because the members were really chosen by the people, imprest with their spirit, governed by ideas of common interest, and actually in the habit of continually consulting their constituents.​[331]​ (64-65)
 
True representation, then, is dialogic, involving Socratic dialectic and consensus rather than sophist wordplay. The present government believe insultingly that the people cannot argue rationally among themselves or with their opponents, or manage public affairs through discourse in a shared language of common sense; as the Farmer puts it:
the present race of writers imagine that no man can read, or understand common sense, except themselves; otherwise they would scarcely attempt to confound us by arguments that are so easily answered. What more could the English, or any other people desire, than to be represented in such a manner, that the parliament should really speak their language, propound their grievances, and manage the public property in the same manner as they would have managed it themselves. (66)

Thus, for the Farmer, political and linguistic representation are intimately involved with each other.
In addition, there must be a common rationality that overrides all self-interest. Despite these slanders against the people and against the Justice’s cynical and slippery ‘virtual representation’, there must be in the manner of Habermas an instinct for open consensus in human nature for society to be possible—and that therefore democracy is justified. The Farmer demonstrates that reason must be social. Throughout the text we see the Justice approaching this, and then retreating, diverted by his own private interests and prejudices. Government must take place through communicative reason:
Far. But as every human being is liable to error, and as opinions vary, it is impossible to decide who has really arrived at truth, therefore the particular systems of right and wrong which prevail in the world, are only the particular opinions of those who profess them.
Jus. Are there not some points upon which all are agreed?
Far. Where all are agreed, there will be no dispute; but where men differ, it is only the judgement of one set of men against that of another. (105)

Having got the Justice to concede this dialogic principle, which is realised in their very argument, the Farmer makes the implicit link between rationality and politics clear: ‘But as no man can pretend to a natural right of judging for another, much less can he pretend to a right of judging for a thousand or a million’ (105). Thus he demystifies the Justice’s ‘virtual representation’, and then exposes the coercion behind that romance: ‘if he does judge, and attempt to enforce his own inferences by compulsion, there is an end of all reason, and one species of violence may be opposed to another’ (106).
To an extent, the Justice is persuaded by the Farmer’s ‘shew’ of communicative reason—but then invokes the force of the state to ward off any further development of Farmer’s argument:
Well, farmer, I cannot, upon the whole, deny that there is some shew of reason in some of the positions you have advanced; I see that you have been ‘chewing the cud over and over again on some bits and scraps collected out of the writings of Oliver’s levellers.’ But I cannot help advising you never to print such seditious libels as I have this day heard.​[332]​ (109)

This enables the Farmer to conclude with a brilliant dissection of the laws of seditious libel (for he knows as much of law, and legal history, as the Justice), exposing the glaring contradictions of these laws with Britain’s claim to be a free society. The legal debate perfectly illustrates Farmer’s point that the enforcement of thought leads to ‘an end of all reason’, but shows too the limits of discourse when the state has instruments in place which are aimed directly at the circulation of ideas.

Thomas Spence and dialogic utopia

It is not so surprising that so many eighteenth-century theorists of language all chose to avail themselves of the dialogue (Jones and, earlier, Mandeville, Harris, and Rousseau); their sensitivity to the dialogic aspects of language and their concern to connect language to the social, their humanism—all of these inclined them to favour the form. Thus Thomas Spence, the radical utopian land reformer, is known equally for his linguistic interests, devising phonetic alphabets in order that that labouring people could both learn to read and to speak without an accent that invited contempt.​[333]​ Spence chose the dialogue form to put forward his vision of a democratic society of communal land owners, free from both the political tyranny of monarchy and aristocracy and the economic tyranny of landlords.​[334]​ He published a handful of interconnected pieces—many of them actual dialogues, but also songs and tracts which mix genres—over the years in which he developed his ‘Spensian Plan’. Spence’s view of what society should be and, too, of revolutionary agitation towards that ideal, is dialogic at heart:
Society ought properly to be nothing but a mutual agreement among the inhabitants of a country, to maintain the natural rights and privileges of one another against all opposers, whether foreign or domestic.​[335]​ (1)

But the threat of opposition shows that Spence is aware of antidialogic forces, even within a society, that can undermine that mutuality. Spence’s main economic and political concern is land distribution, which according with those mutual values, should be owned in common: ‘Let it be supposed, then, that the whole people in some country, after much reasoning and deliberation, should conclude, that every man has an equal property in the land in the neighbourhood where he resides’ (3). Clearly, political action rests, for Spence, on communicative reason; the economic arrangements envisioned here emerge from ‘reasoning and deliberation’ between ‘the whole people’.
It is not surprising that, like other radicals we have examined, the dialogue is his preferred genre, though his works again are dialogic in general in Bakhtin’s different sense of being Menippean, incorporating a variety of genres, that, as we have seen above, characterised the writings of Mandeville and Shaftesbury. Spence’s A Supplement to the History of Robinson Crusoe (1782),​[336]​ lies firmly in the tradition of island utopias, with a nod, of course, to Defoe’s foundational novel. (Remember, too, that More’s Utopia was in dialogue form.) A dialogue takes place among the descendants of Crusoe concerning the foundation of the new Spensonian ‘parish system’ of communal land:
This scheme so favourable to the malcontents was immediately adopted by them, nor could all the precedents, their opponents deduced from other nations, avail any thing; for as in all disputes the right commonly goes with the might, so, here, the landlords being the weaker party, were obliged to submit and the parish system took place. (6)

Thus Spence appropriates Defoe’s Crusoe, which the latter had used to explore aspects of bourgeois economic radicalism and the tensions therein, to express his own, more subversive, radicalism—a radicalism which completes the bourgeois rejection of feudalism in its call for the socialisation of land (but which, for all its utopian courage, is curiously blind to the rapidly growing urban industrial capitalism). The perpetuation of his utopia rests on dialogue too; Spence is aware of the hidden power relations behind the assumed neutrality of dialogue in current social structures; the triumph of democracy in the initial Crusonian foundational debate is ensured by the threat of superior numbers. Here, the landlords are ‘obliged to submit’.
Spence’s fictional visitor to the island of Crusonia, the Captain, engages in a dialogue with Mr Mann, one of the Crusonians, seeking an explanation of the order and harmony of the new society. For, as the outcome of an inner debate with himself, he seeks empirical and rational confirmation of the miraculous things he beholds:
The above relation [. . .] could not gain my entire credit on account of the numberless objections my mind raised against this scheme and impossibilities I thought attended it, till my own senses found the truth of the story in every one of their customs; nay, my presuppositions were so strong, that I was clear a society could not subsist upon a plan so repugnant to any thing I had either heard or thought of;  so to ease my disturbed mind I set to work to examine every thing I saw with the greatest strictness. (6)

But his observations confirm the claims the islanders make:
This view quite astonished me, for instead of anarchy, idleness, poverty, and meanness, the natural consequences, as I narrowly thought of a ridiculous levelling scheme, nothing but order, industry, wealth, and the most pleasing magnificence! (7)

Thus the whole of this miniature utopian text proceeds through educative dialogue: from the account of the primal dialogue that institutes society, to the Captain’s self-questioning, to an actual formal dialogue which describes Crusonia.
There is a now familiar invocation of romance as the feudal ideology of landowners.​[337]​ Thus Spence favours the generic innovation of Defoe and others, the novel (albeit in a utopian variety), as the preferred fictional genre: 
Capt. Would it not tend to make people more industrious if they could lay out their riches in possessions?
Mann. [I]n your country what great incitement, pray, can it be to give the cream of one’s endeavours, unthanked, to the landlord? For what landlord was ever yet thankful for his rents? They think the tenants rather owe thanks to them for permission to live on this earth forsooth! I can never think of them but with detestation. I can compare them with their castles to nothing but the giants and their castles in romance, who were said to be a terror and destruction to all the people around; and must have been invented for a satire upon landlords. (7)

When Spence was later suppressed by the strategic action of the state, he similarly suffered the ‘enchantment’ of tyranny as though in some exotic setting from romance:
Mr Spence, feeling very properly the indignity offered both to law and justice by these proceedings, remonstrated with the prostituted ruffians and modestly asked them whether he was to consider himself in Spain, Turkey, Algiers or England? It appeared to him as though he were enchanted to one of the most despotic spots in the universe.​[338]​ (17)

Mann satirises the superficiality of parliamentary and political debate as it is practiced in Britain, exposing its monologic nature:
In your country they vote in the manner you commend. What is the consequence? Why, the minister tells you, it is necessary to have a majority at any rate for the dispatch of business, which is the same thing as to plead for no parliament at all. So a majority he gets, who vote for him through thick and thin, in spite of the sun and all the eyes of their country. The minority, indeed, harangue and fume, as if something were the matter, to get the majority to understand what they know as well as themselves; but they are too fast asleep, in the lap of corruption, to regard either them or the praises of their country. (8-9) 

Clearly, the majority in Parliament do not administer the country through reasoned dialogue but are passively uncritical; communicative reason has become distorted through the instruments of bribery and corruption. And the dissemination of ideas outside government is similarly distorted; the press is no longer the ideal medium of the public sphere that Habermas delineated but has succumbed to the deterioration that he charts as a later stage: 
This general corruption and jarring sets all your newswriters, and pamphleteerers, on work to show their cobbling genius in their schemes for mending the constitution and redressing grievances by their place and triennial bills, etc. whereas the shoes were so ill made at first, are so worn, rotten, and patched already that they are not worth further trouble or expence, but ought to be thrown to the dunghill and a new pair made, neat and handsome, yet easy, as for the foot of one that loves freedom and ease. Then would your controversies about this and the other method of cobbling be done away, and you walk along the rugged and dirty path of life easy and dry-shod. (9)

Thus democracy for Spence is the active employment of communicative reason to debate and persuade, in contrast to the passive enactment of an unexamined public opinion that he scorns here. It is also revolutionary; a critical examination of society demands more than reformist tinkering and constitutional patchwork. This democracy is inscribed in the style: the use of homely analogies from handicrafts is a novelistic style; the superbly utopian extended metaphor also recalls Socrates, who frequently invoked the cobbler’s craft in arguments about ethical and political knowledge.​[339]​
Spence’s utopianism is tempered by the recognition once more of the intertwining of power and dialogue in that, to safeguard their revolution, his Crusonians have a people’s militia or revolutionary guard whose martial practices are detailed vividly and with relish. ‘And now you shall witness with your own eyes that force is as unlikely to succeed against us as your secret corruptions’ (9), declares Mann, inviting his visitor to observe their field day, where an impressively armed civil militia, officered only by those of ‘conspicuous merit’ (9), parade and demonstrate their democratic force.
A Supplement, like those other dialogues that I have looked at that gravitate towards the novel, embeds other subgenres within it such as the lyrical utopian narrative where the Captain celebrates the rational beauty of Crusonia which is ‘thick with fruit-trees’ and where ‘the corn is cultivated in rows and as carefully as garden-herbs’ (10). The inhabitants, free from the dread of eviction, have cultivated a land which ‘seems to have been intended both by God and man for a nursery and habitation suitable to the chief of the creation and convinces one sufficiently what the deity and rational creatures can affect’ (10). This utopia has arisen through the proper use of the unconstrained dialogue latent in ‘rational creatures’: 
Instead of debating on this and the other method of cobbling the state, as with you, for ours needs no cobbling, it is common to see all degrees of people debating how any thing in their own neighbourhood might either be embellished or improved to the public good. (13) 

The Captain is so persuaded by this vision, and by the ‘civility’ of Mann’s ‘political dialogue’, that Britain becomes ‘poor wrangling Britannia’: a quarrelsome state in contrast to the dialogic Crusonia, so that he determines never to return to until he is ‘certain that this paradisical system has taken place in it’ (14).
Spence delineates his vision of consensual dialogic utopianism, free from faction. He identifies the connections between rationality and free speech, and how the ‘prevailing politics’ of the ruling class is determinedly antidialogic and intimately bound up with coercive violence:​[340]​
Were it possible to deprive the numerous hoards [sic] of mankind (with very few exceptions) of their rational faculties—to divest them of thinking—to restrain them from speaking—to draw a veil over occult powers—and cancel their sensibility; it would be perfectly conformable with prevailing politics to attempt the experiment. Infatuation and ignorance—depravity and corruption—violence and intrigue seem united against the progress of knowledge and the interest of society. (19)

Instead, he posits an alternative, universalised mutuality:
But may we not anticipate a better age and a superior degree of civilisation; when society will be united under one interest and man be no more the dupe of faction—when peace will spread her genial wings and leave the human mind to the enjoyment of those blessings which nature has so bountifully bestowed, when industry will be relieved of the almost insurmountable fetters of the present hour and the only barrier to civil enjoyments will be those of vicious inclinations. (19-20)

‘Faction’ was a recurring concern of the eighteenth century. But often those who denounced it were ideologues of the establishment who saw any critical opposition as subversive; by contrast, Spence employs fiercely disputative dialogue to envision a future free from faction, where dialogue becomes instead a means for the rational management of labour. Dialogue, too, releases nature as well as humanity from their fetters, and a socialised hedonism of ‘civil enjoyments’ is realised.
To the end of ‘A Letter from Ralph Hodge, To his Cousin Thomas Bull’ (1795),​[341]​ Spence attaches a catechism that mocks those most undialogic dialogues published by Hannah More and others. As I have described above, these generally took the form of a dialogic situation, a question and answer session where a spokesperson for the ruling class engages with a ‘deluded’, and often slow-witted, labourer who has become discontented and poisoned by the poisonous ideas of seditious radicals.​[342]​ Ralph Hodge’s cousin is a member of the labouring classes who has been coerced through impoverishment and fear into betraying his class and acting as informer, or some other servant of the state. Ralph reminds him of his shared interests with other working people. Conservative pamphlets very often addressed a Thomas or a Johnny Bull, and Spence duly addresses Johnny Bull in his invocation at the head of this dialogue: 
	For poor Johnny Bull,
	Who is now so dull;
	A few plain questions,
	To suit his thick skull. (24)

But ‘dull’ Johnny Bull here is quite capable of thinking for himself. Spence’s catechism concerns the National Debt, what is done with it, and who benefits from it. Questioner and respondent both make clear how corrupt the system is:
	Q.	What is done with the money thus borrowed in the nation’s name?
	A.	The rich men of the nation give it to each other under pretence of places and services, civil, ecclesiastical, and military.

Whereas More’s exchanges end with the complete subjugation of one voice by the other and a resignation to the dominant order, this exchange culminates in the exuberant and mutual recognition by both interlocutors that established government must be rejected:
Q.	Will those who have all along paid themselves so liberally take the trouble at last of governing us for nothing? Surely no. We must inevitably be ungoverned! Can no way be thought of supporting our government in such unparalleled distress?
	A.	 Let them go a pirating with the Algerines.
Q.	 Nay; them they have long been in league with; and far excelled in depredation, as the African coast and both the Indies can woefully witness; insolence and robbery, rapine and murder, have been fully tried in every quarter of the globe.
	A.	Then damn them, I’ve done with them! (25)

Thus, reflexive about dialogue itself as many of these dialogues are, Spence’s parody of reactionary catechism works by recasting that single-voiced genre as genuine dialogue, thus becoming more than parody.
Spence conjures up another utopia in Description of Spensonia (1795); Spensonia is a variation on his earlier Crusonia.​[343]​ The Spensonians’ colonies are founded on an equal exchange of property; they inevitably encounter people from the neighbouring continent, and here the dialogism implicit in the new society is realised. The ‘several interviews’ and ‘frequent traffickings and dealings’ with the indigenous people are ‘conducted with the utmost simplicity and good faith’—under the conditions, then, of Habermas’s ideal speech situation. The ‘Indians’ are astonished at what they find; unlike their previous encounters with Christians, they now see ‘a people much superior in the comforts of life, as independent as themselves; and though Christians, without those odious tyrants “Landlords”’ (27). They are perplexed by these newcomers, whose behaviour is so unlike what they have come to expect of Europeans, who
expel or exterminate us the natives, because we will not work or pay rent to them for living in our own country; neither have these Europeans the common honesty to share equally, among themselves, their unrighteous plunder; but levy rents of each other here, as they do at home. Yes, their religion it seems will not allow of equality or rights. (27) 

Through dialogue, ‘The curiosity of the Indian was satisfied; he was made to comprehend the brotherly system’ (28). The Indians are won over by dialogic example: 
The enraptured Indian sighed for the domestic happiness of civilized life, combined with his native independence. He was adopted a citizen and was happy. Other Indians heard, saw, and followed the example. [. . .] Trade flourished, ships were built, and commerce extended to distant shores its reciprocal blessings.’ (28)
 
This colonisation through exchange, discourse, and rational example is a common utopian thread in much eighteenth-century thought, where the exchange of goods is metonymous with commerce in its other sense of egalitarian discourse; Voltaire’s description of the Stock Exchange is paradigmatic.​[344]​ Here, it is satirically contrasted with the Indians’ previous encounters with Christian colonisers and their landlords. The dialectical aspect of dialogic encounter is raised when the twin eighteenth-century motifs of noble savagery and polite civilisation, uneasily handled by other writers, are here transcended by retaining the positive aspects of both.
The full utopian force of Spence’s writing emerges as the awed visitor remarks, in a move from romantic pastoral to a yet more visionary genre:
I can never enough admire the beauty of the country. It has more the air of a garden or rather a paradise than a general country scene; and indeed it is only a continuation of gardens and orchards. For besides the infinite number of real gardens, the very fields, meadows and pastures, are plentifully strewed with fruit trees and the corn is cultivated in rows, and as carefully as garden herbs. The houses and everything about them are so amiably neat and so indicative of domestic happiness, so far distant from the inflated pomp and ghastly solemnity of the palaces of the great and the confined miserable depression of the hovels of the wretched, that they seem the habitations of rational beings; of beings worthy the approbation of the Deity, because, though as he designed them they be lords of all his works, they presume not to be lords of each other. (31)

Nature is tamed by dialogic speech. The proper object of human agency is the inanimate world, not the employment of strategic action against other people. There appears once more the democratic and dialogic administration of space, and the limits of established democracy:
Instead of debating about mending the State, as with you (for ours needs no mending) we employ our ingenuity nearer home and the results of our debates are in every parish, how we shall work such a mine, make such a river navigable, drain such a fen, or improve such a waste. These things we are all immediately interested in and each have a vote in executing; and thus we are not mere spectators in the world, but as all men ought to be, actors, and that only for our own benefit. (31)

Thus dialogue in Spensonia is active and practical rather than passive and abstractly contemplative.
 In The End of Oppression (1795), a young man (a worker, as the subtitle, ‘Being a Dialogue between an Old Mechanic and a Younger One’, shows) has heard of ‘another RIGHTS OF MAN’ (that is, Spence’s) ‘that goes further than Paine’s’ (34).​[345]​ He is answered by an Old Man who socratically leads his interlocutor into the Spensian vision, arguing for the collective appropriation of private land on the issuing of a proclamation to the landlords, but again backed up by the threat of the counterforce of the majority if they attempted to violently resist:
[L]et us suppose a few thousands of hearty determined fellows well armed and appointed with officers, and having a committee of honest, firm, and intelligent men to act as a provisionary government and to direct their actions to the proper object. (36)

Again, dialogue is immediately translated into practice; such a body would take possession of the land: ‘But if the aristocracy arose to contend the matter, let the people be firm and desperate, destroying them root and branch and strengthening their hands by the rich confiscations’ (37). Spence well knew that consensual, majoritarian dialogue was not enough to effect social transformation; power and force lie behind the polite agreement of the ruling classes, and he was, in fact, prosecuted for this very pamphlet. 
To this action Spence responded with a mock apology that sets up an ironised dialogue between himself and authority—Spence’s Recantation of The End of Oppression (1795).​[346]​ Satire is in a sense a fundamentally undialogic mode; it feels no need to be respectful or attentive to other views. But it can also expose the undialogic assumptions at work elsewhere. It may thus be dialogic in the sense that it puts things to the test, bringing them into an argument. Here, Spence exposes the distorted nature of a public speech that conceals division and antagonism with a veneer of politeness, this unmasking the ideological aspect of dialogic consensus that is the obverse of its utopian potential. He ‘hopes’ that by ‘publicly retracting, denying and recanting all those doctrines of an offensive nature propagated by me, to regain the good-will and applause of my fellow-citizens’ (39). This is a mockery of the true dialogic process, and satirises the benignity of the model eirenic dialogue; here, refutation and negation serve public complacency and shallow approbation rather than truth. Thus he feigns regret at the ‘uneasiness and alarm’ that he has inspired (many of the conservative dialogues began by depicting uneasy labourers, made anxious by radical thought) and retracts his ‘offensive’ doctrines: the right to offend, in this falsely dialogic public sphere, must be sacrificed ‘to regain the good-will and applause of [his] fellow-citizens’ (39). 
He (illegitimately) pretends to represent the whole of his class (again, a satirical reversal of his usual role) and does 
most solemnly for myself and for the whole plebeian race of mankind, renounce and give up all claim to this world, to its soil, and every product thereof for the time present and for ever;—save what we can earn of the crumbs that fall from the tables of the landed interest by rendering ourselves subservient and useful to their pleasures and luxuries. (39)

The irony lies in adopting the voice of passive obedience, of submission to the monologic direction of authority; this is Bakhtin’s double-voicedness once more. The right to hold an ‘absurd opinion’ (such as ‘foolishly supposing that mankind could manage the affairs of a parish as well as of a nation’ (39)) must also be sacrificed to the ‘cogent reasons’ of accepted ‘common sense’—what ‘everybody knows’.​[347]​ Among these commonplaces is the notion that ‘the mental powers of mankind are so depraved, crooked and perverse’ that the people would not know how to manage common land even if it were bequeathed to them freely:
They would never think of dividing it among them. And if they did divide it, behold the evils attending it! The idle, I mean the poor of society, would be claiming as large dividends as the more wealthy, which would be insufferable. Everybody knows that the wealthy only are the industrious, the laborious, and the honest, and therefore have an indefeasible right to the principal shares in all divisions. (39-40). 

Heavily sarcastic about the disruption of social harmony, he repents his depriving ‘many poor families of sleep and comfort’ by denying them the dream of one day being able to buy land (40).
The Reign of Felicity (1796) is, again, a formal dialogue, set in that most typical arena of the public sphere, one of Berkeley’s detested coffee-houses.​[348]​ A Spencian Farmer contests with a Clergyman, a Courtier, and an Esquire, on the politics of ideology and the civilization of ‘the Indians of North America’. The Courtier and the Clergyman both hope that the native Americans will be constrained by a monologic ideology to be submissive; Spence here exposes the dialogic complicity of the ruling classes and their traditional intellectuals (for dialogue can be conspiratorially oppressive as well as emancipatory):
Clergyman. Well, Gentlemen, what do you think of the civilization of the Indians of North America, which General Washington speaks of in the Congress as a matter of practicability? I hope he will be careful in their instruction to sow the seeds of religion, for without a due impression therefrom, they will be but savages still.
Courtier. I am of your opinion, Sir, that nothing conduces so much to render the people good and submissive subjects as religion. This was a matter well understood by all the ancient legislators for they always commenced their business by forming the minds of their new subjects to religion.

The Esquire recognises that complicity and adopts a more liberal attitude, but displays the limits of a merely political critique that fails to move into the economic dimension:
Esquire. Yes, that was certainly the way to make blind and slavish subjects, but not manly and independent citizens. Superstition undoubtedly contributed very much to render the people a willing prey to Kings and Priests, therefore it is not surprising to see Church and State so inseparably united from the beginning. For which reasons I would be very sorry to see the independent minds of these North American Indians, the only freemen remaining on the earth, poisoned and depraved by superstition.

The Esquire represents the Paineite insights of the newly-risen bourgeois opposition to feudal interests, those of classic Enlightenment liberalism, as observed in Hume and Shaftesbury. This is a sophisticated performance of dialogue: not the simple opposition of two clearly contrasted stances, but dissent among factions of the ruling class, revealing uneasy compromises there, with a third interest entering the foray. Hence the Farmer takes the argument further:
Farmer. Neither would I like to see them become beasts of burden to esquires and landlords, for then I would give them as irrecoverably lost. [. . .] [A]s in all scrambles the most powerful are the most successful, the landlords are sure to seize on the government and as surely will keep it. (41)

For Spence’s Farmer, the association of people that is civil society must not be coercive, and private property is itself coercive: ‘If there can be no civil society without paying rents to individuals, I could heartily wish the Indians to remain for ever in their native freedom, without Kings, Priests, Lords or Landlords’ (41).​[349]​
The Courtier appeals to history to show that the mixture of conquest by force and the anodyne of religion practiced in the past is the only means of civilisation, rejecting civility that ‘civilisation’ might be brought to America: 
This way of instructing mankind appears indeed very harsh, but their conquerors always endeavoured to soothe their sorrows with the consolations of religion, which they introduced at the same time. (42) 

In contrast, the liberal Esquire, as befits the spokesman of liberal capitalism rather than the feudal reactionary, would have a more apparently consensual approach, though concealed behind his civil dialogue is the oppression of property relations:
A very uncivil way of civilizing the world indeed, and I don’t approve of it [. . .] I would however propose a milder way for the Americans.—As there can be no civilization without landlords, to let and parcel out the lands among the people, and see them cultivated, they must of necessity have landlords [. . .] the best way is for the men in every township to cast lots who should be the landlord of the district. (42)

However, this is but the illusion of democracy, despite the Esquire attempting to argue that the consequences would be beneficial:
The rest of the natives, and also foreigners, would then come and take of these landlords such portions of land as they wanted, at certain rates and rents as they should agree. And if the foreigners who thus came to settle among them, would bring with them commerce and the arts and sciences, and thus they would soon become a populous and flourishing people. 

The Farmer retorts to this: ‘And is there no way to civilize mankind without reducing the great body of the people to a state of dependence and vassalage? [. . .] landed property and liberty always go together’ (42). He then apostrophises the absent Indians, warning them of the rapaciousness of Western colonisers and appealing to their uncorrupted rationality. That rationality is communicative reason, antithetical to the versions of strategic rationality of ‘force’ or ‘sophistry’ (corrupt, monologic speech), or the coercion and persuasion of Gramsci:
Wherefore, O ye Indians, hearken to the voice of truth, and let neither force nor sophistry deprive you of the lordship of your soil, nor of the sovereign disposal of your rents and revenues. is Lord of the Manor, from generation to generation, and that all other landlords are imposters and robbers, and however they may style themselves gentlemen, are only wolves in sheeps’ cloathing and live by spoil. (43)

Liberty is infectious, just as Spence’s prosecutors feared; the open dialogicity of public ownership persuades by its rationality and expands through its universalism:
Think of these things, and preserve your lordship entire and your liberties are safe and you soon will become the most enviable nation upon earth, and the lovers of freedom will flock to you from all corners of the world intreating to become your fellow citizens. (43)

When the Spensonian system is established:
universal suffrage follows of course, as well as universal capability of being elected. The government of such a people must of necessity be the most pure and perfect democracy, and every thing must be subject to their control.
Thus may the manly, the warlike Indians be civilized without being tamed, without being hewers of wood and drawers of water, either to foreign invaders or native usurpers. The slaves and disenfranchised labourers of other nations would find emancipation, and ascend to the real character of man. (44)

The ‘real character’ of human beings is thus dialogic, involving a ‘universal capability’ to manage their own affairs mutually.
Spence acknowledges women and even children as dialogic subjects: The Rights of Infants (1796) has a woman demanding the rights in the title from ‘the haughty Aristocracy’ (48).​[350]​ In this exchange, the Woman declares that the rights of infants ‘extend to a full participation of the fruits of the earth’ and derive from nature. The Aristocracy question the right of women to enter the public sphere, ‘sneering’, in Spence’s stage direction, ‘And is your sex also set up for pleaders of rights?’ (48). ‘Yes, Molochs!’ replies the Woman, defiantly:
Our sex were defenders of rights from the beginning. And though men, like other he-brutes, sink calmly into apathy respecting their offspring, you shall find nature, as it never was, so it never shall be extinguished in us. You shall find that we not only know our rights, but have spirit to assert them to the downfall of you and all tyrants. (49)

This is exceptional; women have been notably absent from these dialogues, with the exception of Clara Neville above. The more eirenic dialogues of Chapter Two, which established wider pluralistic spaces, were more inclusive; as towards Mandeville’s Fulvia and Fontenelle’s Marquiese. A deeper look at gender and dialogue is beyond the scope of this thesis, but it does point to the limitations of the bourgeois public sphere, particularly as raised by some of Habermas’s feminist critics.​[351]​
Thus in each of the forays into dialogue that Spence attempts, the form is entirely adapted to the subject matter. In a Menippean manner, he places diverse genres in conjunction with each other: formal dialogue, public epistle, utopian travelogue, broadsheet ballad, constitutional declaration, and chap-book tale. He persistently, urgently, appeals for a dialogic realm free from not only the obvious coercive forces of feudal tyranny but also the concealed material constraints of land ownership and the systematic distortion of ideological sophistry. In Spence’s works, the utopian moment of the earlier bourgeois public sphere is reimagined as encompassing all those whose voices have been silently occluded behind the politeness of Hume’s dialogic community.









Writing, when properly managed, (as you may be sure I think mine is) is but a different name for conversation.​[352]​

If we attend to the course of conversation in mixed companies consisting not merely of scholars and subtle reasoners but also of business people or women, we notice that besides storytelling and jesting they have another entertainment, namely, arguing; for storytelling, if it is to have novelty and interest, soon exhausts itself, while jesting easily becomes insipid. Now of all arguments there are none which excite more ready participation [. . .] than one about the moral worth of this or that action from which the character of some person is to be made out.​[353]​

What Kant’s women and businessmen are arguing over is the stuff of the novel. They are attending, in a social forum, to one of Jürgen Habermas’s validity claims—the normative rightness (‘moral worth’) of people’s actions. For Habermas, ‘anyone acting communicatively must, in performing any speech act, raise universal validity claims and suppose they can be vindicated’.​[354]​ The speaker raises three types of claim in a speech act:
He claims truth for the stated propositional content or for the existential presuppositions of a mentioned propositional content. He claims rightness (or appropriateness) for norms (or values) that, in a given context, justify an interpersonal relation that is to be established performatively. Finally, he claims truthfulness for the subjective experiences (Erlebnisse) expressed.​[355]​

In reality these modes can coexist, though ‘they appear in greater clarity the more clearly reaching understanding is oriented toward only one validity claim’.​[356]​ In the speech acts represented by the formal dialogues I have been looking at, it is generally truth claims or claims to rightness that are dominant: scientific, political, philosophical, and theological arguments are open to contest on matters of fact or morality. In some of the more hostile exchanges that I discussed in the previous chapter, questions of truthfulness are also raised: the sincerity and the motivations of speakers are scrutinised (often as a means of discrediting them). The novel, too, is profoundly concerned with the validity claims raised by speech acts. Truth claims in particular are tangled up with narrative, their resolution often being crucial to plot development. But, as with Kant’s conversationalists, the novel derives much of its ‘novelty and interest’ from its concern with truthfulness. What interests me here, too, is Kant’s concern with the admixture of narrative with argument; the demotic (though faintly disparaging) involvement of the middling classes and of women; the focus of their conversation upon behaviour—these are all very novelistic concerns. Thus, as Sterne suggests, conversation has a great deal to do with the kind of ‘properly managed’ writing that is the novel.
In Chapters Two and Three above I suggested how the eighteenth-century English dialogue could be impressively novelistic in various ways. In their even-handedness and generosity towards their interlocutors, the more Humean of them approach the polyphonic sympathy that Bakhtin again finds in the novel. Related to this, the participants in these dialogues are often more than mere abstractions and have become distinctly individualised. These characters are even, in some dialogues, drawn more inclusively from society’s lower ranks.​[357]​ Many dialogues have that Menippean embrace of diverse genres that characterises the novel for Bakhtin. Eighteenth-century dialogues and prose fictions have an even closer relationship, however. Take, for example, the rhapsodic and Menippean structure of such fictions as A Tale of a Tub (1704) and Tristram Shandy. With their salmagundi of genres, these are not yet a radically separate species from The Moralists or The Fable of the Bees.​[358]​ In all, the eighteenth-century dialogue is so generically variegated, and the early novel so multiform, that the two genres overlap to the extent that definitions become highly problematical. 
We have also seen how the typically dialogic activity of the eighteenth-century public sphere surrounds many of the texts already considered. The construction of Mandeville’s Fable, already dialogic in the sense of the clashing juxtaposition of genres, including actual dialogues, occurred out of the process of publication and consequent criticism. A smaller exchange took place around Alciphron, and Fontenelle’s multiple translations, editions, and reverent imitations is yet another example. Thus it may not be surprising to see this manifested in the production of novels. Such works as Clarissa (1747-48) and Tristram Shandy (1759-67), too, were forged in the dialogic situation of the eighteenth-century literary public sphere that Eagleton delineates.​[359]​ There, exchanges of letters, literary discussions, reviews of the published instalments all made the writing of these texts a dynamic and highly social process, as Thomas Keymer shows.​[360]​
For Bakhtin, dialogue is closely related to Menippean satire, where ‘the unfettered and fantastic plots all serve one goal—to test and expose ideas and ideologues’; as in formal dialogues, this is the testing of ideas, rather than character. Menippea are rooted in Socratic dialogue: they are ‘the product of the disintegration of the Socratic dialogue’.​[361]​ Bakhtin claims that menippea expanded into novels. Certain ‘serio-comical genres’ of antiquity:
anticipate the more essential historical aspects in the development of the novel in modern times, even though they lack that sturdy skeleton of plot and composition that we have grown accustomed to demand from the novel as a genre. This applies in particular to the Socratic dialogues [. . .] and also to Menippean satire. [. . .] These serio-comical genres were the first authentic and essential step in the evolution of the novel as the genre of becoming.​[362]​

Bakhtin suggests that the novel, emerging from Menippean satire and formal dialogue, turned its attention away from the testing of truth or aesthetic value, to the practical reason of the ethical realm: ‘The idea of testing the hero, of testing his discourse, may very well be the most fundamental organizing idea in the novel, one that radically distinguishes it from the epic’.​[363]​ Bakhtin’s testing is thus very close to the examination of validity claims to truthfulness. He then historicises this notion, showing that ‘the very content of the idea of trial may change fundamentally in different eras and among different groups’.​[364]​ I want to suggest that a similar shift of attention occurred with the overlapping of dialogue and novel in the process I am examining, though aspects of the formal dialogue are retained and fused with the testing of the hero’s authenticity. 
This process is also about the encroachment of plot onto dialogue, or vice versa; the skeleton of plot (which by itself bores Kant’s talkers) needs the flesh of dialogue, and the mutual animation of the two is what the eighteenth-century novel excels at. Of course, the rich and involved texts that I have been looking at are not novels; there is hardly any action or motion, or ‘sturdy skeleton of plot’, whereas the early novel, at least, often involves a good deal of geographic mobility and the protagonist will certainly undergo the drama and vicissitudes of plot; there is very little emotional life; the dialogic interaction is generally linear, confined to the one serious—philosophical, scientific, religious, ethical, or political—topic. Yet there is the continual temptation to escape these constraints: Shaftesbury’s rhapsodic philosopher, Theocles, becomes highly enthused and emotional, if only about abstract ideas; Mandeville’s characters hover dangerously over aggression and conflict, whereas in Berkeley and Day this becomes naked; and only intellectual curiosity seems to prevent Fontenelle’s Philosopher and Marquiese from tumbling into erotic drama.
Yet as these dialogues tend towards the novelistic, prose fictions were, in turn, in some ways founded in the formal dialogue. The novel needs to preserve its novelty (and perhaps its commodified value) by periodically reinventing itself. According to Keymer, during the mid-eighteenth century, the newly prominent institution of criticism from the periodicals placed ‘a new premium on self-conscious rejections of prior convention, especially in terms of form [. . .], and leading all but the period’s dullest novelists to cast around for unorthodox turns and techniques’.​[365]​ Throughout the period, one of the resources it calls upon to do this is the dialogue, which (along with many other elements) becomes a speech genre that is incorporated into it. The dialogue already performed many of the functions and had many of the virtues of its more heterogeneous sibling (even though the sophisticated eighteenth-century dialogue was itself generically variegated). As the novel developed, however, the popularity of the dialogue dwindled.
And yet still, even after its fading, the dialogue hovers around as a resource, an example, or model in parallel with the novel, and always, potentially, one of its constituents. Many critics have uncovered the various kinds of genre that became incorporated into the novel during its much contested ‘rise’—romance, spiritual diary, the letter, journalism, and so on.​[366]​ In fact, as Bakhtin, shows, practically any textual item can be seized upon in this way:
The novel permits the incorporation of various genres, both artistic (inserted short stories, lyrical songs, poems, dramatic scenes, etc.) and extra-artistic (everyday, rhetorical, scholarly, religious genres and others). In principal, any genre could be included in the construction of the novel.​[367]​

According to Bakhtin, secondary speech genres such as literary and other complex textual forms are all derived from the dialogic utterances in speech which are primary speech genres:
Secondary (complex) speech genres—novels, dramas, all kinds of scientific research, major genres of commentary, and so forth—arise in more complex and comparatively highly developed and organized cultural communication (primarily written) that is artistic, scientific, socio-political, and so on. During the process of their formation, they absorb and digest various primary (simple) genres that have taken form in unmediated speech communion.​[368]​
 
Thus novels are, for Bakhtin, a secondary speech genre. But it may be productive to observe that what novelists do is ingest some of these secondary speech genres to form what may be considered instead a tertiary speech genre, thus emphasising the peculiarly mixed nature of the novel. A secondary speech genre can itself become the dominant form of the tertiary object—the novel—built from it. Novels as diaries and journals, for example, are well known; the epistolary novel was of major significance in the eighteenth century, and there is a wealth of critical writing devoted to it.​[369]​ But novels constructed entirely as formal dialogues such as Diderot’s are rare. 
One highly notable narrative-in-dialogue which straddles genre boundaries comes, not unexpectedly, from Mandeville: his The Virgin Unmask’d (1709). The suggestive title seems to promise a piece of erotica. Yet it might also be a conduct book, being ‘several Diverting Dialogues of the Female Sex’ on such subjects as ‘Love and Gallantry’, ‘Beauty and Education’, ‘Dress and Behaviour’, but also ‘Plays and Musick’. In this text, a deliberately celibate maiden aunt, Lucinda, engages in a dialogue with her young niece, Antonia, in a digressive tour round the nature of men and matrimony. But embedded in this is a narrative about a young woman who defies parental authority, marries for passion, and is then abused and exploited abominably. This is archetypal novel material, and the formal and psychological realism that Mandeville employs, coupled with its free mix of genres, create something very like a novel indeed.​[370]​ Yet the novelistic narrative is still framed by a dialogue and one would hesitate to classify this text as a novel, despite the blurring of boundaries that I have mentioned.
Sarah Fielding’s The Cry (1754) is more definitely a novel, however, and it is largely in dialogue form. It emerged during that period of experimentation which Keymer describes as a moment of reinvigoration of the still-new form, and is a fine illustration of a text that resembles Shaftesbury’s or Swift’s miscellanies as much as any novel. It is assembled as a dialogue (though with features of the closet drama), but includes embedded tales, satirical episodes, and essays on poetics. I will discuss this in depth below. 
The other genres that became incorporated in the novel are, on the whole, notably individualised (apart from letters, which obviously have a strongly social component); certain genres might offer themselves as evidence of the individualistic character of the novel itself, symptomatic of the growth of an expansionist capitalism. Ian Watt’s account makes much of this individualism, and it is undoubtedly an important factor in the novel. But this period also demanded an increased sociality often in conflict with that individualism. This sociality was, in part, especially in the manifestation it takes as the public sphere, a necessary component of the struggle against feudalism, as in Habermas’s account of unconstrained rational discussion of public issues. It was also, however, a more ideological expression of the anxiety concerning social fragmentation; thus the distillation of these concerns with sociality in moral sense theory, for Eagleton, 
testifies to a bankrupt tendency of bourgeois ideology, forced to sacrifice the prospect of a rational totality to an intuitive logic. Unable to found ideological consensus in its actual social relations, to derive the unity of humankind from the anarchy of the market place, the ruling order must ground that consensus instead in the stubborn self-evidence of the gut.​[371]​ 

As a consequence of these concerns, the novel is usually much more than an account of an individual’s self-development and interiority: it is an enactment of that consciousness in an interpersonal setting, mediating all the conflicting forces of that setting; hence the importance of dialogue (which here includes the more affective dialogue learnt from drama as well as the formal dialogue of ideas). Note, too, that many of the more individualised forms (spiritual autobiography, for example) enact the inward colloquy that Shaftesbury found crucial and that Vološinov has theorised as vital to consciousness.​[372]​ As Shaftesbury was aware, and Vološinov explicates, this inward self-utterance is highly dialogic; even, Vološinov suggests, structured like a formal dialogue.​[373]​ And the introjected dialogue that is inner speech has its origin in intersubjective dialogue. Although I will not be pursuing this line in depth, the inner self-examination of even a Crusoe is thus founded in social life and cannot be taken as a symptom merely of individualism. Watt, in fact, does develop this line of thought; Crusoe is a critique of extreme individualism that initiates the concerns of later novels with sociality: 
it is appropriate that the tradition of the novel should begin with a work that annihilated the relationships of the traditional social order, and thus drew attention to the opportunity and the need of building up a network of personal relationships.​[374]​

Paralleling this qualification of Watt’s individualistic thesis, what John Richetti says on the change in the genres of philosophy needs to be similarly qualified—particularly with the philosophical dialogues that I have looked at, which are social in important ways:
A profound transformation of what might be called the dominant literary genres of philosophy marks the emergence of modern thought, as the autobiographical meditation, the essay, and the treatise succeed older forms such as the medieval commentary with its catechetical and interrogatory structure that is a form of dialogue.​[375]​

But I hope to have shown that, for this period, among these dominant genres was the dialogue, and that this dominance was due to a spirit of communicative reason that inspired and vivified the eighteenth-century public sphere. Richetti goes on to describe the radical individualism of the modern philosopher in ways that remind us of Watt, alluding to the archetypal novel of individualism along with the mythical lone originator of language:
The modern philosopher-writer is a man alone, a sort of voluntary Robinson Crusoe or self-appointed philosophical Adam whose thought tends to represent itself as a new beginning rather than a continuation and modification of older thought.​[376]​ 

What Richetti misses here, I think, is the extent to which such new beginnings had to be justified in debate and thus how the dialogue was a genre eminently apt for this. It is certainly true that, ‘The dialogue, polemic, commentary, and disputation of ancient and medieval thought have a communal context’, but then Richetti adds:
The radical epistemologizing of thought after, say, Descartes requires the denial or at least the functional dismissal of context. Society and its concerns become effects of consciousness rather than its cause or its accompaniment. What emerges as the genres of philosophical expression shift is a redramatization of thought as private in a new and radical sense.​[377]​

There is a dialectical tension between meditation or treatise, and philosophical dialogue, as there is between such genres as confessional journal and the less private genres that were available for incorporation into the novel. And the eighteenth-century dialogue was arguably more dialogic than the ‘catechetical structure’ of mediaeval forms that Richetti invokes.​[378]​    
 I am, therefore, suggesting a further source that has rarely been acknowledged, showing the role of the dialogue in early novels, and discerning its persistence comparatively late in the novel’s history, overtly in some cases, and as a fossil trace in many other novels. However, it is not only embedded within the novel like other genres but it, in various ways, informs the perspective and even, occasionally, the form of the entire novel. Hunter observes that among the kinds of discourse included in novels are ‘conversation, controversy, and debate’; I will show that these are very often patterned as formal dialogue.​[379]​  And many novels enact a commitment to communicative reason that propagates out from these dialogic nuclei. Thus the novel is dialogic, in Bakhtin’s sense, and becomes doubly so with the aid of the multi-voiced eighteenth-century dialogue that lies alongside of it, overlaps it, develops in parallel with it and shares its concerns.
The three putative ‘founders of the novel’—Defoe, Richardson, and Fielding—that Watt makes central were all highly aware of the importance of the dialogue, and are as concerned with sociality as they are with individualism, interiority, and subjectivity (and even their interiority has a dialogic component as I have suggested). Both the idea of foundation and its patriarchs have, of course, come under immense scrutiny, but taking these three most typical (though this, too, is contentious) figures serves a useful starting point for my uncovering of dialogue in the early novel. Very often, among the other genres that have been found embedded in the early novel—travel narrative, diary, letter, and so on—the dialogue stands out plainly. 
There are sections of dialogue—that is dialogues specifically marked as such, with speech-prefixes laying bare the dialogic armature—in both Defoe and Fielding.​[380]​ Defoe had apprenticed in the dialogue before embarking on what many consider to be among the first English novels, and these latter often have the formal dialogue nakedly visible within them; sections of, for example, Robinson Crusoe (1719) incorporate the dialogue (following the anguished self-questioning of many spiritual records).​[381]​ Henry Fielding, of course, was preoccupied with genre, as with his famous delineation of the comic epic in Joseph Andrews (1742), and he not only incorporates formal dialogue in his fictions, but often self-consciously alerts the reader to his dialogic concerns.​[382]​ Samuel Richardson constructed Pamela (1740) and Clarissa (1747-48) out of the secondary genre of the letter. But, in addition, the formal dialogue can be seen embedded (though unmarked) in Pamela, where moral attitudes are subjected to an almost Socratic interrogation and where Pamela herself discourses inwardly on spiritual temptation; I will explore this further below. 
Other writers, more recently nominated as founders or precursors, employed the marked, formal dialogue, though it is often merely the importation of the convention of marking speech from printed drama. Thus Delariver Manley’s The New Atalantis (1709) sets up a suggestive encounter between Astrea (the Goddess of Justice), Virtue, and Intelligence (that is, Gossip), but there is no particularly dialectical exchange between these figures; the situation is used rather to trigger spicy gossip from Intelligence and sighs over the depravity of it all from Astrea and Virtue.​[383]​ However, Eliza Haywood’s early fiction, Love in Excess (1719–20), which rivalled Robinson Crusoe has embedded dialogues between lovers which announce a theme I develop in this chapter; notably, and nicely for my thesis, D’Elmont’s desire for Melliora is triggered by the sight of her reading Fontenelle who, I have argued, effectively dramatised enlightened, dialogic amorousness in A Discovery of New Worlds.​[384]​
The visibility of dialogue became particularly pronounced in the 1790s due to the urgency of actual political debate of the time. ‘Argument’ might be preferable to ‘debate’ here, since dialogue was now openly adversarial and polemical in a fashion not really seen since the Restoration; we have observed this in the dialogues of the previous chapter. But it is the particular political situation which both exposes the covertly antagonistic nature of dialogue and encourages its more open employment. So-called ‘Jacobin’ novels such as the radical, polemical novels of Thomas Holcroft, Anna St Ives (1792) and Hugh Trevor (1794–97), as Gary Kelly points out, frequently incorporate the formal dialogue within the narrative, exemplifying the revitalisation of the novel that the dialogue offers. The narrative is interspersed with formal philosophical-political debates.​[385]​ Robert Bage’s Hermsprong (1796), another radical novel of this period, also employs the dialogue in striking ways, and I will discuss this in detail below. 
Such incorporation of dialogue is widespread in the novels of this period. Thus the eighteenth-century novel is dialogic not only in Bakhtin’s senses, but in a more literal way that is nevertheless related to his concerns. Novels became dialogic in this latter sense simply through the insertion of the dialogue as a formal genre into the body of the novel, though what is inserted had already been novelised, as I have shown, so there is a complex interplay between secondary and tertiary genres. In understanding this interplay, the historical transformations of genre must always be attended to whilst, at the same time, the very focus on ‘genre’ presupposes an interest in constant formal qualities. As Bakhtin says:
A literary genre, by its very nature, reflects the most stable, eternal, tendencies in literature’s development. Always preserved in a genre are underlying elements of the archaic. True, these archaic elements are preserved in it only thanks to their constant renewal, which is to say, their contemporization. A genre is always the same and yet not the same, always old and new simultaneously.​[386]​

The ‘archaic elements’ of the dialogue genre reflect the ahistorical, utopian, permanent possibility of undistorted communication posited by Habermas in his recent work; his earlier, more historicised account of the eighteenth-century public sphere underlies the ‘renewal’ and ‘contemporization’ of dialogues and the particular richness of those we have observed. 
A concentration upon dialogue is one of the features that distinguishes the novel from the purely narrative interest of earlier fictions, dialogue not only in Bakhtin’s sense of the rendering of many voices, but also in the more formal sense of the exchange of ideas—whether this occurs with mutual agreement and shared enlightenment (comic), or with discord (tragic and logomachic), or with incomprehension and the ironic comedy or tragedy that ensues. An advantage of the novel is that the deviation from or approximation to ideal, undistorted speech can be observed in vivo rather than under the laboratory-like conditions of abstract dialogue, and the full spectrum of dialogicity can be mapped. But the novel also, more obviously, plays with dialogue as conversation. Conversation, as might be expected in a culture as concerned with sociality as was eighteenth-century Britain, was granted great importance and was the focus of much self-conscious discussion.​[387]​ (This sociality was, to a degree, pan-European; Kant’s observations are symptomatic.) Betty Schellenberg, in an illuminating study, identifies a strand in the eighteenth-century novel where the emphasis is on sociality and conversation in contrast to the opposition of the individual to society.​[388]​ However, she is too ready to assume this has a conservative function as opposed to the radicalism of the other strand of individualism, and also errs in isolating the two stances, rather than seeing them as tendencies which may coexist dialectically in the same novel. Her emphasis on conversation in the novel is, however, valuable. Conversation is obviously an important aspect of the public sphere, reflecting its dialogism—as my study of the content of such conversations as represented in the novel will reveal—and thus its centrality in novels of the period is not entirely, or automatically, conservative. But the idea of consensual community must be qualified: it may have a coercive function as Schellenberg suggests, and as present-day appeals to communitarianism demonstrate. Yet a critical community, or consensus only formed after debate and subject to revision, modelled on the utopianism latent in Habermas, is a different matter; the tension between the utopian and the ideological aspects of a text should always be borne in mind.
 What is of deep interest here is that in the novel conversation and intellectual dialogue may merge. The novel excels in the depiction of conversation, the medium through which character is revealed and the matter of social life carried out.​[389]​ But it is perhaps surprising to see how many of the conversational interludes in eighteenth-century fiction are modelled on the dialogue; philosophical debates, formally dialogic in their argumentative structure, take place in the drawing rooms of polite society. Yet such formal dialectic, too, can be instrumental in the depiction of character which, after all, is as much the intellection of a person as their emotional behaviour, though this was, perhaps, something eighteenth-century writers and readers accepted more readily.​[390]​
Conversation in the novel is entwined with questions of gender, being the medium of courtship, which is so often a significant part of the efficient and final causes of plot. And dialogues between the sexes are paradigms for probing the limits of dialogic universalism. This was apparent with the intellectual mutuality in Fontenelle, and the suggestion of Fulvia’s intellectual acuity in Mandeville in Chapter 2 above. In the novel, these become highly significant—sexual relationships being a prime concern of the novel (here lies its lingering link with romance and also the earlier scandal novels).​[391]​ Swift (and many others) considered the participation of women in conversation to be a civilizing force; he refers, perhaps, to salon life:
This degeneracy of conversation, with the pernicious consequences thereof upon our humours and dispositions, has been owing, among other causes, to the custom arisen, for some time past, of excluding women from any share in our society, further than in parties at play, or dancing, or in the pursuit of an amour.​[392]​
 
This absence is addressed in the radical novels of the 1790s, where women enter into dialogue not just as genteel moderators but on equal intellectual terms, sharing the ingenuity of their interlocutors, following on from Mandeville and Fontenelle. But the traditional speech acts of courtship now overlap with the incorporated formal dialogue: the desired woman is desired for her rationality, too, so the discourses of Eros and Athene playfully intertwine. 
Thus, in a seeming paradox, the openly antagonistic conditions of the 1790s, generating dialogue at its most polemical pole within the novel, enable the eirenic, utopian pole to be explored. The specific attention in these novels to conversation between the sexes submits dialogism to the test: its universalism, its rationality, its hedonistic element—all come to the fore in the specific rediscovery of dialogue in this revolutionary era. Yet, there are prefigurings of this earlier; as in the rational, yet amatory, exchanges between Richardson’s Pamela and Mr B, Portia and Ferdinand conduct a romance of communicative reason amidst a backdrop of debate in Sarah Fielding’s The Cry. And even these earlier novelistic deployments of rational eroticism had a precursor, as we have seen, in Fontenelle.




The dialogic consensus of the early decades of post Civil War England would not last and, as I suggested in Chapter 2 above, underlying tensions even then were accumulating in various ways. Jonathan Swift would anticipate the breakdown very early on, employing an intellect forged in Enlightenment against reason, progress, and, in particular, the new commodified literature that was coalescing as the novel. Yet, ironically, in doing so he added significantly to the resources of the new fiction. Much has been written on Jonathan Swift’s problematic relationship with print and the novel: I will look at Swift’s version of dialogue. Swift, whose Gulliver finally abjures human sociality for the company of horses, is deeply sceptical of the claims to discover communicative rationality in contemporary polite discourse.
Swift, one of Berkeley’s closest conservative allies, saw political dialogue as distorted and strategic, and ‘genteel’ conversation as void of communicative content. His A Tale of a Tub (1704) is dialogic in the Bakhtinian sense of being heteroglossic, rejoicing in its conflicting tongues and genres; a Menippean satire that resembles the novel.​[394]​ The Tale may be seen as both an attack on the novel and implicated in its coming into being.​[395]​ The Battle of the Books, published alongside A Tale, is also mock epic—a novelised genre in its way; thus we see Swift succumbing to the tide despite his hostility to the new form.​[396]​ Among the many speech genres it incorporates, the dialogue itself is not included, though Swift does do dialogues: in a handful of poems, in dialect with ‘A Dialogue in Hibernian Style between A. and B.’, and, in particular, A Complete Collection of Genteel and Ingenious Conversation.​[397]​ 
However, The Battle of the Books does confront dialogue, but in a not very complimentary way. In The Battle of the Books, itself a product of and contribution to an acrimonious debate, consensual dialogue between opposing sets of values is impossible. Swift’s Battle allegorises this and is at the same time Swift’s intervention in a very real struggle over hegemony (although, as Judith C. Mueller reveals, Swift’s allegiances here are not as clear-cut as they seem).​[398]​ The levelling modernity that welcomes dialogue is poisonous to Swift because of its equalising tendencies, its deceitful balancing act: the commodification of literature in particular rendering everything down to exchange value. Swift’s model of dialogue is logomachic: the interlocutors are engaged in a fierce battle of words and not the agreeable pursuit of mutual enlightenment. The Battle of the Books is antidialogic, sceptical concerning reasoned debate, hostile to the novel in both senses of the word. And debate is never seemingly harmonious or congenial, but is fiercely polemical; important values were being contested in The Battle of the Books that could not be treated politely. One of Swift’s targets here in the real conflict between the Ancients and the Moderns was Fontenelle who, as we have seen, was an ardent advocate for dialogue and modern questioning. This attack on the modern phenomenon of the commercial production of books, their commodification, ironically exemplifies the distinctively dialogic nature of the new forms that were emerging. A Discourse Concerning the Mechanical Operation of the Spirit (the third part of the volume published as A Tale), in parodying the publications of the Royal Society, attacks the very urge to exchange scientific ideas—an antithesis, then, to Fontenelle and his descendants.​[399]​ Swift, sceptical of Whiggish versions of dialogic consensus, exposes the antagonistic struggle that the bustling commercial society was founded on, and sees dialogue essentially as battle.
In A Compleat Collection of Genteel and Ingenious Conversation (1738), genteel conversation is impossible and ingenious talk undesirable.​[400]​ Although play-like (and it has, in fact, been staged), Compleat Collection can be seen as another of Swift’s attacks on novelism from within the forms of prose fiction itself.​[401]​ It takes the subject matter of the novel—the minutiae of everyday life, the encounters between the sexes in the drawing room and at dinner—and renders it as disintegrated, fragmented discourse without any possibility of authentic communication, rational speech, or dialogue. It is fitting that Wagstaff, the pompous ethnographer who has collected these edifying utterances and assembled them into antidialogue, is a ‘projector’; dialogue itself has become as commodified as the hack literature Swift mocks in A Tale.
In this debased symposium, conventions of communicative rationality as outlined in Swift’s own Hints Toward an Essay on Conversation (1709) are systematically violated.​[402]​ There, for example, he condemns ‘the itch of dispute and contradiction, telling of lies, or of those who are troubled with the diseases called the wandering of thoughts’.​[403]​ Wagstaff enumerates a series of ‘entertaining’ and ‘illuminating’ speech acts which are nothing of the sort. Rather than being ‘polite questions, answers, repartees, replies, and rejoinders’ (258) (all of which might indicate genuinely mutual dialogue), they are instead bad puns, non sequiteurs, innuendoes, clichés of the deadest sort, breaches of sexual decorum that verge on assault. His subjects are stuffed with misogyny and animality, gluttony and lust, avarice and financial interest; they gossip, spout platitudes and tired proverbs, and, above all, hurl insults. The genteel and the ingenious is also characterised by neologism, which Swift detested; yet he despises sterility and lack of invention equally. 
Genteel society is irrational and atomistic. This is a class united only by interest; elsewhere its members are at war, and most of all where men and women meet. These encounters are particularly distorted, displaying an undercurrent of permanent hostility between the sexes. Miss Notable declares, ‘Well, colonel; but whatever you say against women, they are better creatures than men: for men were made of clay, but woman was made of man’ (292). This might be the beginning of a philosophical debate, but that the rejoinder cuts this short with egoistic display, and then flirtatious dialogue moves to the point where creative neologism becomes private language (and an infantile one at that):​[404]​
Col. Miss, you may say what you please; but faith you’ll never lead apes in hell.
Never. No, no; I’ll be sworn miss has not an inch of nun’s flesh about her.
Miss. I understumble you, gentlemen.
Never. Madam, your humblecumdumble. (292)

Rational discourse never takes place between male and female; only suggestiveness, grossness, even violence:
Miss gives Neverout a small pinch.

Never. Lord, miss, what d’ye mean? d’ye think I have no feeling?
Miss. I’m forced to pinch, for the times are hard.
Never. [Giving miss a pinch.] Take that, miss; what’s sauce for a goose, is sauce for a gander.
Miss. [Screaming.] Well, Mr. Neverout, that shall neither go to heaven nor hell with you.
Never. [Takes miss by the hand.] Come, miss, let us lay all quarrels aside, and be friends.
Miss. Don’t be so teasing; you plague a body so! can’t you keep your filthy hands to yourself? (316)

 Swift opposed eighteenth-century mechanical materialism, as did Berkeley, on the grounds that it robbed human beings of their autonomy. Anne Cline Kelly emphasises the mechanical nature of Swift’s polite conversation; the interlocutors, if they can be called that, of the Compleat Collection are mechanical figures or Lucretian atoms.​[405]​ By contrast, the authentic dialogue, when incorporated into the novel, allows this genre to become a literature of freedom. For Bakhtin, Dostoevsky epitomised the novelistic opposition to mechanical materialism: 
Dostoevsky could hear dialogic relationships everywhere, in all manifestations of conscious and intelligent human life; where consciousness began, there dialogue began for him as well. Only purely mechanistic relationships are not dialogic.​[406]​
 
Swift could not hear these relationships in the Mechanical Operations of the atomised society he portrayed.
Swift’s conversationalists often comment on others’ speech acts, and always in a negative way that displays their own cynicism and contempt for open communication; such metaconversation is common in novels, but here, almost everyone is labelled as a liar; the protagonists thus deny that the foundations for communicative reason are in place:
Never. Indeed, miss, you lie—
Miss. Did you ever hear anything so rude?
Never. I mean, you lie—under a mistake.
Miss. If a thousand lies could choke you, you would have been choked many a day ago. (293)

These accusations of lying appear frequently in the text: Miss Notable’s whispering (itself rude and asocial) provokes, ‘There’s no whispering, but there’s lying’ (281); to a personal affront from Neverout she snaps, ‘Well, I love a liar in my heart, and you fit me to a hair’ (285); and misogyny or mutual antipathy between the sexes often colours these exchanges:
Miss.[To Neverout.] Pray, Mr. Neverout, will you please to send me a piece of tongue?
Never. By no means, madam: one tongue is enough for a woman.
Col. Miss, here’s a tongue that never told a lie.
Miss. That was, because it could not speak. Why, colonel, I never told a lie in my life.
Never. I appeal to all the company, whether that be not the greatest lie that was ever told? (299)

Note that the misogyny here is focussed upon communicative pragmatics, invoking the ancient prejudices against women as babblers and deceivers. Miss Notable even suggests that speech is inevitably corrupt: the only tongue that never lies is the dead tongue of an animal without language. 
Or their attempts at communication, if that is what they are, are rudely dismissed by other criteria, as Miss Notable here disparages Mr Neverout’s conversational technique: ‘What! you think you said a fine thing now; well, if I had a dog with no more wit, I would hang him’ (283). There is much malicious gossip, and this too is often metaconversation that disparages the style of others’ speech acts: ‘Her tongue runs like the clapper of a mill; she talks enough for herself and all the company’ (273). There are no real social bonds and no loyalty between friends: as soon as Sir John Linger leaves, Neverout denies any friendship with him, claiming to ‘believe he was bred at Hog’s Norton, where his pigs play upon the organs’ (315). And women, particularly, together display their disloyal slandering in a manner free from gentility now that there are no longer male admirers to perform before; they are stripped of their cosmetic linguistic decorum as with the undressing of Swift’s prosthetic prostitute, Corinna:
Lady A. Well, she had good luck to draw Tom Plump into wedlock; she ris with her a— upwards.
Miss. Fie, madam; what do you mean?
Lady S. O, miss, ‘tis nothing what we say among ourselves.
Miss. Ay, madam; but they say hedges have eyes, and walls have ears.
Lady A. Well, miss, I can’t help it; you know I’m old Telltruth; I love to call a spade a spade. (320)

The communication of truth here has been reduced to meanness and vulgarity.
The paradigm of the eirenic dialogue of genteel and ingenious conversation that aims sincerely at uncovering truth through dialogue, and where all viewpoints are considered with detached respect, is Hume’s Dialogues. But for Swift, ‘genteel’ is intellectually vacuous, and ingenuity is always treated with suspicion—especially ingenuity in language; innovation as slang, the other pole of the lifeless repetition of cliché, was a particular bugbear of Swift’s:​[407]​
Never. [To Lady Smart.] Madam, have you heard that Lady Queasy was lately at the playhouse incog.?
Lady S. What! Lady Queasy of all women in the world! do you say it on rep.?
Never. Poz, I saw her with my own eyes; she sat among the mob in the gallery; her own ugly phiz: and she saw me look at her.
Col. Her ladyship was plaguily bamb’d; I warrant it put her into the hips. (288)

In thus parodying the genteel conversation that was the model for the non-contentious dialogue of Hume and other texts in Chapter 2—and the ‘ingenious’ nature of their claims to modernity and discovery—Swift undermines the whole idea of dialogue: where there is no contention, or conversely where there is only a solipsistic rudeness, there is no communication. The dialogicity of language itself is denied, for there is no innovation, just the stale recycling of cliché. 
The progressive moment in Swift’s critical conservatism lies in positing a rationalist yearning for authentic communication against the distortion of speech he exposes in contemporary commercial culture. But by contrast with Swift’s negative vision, I intend to show that many conversations in eighteenth-century novels are truly genteel and even ingenious. There, encounters between people, particularly men and women, take on a genuinely dialogic shape, often mirroring the formal dialogue in intriguing ways as political, ethical, and philosophical debate mingles sociably with polite chit-chat and even courtship.
Also, despite the depths of asociality and antidialogue enacted here, Swift’s writing as ever is sophisticated enough to reveal countervailing tendencies: the sheer vigour and fun of the language is inescapable. And this inevitably raises questions about the dialogic aspects of satire. For Bakhtin, the critical force of satire, particularly as practiced by Socrates, makes it essentially dialogic in its negativity towards orthodoxy. We have seen Shaftesbury embrace raillery, and Berkeley, while denouncing its irreverence, ineluctably availing himself of it. Yet in its absolute refusal of the Other’s voice and its deliberate strategic distortion of his or her speech, satire surely has a strongly monologic dimension. It might be that it depends on who wields it—subaltern or oppressor. The radical novelist, Robert Bage, would develop a complex endorsement of certain strategic actions, including satire if it be thus, whilst committed to dialogue. By contrast, the anti-Jacobin novelists, often suspicious of the democratic tendencies in the very idea of dialogue, rarely represent it other than parodically. I will expand on this towards the end of this chapter.
Swift incidentally reveals some of the curious dialectic between plot and dialogue. While dialogue may impede or interrupt plot, the interdependency of each is revealed. For characters as opaque to each other as Swift’s, with their totally solipsistic and mechanical exchanges, there can be no motivated action either. So nothing happens in Compleat Collection; the stagings of this text mostly had to distort the material to make it actually dramatic.​[408]​ We may turn now to Samuel Richardson, who had a far more optimistic view of the potential of rational communication, especially between the sexes. Here, plot and dialogue illuminate each other and urge each other on; autonomous subjects struggle through discourse to take control of their narratives.

Dialoguing with Plot: Pamela

Plot—thickened with darkness and silence—is in one sense the antithesis of dialogue. In Samuel Richardson’s Pamela (1741), when Pamela displays near paranoid symptoms, this is evidence of the impotence of her considerable verbal powers in a situation where crude coercion disables any rational public critique of authority: ‘Every thing, Man, Woman and Beast, is in a Plot against your poor Pamela, I think!’ (152).​[409]​ Despotic plotting blocks free dialogic exchange in a palpably material way by intercepting letters and otherwise distorting communication (this is even more so in Clarissa, where it becomes a major part of the plot—in the literary sense): ‘EVERY thing gives me additional Disturbance. The miss’d Letter of John Arnold’s makes me suspect a Plot. Yet am I loth to think myself of so much Importance, as to suppose every one in a Plot against me’ (158). Mrs Jewkes is guilty of ‘horrid romancing’, which ‘may possibly serve to introduce some Plot now hatching’ (179); this neatly conflates the two meanings of plot, the narrative of ‘horrid’ romances, and of conspiracy.​[410]​ Here, plot represses dialogue. And dialogue in turn hampers and impedes plot—its deliberativeness slows down, its openness can spoil the suspense. But on the other hand, as Kant points out, storytelling gains ‘novelty and interest’ from argument; plot and dialogue may have a symbiotic relationship.​[411]​
Much of Pamela is dialogic in the same way that Defoe sometimes is; the similar middling-sort dissenting background of Defoe and Richardson encourages them both to employ the nonconformist genre of spiritual autobiography, dialogised; as, for example: ‘thus foolishly I dialogu’d with my Heart; and yet all the time this Heart is Pamela’ (251). Similarly, with profound anguish she contemplates suicide, but then enters an inward theological dialogue, formally announced with ‘And thus I reason’d with myself’ (172-75). But in addition, there are formal dialogues of the public kind secreted throughout Pamela (and these are strikingly absent in Defoe’s novels).​[412]​ 
Questions of virtue and of truth intertwine in this novel as McKeon so persuasively argues.​[413]​ The aristocrat exercises power through discourse in a monologic fashion; Mr B. seeks to impose his word upon Pamela. B’s control of discourse is misrepresented by himself as free, public, and unconstrained; he claims that it is Pamela, with ‘Tricks and Artifices that lie lurking in her little, plotting, guileful Heart’ (186), whose secretive manipulation of narrative is private and undialogic. According to him, Pamela violates the public norms of free exchange and distorts the processes of communication:
But, you see, I am not afraid any body should read what I write. I don’t carry on private Correspondancies, and reveal every Secret that comes to my knowledge, and then corrupt People to carry my Letters, against their Duty, and all good Conscience. (186)

Her response is stifled by her weakness; thus B’s power effectively mutes her capacity for dialogue: ‘Grief and Indignation choaked up the Passage of my Words’. And a further word, denoting her innocence, is ‘the subject of their Ridicule’ (186). But Richardson’s text questions both B’s political authority and his version of a truth that cannot be contested in public debate.
Under the pretence of dialogue and the free exchange of goods, Mr B then makes his power nakedly manifest by peremptorily laying down articles for Pamela’s subsequent perusal and, he supposes, automatic agreement, that would bind her on his own terms. But the text displays her dialectical exposure of his propositions, her responses dialoguing with him in a columnar table (188-92). Significantly, it is a response he will not accept; he has not yet learned to grant her communicative mutuality, and imperatives are the only speech-acts he can offer: ‘if I have this as your absolute Answer, and I don’t like it, you are undone; for I will not sue meanly, where I can command’ (193).
One notably adversarial segment of dialogue is the encounter between a spirited Pamela and the oppressively disdainful Lady Davers, Mr B’s sister, who will violently oppose the fact of his and Pamela’s marriage. Here, in a distorted image of a judicial trial, Pamela defends herself adroitly in near-dialogue form (381-98). She confronts the antithesis of communication, approaching that of Swift’s interlocutors, including the strategic action of attempted violence against her: her exit is barred by a chair; she is even terrified by the nephew’s display of his sword. Pamela in turn attempts to create proper discourse and is resisted by archaic power. Like Swift in Compleat Collection, Richardson here displays a distorted speech situation, a non-dialogic exchange, and some of the speech acts and, indeed, physical acts mirror the impediments to communicative reason in Swift. She is repeatedly accused of lying, and slapped for an insolent reply:
Thou lyest, Child, said she. So your Ladyship told me twice before!
She gave me a Slap on the Hand for this. (391)

But where Swift looks in horror at the emerging bourgeoisie, seeing in their bustling competitive commerce only atomistic individualism, Richardson discerns the possibilities for dialogue in the very same ferment of that nascent culture, and sees instead the blocking of dialogue as emanating from the arbitrary and irrational institutions of ancient aristocracy and patriarchy.
Behind one exchange in particular between Pamela and Mr B we can discern the structure of the formal dialogue, and observe the two would-be lovers weighing each other’s validity claims. Pamela and Mr B’s intimate dialogue here is as much textual analysis as it is the revealing and unveiling of a courtship. And that text is a mediation of material forces; as Watt acutely notes, ‘the dialogue between the lovers is not as it is in romance, a conventional exercise in rhetoric, but an exploration of the forces that have made them what they are’.​[414]​
As a prelude to this dialogue, Pamela finds Mr B’s letter to Mrs Jewkes, and reads, in this evidence of plotting against her, of preordained narratives with an inevitable conclusion, how she herself is read as a plotter. Nevertheless, she is herself mechanically determined by the plot of another, since her ‘ensnaring Loveliness shall not save her from the Fate that awaits her’ (197). Yet the letter recognises her fecund creativity in cautioning Mrs Jewkes: ‘But let her know nothing of this, lest it put her fruitful Mind upon Plots and Artifices’ (197). And soon after, Mr B directly accuses Pamela of plotting, through her writing, against his aristocratic and patriarchal control of discourse as though in rebellion against the state in miniature: ‘So, Pamela, we have seized, it seems, your treasonable Papers? Treasonable? said I, very sullenly. Ay, said he, I suppose so; for you are a great Plotter, but I have not read them yet’ (228).​[415]​
This exchange about plotting prompts a dialogue on the interpretation of Pamela’s texts, where Mr B is enthralled by Pamela’s bewitching plots as much as her person, and implicitly yearns for undistorted communication and transparency. There is a close homology between this section of conversation between Pamela and Mr B and the formal dialogue; with some revision, this could well be cast as one of the many dialogues on poetics in this period where particular texts are discussed and evaluated.​[416]​ And novels of this era are strikingly full of critical reflection by characters on other people’s conversation or letter writing; a pragmatic poetics is seen as a window on character and morality. This is related to the wider prominence of literary criticism as a dialogic activity that Habermas emphasises.
As in a State tribunal that examines documentary evidence for treasonable thought, so Pamela is summoned before her judge: ‘he held the Papers in his Hand, and said, Now, Pamela, you come upon your Trial. Said I, I hope I have a just Judge to hear my Cause’ (230). Mr B declares his discursive conventions at the outset: ‘I expect, continu’d he, that you will answer me directly, and plainly, to every Question I shall ask you’ (230). But Pamela, in turn, asserts her agency over the close textual analysis that follows: Mr B interpolates beyond what is reasonable, and Pamela corrects him thus: ‘Well, Sir, said I, that is your Comment; but it does not appear in the Text’ (230). Mr B is seduced as much by Pamela’s narrative powers as her person, and lusts after letters in her father’s possession that will complete the body of the text: ‘Said he, I must see them, Pamela, or I shall never be easy: For I must know how this Correspondence between you and Williams, begun’ (231). 
The plebeian Pamela, resisting autocracy, tries to construct a miniature public sphere at the domestic level by insisting that the preconditions for mutual and open exchange are set in place. Evaluating the truthfulness of her interlocutor, she insists that authentic speech is maintained on both sides, transforming the magisterial monologism of the courtroom, where the judge demands the truth from the accused without reciprocity, into a forum of equals:
Why, said he, tell me truly, Have you not continued your Account till now? Don’t ask me, Sir, said I. But I insist upon your Answer, reply’d he. Why then, Sir, said I, I will not tell an Untruth; I have.—That’s my good Girl! said he. I love Sincerity at my Heart.—In another, said I, I presume, you mean!—Well, said he, I’ll allow you to be a little witty upon me; because it is in you, and you cannot help it. (231)

Some of B’s magisterial authority has been conceded here, charmed away by Pamela’s virtue and beauty, but also by her Socratic wit.
Plot is addictive, not only for readers; having been assured that Pamela will obtain for him the introductory letters, Mr B yearns for sequels as well as beginnings: ‘as I am sure you have found means to continue your Journal, I desire, while the former Part can come, that you will shew me the succeeding?’ (231). He has paid close and appreciative attention to both the narrative content and the style of Pamela’s journaling: 
But you will greatly oblige me, to shew me voluntarily, what you have written. I long to see the Particulars of your Plot, and your Disappointment, where your Papers leave off. For you have so beautiful a manner, that it is partly that, and partly my Love for you, that has made me desirous of reading all you write; tho’ a great deal of it is against myself; for which you must expect to suffer a little. 

Yet he insists still on seizing authorial power over these plots:
And as I have furnished you with the Subject, I have a Title to see the Fruits of your Pen.—Besides, said he, there is such a pretty Air of Romance, as you relate them, in your Plots, and my Plots, that I shall be better directed in what manner to wind up the Catastrophe of the pretty Novel. (231-32)

Two meanings of ‘plot’ converge here in this commentary on romance and novel, which replicates many similar dialogues of the period that discuss style and genre. It would be a mistake to see all this examination of plotting as postmodern self-referentiality avant la lettre; it is natural that intelligent, literate people should be thus aware of their language and understand events and conversation in literary-critical terms: as I have noted, the eighteenth-century novel is permeated with characters’ minute observations of the conversational and epistolary style of others.
Pamela’s response to Mr B’s excursion on plots and romance is to demystify his literary critique and point out that her suffering lies behind his narrative pleasure in his delightful plot, on which he explicitly admits to an authorship that denies her autonomy. Thus Richardson’s own authorial direction acts out the values of the novel, as set against the romance here, allowing Pamela to respond as an authentic dialogist, and emphasising the alluring mechanical illusion of romance as untrue to reality. So to Mr B’s intention of controlling narrative denouement, Pamela again asserts her subjectivity: ‘If I was your Equal, Sir, said I, I should say this is a very provoking way of jeering at the Misfortunes you have brought upon me.’ Mr B replies lightly, ‘O, said he, the Liberties you have taken with my Character, in your Letters, set us upon a Par, at least, in that respect’ (232). This is distorted speech in bad faith on B’s part; Pamela has in fact represented him with the truthfulness that the novelist aspires to.
Pamela again appears as a Socrates figure, further exploring the crucial issues of freedom and causality that have been raised, and their relation to literature, combining mocking wit and intellectual analysis: ‘Sir, reply’d I, I could not have taken these Liberties, if you had not given me the Cause: And the Cause, Sir, you know, is before the Effect’ (232). And Mr B, amidst this punning on liberty and representation, is even more delighted by her intellectual and linguistic felicity: ‘True, Pamela, you chop Logick very prettily. What the Duce do we Men go to School for? If our Wits were equal to Womens, we might spare much Time and Pains in our Education’  (232). Despite the obvious inequalities of power at play here, there is yet a foreshadowing of something utopian—a mutuality between the sexes where a full delight in dialogic play between speakers of equal intellectual acuity becomes itself eroticised (as in Fontenelle).​[417]​ Later novels, more overtly radical, will embody this utopianism in dialogue, as I will show below. 
Richardson’s complex subversiveness is revealed by the way the dialogue unfolds; the realism that reveals the constraints of power on dialogue; the uncomfortable truth that B’s ‘innocent Exercises’ have, in fact, through the Bildungsroman convention, tested the heroine and honed her ‘Invention’ (as the dialogicity of the eighteenth century itself was sharpened through resistance to absolutism). Yet B, with equal realism, points out that her virtue would be no more safe had she remained with her dialogic potential blunted: ‘Nay, continued he, I believe I must assume to myself half the Merit of your Wit, too; for the innocent Exercises you have had for it from me, have certainly sharpen’d your Invention’ (232). In a curious way, he is right. And the cost of this enlightenment is revealed by Pamela who yearns temporarily for the easy contentment of resignation to lowliness:
Sir, said I, could I have been without those innocent Exercises, as you are pleased to call them, I should have been glad to have been as dull as a Beetle. But then, Pamela, said he, I should not have lov’d you so well. But then, Sir, reply’d I, I should have been safe, easy, and happy.—Ay, may-be so, and may-be not; and the Wife too of some clouterly Plough-boy.
But then, Sir, I should have been content and innocent; and that’s better than being a Princess, and not so. (232)

But B, with a realist’s awareness of the rapaciousness of a society founded upon domination through class and gender, points out the futility of this escapism:
And may-be not, said he; for if you had had that pretty Face, some of us keen Fox-hunters should have found you out; and, spite of your romantick Notions, (which then too, perhaps, would not have had such strong Place in your Mind) would have been more happy with the Ploughman’s Wife, than I would have been with my Mother’s Pamela. (232)

There are complex dialectics at work in this spry exchange (and note that this is an intellectual exchange as well as a testing of values). I observed in my previous chapter how later conservatives would portray the lower orders as being inflamed by radicals with discontent and dangerous ambitions. Here, Pamela’s aspirations to become a fully dialogic subject are lauded, but that discontent is indeed acknowledged with all the psychological anxieties that it could involve. Pamela’s ‘romantick notions’ of virtue are bound up with her aspirations but also with her dialogic capacity (since virtuousness, without this, ‘would not have had such a strong Place’), and both virtue and communicative capacity are what inspire B’s desire. And this desire, in its raw form, untamed by Pamela, has in an ironic way spurred Pamela’s own development of democratic resistance and dialectical felicity. 
Mr B further insists on his ‘laudable Rule’—that conversations should be as open and truthful as Pamela’s journaling, despite the latter’s ‘Arts, Shifts and Stratagems’; in all her ‘little Pieces of Deceit’, she has ‘told very few wilful Fibs’ (233). However, Richardson makes evident how Pamela, as many a subaltern has found, has had to distort the conventions of communicative rationality herself in order to survive; as B recognises, ‘I know you won’t tell a downright Fib for the World; but for Equivocation! no Jesuit ever went beyond you’ (233).
There is a constant struggle by Pamela to maintain this dialogue as democratic forum, not feudal inquisition, as B seeks out Pamela’s texts: ‘No, Sir, reply’d I; but pray, no more Questions: For ask me ever so much, I will not tell you.’ The reader (and Pamela herself) are continually reminded of the reality of B’s power, although this is veiled in teasing humour; here, he manoeuvres the exchange towards a juridical arena once more:
O, said he, I have a way for that. I can do as they do abroad, when the Criminals won’t confess; torture them till they do.—But pray, Sir, said I, Is this fair, just or honest? I am no criminal; and I won’t confess.
O, my Girl! said he, many an innocent Person has been put to the Torture, I’ll assure you. But let me know where they are, and you shall escape the Question, as they call it abroad.

In response, Pamela claims the rights of free English subjects over continental tyranny: ‘Sir, said I, the Torturer is not used in England; and I hope you won’t bring it up’ (234). Mutual intercourse is thus constantly overshadowed by despotic power, and the dialogue ends with what is, in fact, near rape, and has been much analysed as a symbolic violation of Pamela’s textual body, as B threatens to strip Pamela to discover her writings (235).​[418]​ Strategic action, after Habermas, as at other moments, again disrupts their mutual development towards communicative reason.
After a brief respite, Pamela collates her texts in order to present them to B, and further dialogising over this written material takes place the following day. Pamela appeals defensively, as though to a state censor: ‘And I must beg you, Sir, to read the matter favourably, if I have exceed in any Liberties of my Pen’. But she is self-consciously using her speech act strategically too, ‘to drive him from thinking of any more’ (239). However, Pamela’s dialogic skills triumph and she takes control of plot, finally generating a comic resolution in a companionate marriage based on mutual dialogicity.​[419]​
The interchanges of B and Pamela are approximations to authentic dialogue: a longing for a transparency free from the coercion of the strategic use of language employed between sexes and classes, unlike the frankly utopian gender politics of lovers in Bage and Holcroft that emerge later. But in some ways Richardson gives a far more realistic picture of the barriers that the power relations of sex and class erect to undistorted speech, and a radical illumination of the contradictory nature of Enlightenment dialogism, peering into the silent shadows that obscure communication. It is significant that one of the more hostile dialogic responses to Richardson equates Pamela’s Socratic felicity with democratic subversiveness, as Pamela talks ‘like a Philosopher in one Page and like a Changling the next: As we hope her Master will be found to talk a little more like a Gentleman’.​[420]​ In Pamela, there is an underlying commitment to a demotic and universalist notion of communicative reason, despite ideological countertendencies of uncomplicated bourgeois optimism. A progressive naïve empiricism (in McKeon’s terms) is at work here, complicated by a movement towards scepticism. Other writers, however, had a more painful sense of conflict between their aspiration towards dialogicity and their distrust of society and people as they perceived them to be in actuality, as my examination of Sarah Fielding’s The Cry will show. 

Sarah Fielding: The Voice of the Multitude

Thomas Keymer suggests that the novel struggled to reinvigorate itself in the 1750s. Here, amidst conditions of authorship and criticism in the literary public sphere that were themselves dialogic, Keymer shows how there was a flurry of novelistic experiment, resulting in texts such as John Kidgell’s The Card (1755), but most notably Sterne’s Tristram Shandy, the first two volumes of which appeared in 1759 (with the further seven appearing from 1761 to 1767).​[421]​ Sterne’s novel incorporates features of the dialogue,​[422]​ but it is Sarah Fielding’s The Cry (1754) that I next want to look at closely. This is partially because it is a rewarding, yet neglected, work, but principally because it is a novel set out in the formal dialogue mode—a rarity, as observed above. The authorship of The Cry is uncertain; many attribute it to Jane Collier in addition to Sarah Fielding (although J. Paul Hunter, who argues for the importance of this novel, points out that only Fielding is referred to in the publisher’s contract).​[423]​ Carolyn Woodward proposes a collaborative dialogic authorship akin to the circumstances that Richardson composed in: ‘while The Cry likely was written mostly by Sarah Fielding and Jane Collier, its authorship extends to a whole group—James Harris certainly, and possibly Margaret (and Arthur?) Collier, Ursula (and Henry?) Fielding’.​[424]​ 
Sarah Fielding had already composed an intriguing dialogue that was part of the feminised critical exchanges around Richardson’s writing. It acts as a prototype for some of the explorations of intellectual romance, mutuality, and companionship, and the constraints on women in The Cry, and encroaches on the novel with an amatory romance that emerges from the dialogue. Remarks on Clarissa (1749), addressed to Richardson, is an account of a discussion which takes place among a ‘pretty large Assembly of mix’d Company’ (4).​[425]​ It is mixed by age, apparently status, and, importantly, sex. Clarissa is the topic of debate, alongside important questions of poetics—of narrative techniques, of the dignity of subject matter, of ‘the primary Passions’, and the project ‘to trace the several Channels into which they flow’ (7). But the debate concerns Clarissa Harlowe as much as Clarissa and, like Kant’s conversationalists, Fielding’s characters are engaged in testing through dialogue those of Richardson according to the moral worth of their actions. Here, judgement of character is interwoven with judgement of style; literary criticism is also moral analysis. A gendered perspective inevitably emerges, and the roles and behaviour of women are examined (as they have already been in the purportedly non-fictional world where the discussion takes place). This leads to the suitability of lovers and an amatory narrative emerges from the lively debate: the rational and sensible Miss Gibson attracts the attention of Bellario through the intelligence of her remarks, on writing and on morals. Miss Gibson has a vision of the ideal lover, where goodness of heart and the, more sensual, ‘impetuous Spirit’ (26) of a Lovelace are synthesised:
the Heart is certainly the first thing to be considered in a Man to whose Government a Woman resigns herself; but I should not chuse either Lovelace or Hickman. I must confess I should desire Humour and Spirit in a Man. A married Life [. . .] must be very dull, when a Man has not the Power of diversifying his Ideas enough to display trifling Incidents in various Lights. (27)

Thus what she desires is a man with the rhetorical powers of Lovelace but whose linguistic competence is not distorted by strategic considerations. Fielding suggests a dawning attraction between her and Bellario, fired by their own ethical eloquence. On the following day, she receives a letter from him that continues the analysis of Clarissa which cannot hide his sentiments towards her. She replies, grateful for his ‘Design to give [her] Pleasure’ (50) through intellectual dialogue, initiating a further dialogic exchange through letters, mimicking their very subject matter but, unlike Lovelace’s to Clarissa, one that is an undistorted correspondence. Fielding imagines, through her own characters’ desire, a comic and utopian resolution for Clarissa in rational mutuality between the sexes:
Tho’ Clarissa unfortunately met with Lovelace, yet I can imagine her with a Lover whose honest Heart, assimulating with hers, would have given her leave, as she herself wishes, to have shewn the Frankness of her Disposition, and to have openly avowed her Love. (54)

This is the resolution that the authentic exchanges of her own characters will initiate. Miss Gibson’s letter goes on to dissect and acknowledge the realism of the tragic resolution of Clarissa, but Fielding has offered an alternative discourse between the sexes, one she will explore further in The Cry, and which like the later work ostentatiously blends dialogue with narrative in a way that makes dialogicity an essential subject of that plot.
The Cry is, as I have said, cast as a formal dialogue; Keymer calls it ‘a formally innovative dialogue novel’, and an example of ‘the exploratory stance into which many novelists seem to have felt pushed’.​[426]​ But it also dramatises some of the contemporary debates on dialogicity—a commitment to communicative reason; a Shaftesburian belief in benevolence enacted through polite exchange; the concerns of many literate women about their place in the common dialogue and their possible exclusion from it; and an anxiety among the ruling classes about the dialogic claims of the multitude they dominated.
What is immediately striking about The Cry is its form. It is startlingly experimental; all Fielding’s novels are experimental to some extent, but this still looks unusual to a reader of today. The work is constructed in five Parts, some with Prologues, each divided into Scenes, with the speech markers of drama or formal dialogue, and minimal stage directions. But despite its appearance and its subtitle (‘A New Dramatic Fable’), The Cry is not a drama, but a novel in dialogue form. In fact, as will appear, it is profoundly hostile to the dramatic, an attitude that is part of its ambivalence towards the public. It may be that Sarah Fielding draws initially on drama as her model yet this is not the synthesis of conversation and action that is drama, but the exchange of ideas and the subjection of them to scrutiny that characterises the dialogue proper; any action is presented diagetically through recollection and inserted narratives recounted by the interlocutors. 
This unfamiliar novel needs a brief summary. In some unspecified and abstract arena, Fielding’s heroine, Portia, raises validity claims of her rightness and truthfulness and defends them in dialogue before a judge, Una (Truth), and an atomised and irrational chorus, the Cry. The dialogue is interspersed with essays and exemplary tales, and with the life stories of Portia and others that explore personal relationships and women’s subjectivity in ways that make this text very much a novel. The Cry’s novelistic character lies in the narrative element embedded in the mock trial: a narrative concerned with interpersonal relationships and of the negotiations and obstacles involved in love affairs, with the validity claims of truthfulness and rightfulness that are the novel’s concerns, and handled with the verisimilitude of the novel rather than the escapism of romance. Fielding explicitly declares her concerns with interiority and her disdain for fictional frivolity, her intention towards her readers being ‘not to amuse them with a number of surprising adventures, but rather to paint the inward mind’ (i: 11).​[427]​ But her unmasking of romantic monsters is very much a matter of communicative pragmatics, of language in a social context:
But the puzzling mazes into which we shall throw our heroine, are the perverse interpretations made upon her words; the lions, tigers and giants, from which we endeavour to rescue her, are the spiteful and malicious tongues of her enemies. In short, the design of the following work is to strip, as much as possible, Duessa or Falsehood, of all her shifts and evasions. (i: 13)

She thus declares her work to be concerned with exposing linguistic distortion as exemplified by rumour (and the centrality of this category of antidialogic speech in eighteenth-century fiction is worth noting). The novel, for Fielding, is a demystification of romance, where the threats to the heroine’s autonomy are not fabulous, but the linguistic incompetences of others.​[428]​ 
Before Una’s court, Portia presents the story of her developing intellectual and amorous relationship with Ferdinand, punctuated with abusive heckling from the Cry. The account of her friendship with Ferdinand’s sister, Cordelia, develops the idea of high-minded and dialogic companionship. Her tale is complicated by the intrigues of Ferdinand’s family, particularly the strategic machinations of the Ferdinand’s treacherous brother, Oliver. Oliver brings the two senses of plot together, in the manner of Richardson’s Mr B, with his ‘deep-laid plots’ (iii: 270) and ‘malicious inventions’ (iii: 271). Like many other strategic distorters of language, Oliver, too, intercepts messages—this is another important motif in the eighteenth-century novel—and, like Richardson’s Lovelace, he falsifies dialogic exchanges. His plots drive the plot, causing the estrangement of Ferdinand and Portia. Even Portia’s maid, in a somewhat contrived turn, plays a Lovelace-like part in distorting communication. I suggest that the interception and falsification of letters in eighteenth-century fiction was felt to be disturbing precisely because of the centrality that society granted to transparent communication (although it is, too, an index of how precarious dialogue was seen to be).​[429]​ As a contrasting narrative, in Part iv, a second heroine, Cylinda, appears before the tribunal to narrate and defend her own story. Her life, spotted with mistaken philosophic enthusiasms and illicit love affairs, including one with Ferdinand’s father, has been more reprehensible than Portia’s (and, for modern readers, is perhaps more engaging).
Fielding announces from the beginning that the novel is to be a dialogic testing space where her heroine’s values are examined and defended, before truth and the factious world of common sense, and subjected finally to the rational examination of the reader: ‘we still claim this candour at the hand of our readers, that they condemn not any sentiment which is stamp’d by the approbation of our Una, till they have thoroughly consider’d and given it a fair examination’ (i: 24).
The structure is complex and dialogic exchanges can be observed in several locations; as Woodward puts it, ‘Gesture of conversation permeate every level of the narrative—writer(s) to readers, speakers to audience, friends and lovers to one another’.​[430]​ ‘We’, the narrating voice, an assumed rational community, act ‘in the office of a chorus’ (i: 201) and have the privilege of imparting to the reader those events which Portia cannot know; they describe in the manner of the novelist what otherwise could not be displayed in dramatic form. They are a counter-chorus, then, to the vicious and ill-informed Cry. If Woodward’s ‘hunches and knacks’ about the collaborative creation of The Cry are justified, Fielding is offering an alternative mode of collectivity to the Cry itself—a dialogic unity of individuals as opposed to the atomised disharmony of eighteenth-century bourgeois society.​[431]​ And we can postulate a third chorus—the critical readership of the public sphere for, as Timothy Dykstal points out, The Cry ‘demand[s] a “dialogical” response’ provoking readers
in the same way that Socrates—the philosophical hero of Fielding’s translation of Xenophon—provoked his followers, refusing to let them settle into the easy pleasures of romance or the moral superiority of the economically and emotionally powerful.​[432]​

Fielding is extremely careful to avoid these ‘easy pleasures’, and Dykstal here captures too the way in which The Cry is socially critical.
Dykstal claims that the Cry is modelled on the chorus of ancient Greek tragedy.​[433]​ I think that, as well as noting how non-dramatic the text as a whole actually is, it is important to observe how non-choric the Cry is. The Greek chorus is in unison; it represents the values of a community that (ostensibly at least) was not divided amongst itself, where one voice could articulate a shared value system; the Greek chorus is usually, too, if not always an ultimate authority, a voice to be respected and listened to. Fielding’s Cry is none of these things: it is a divided mass of foolish and aggressively counterdialogic voices that constantly mock Portia’s values, her honesty, and her aspirations towards autonomy; and proclaim their own vanity and shallowness. Her neoclassicism (which Dykstal delineates acutely) is strikingly aware of the decay of classical values (as was that of Pope and other Augustans). Fielding’s device allows her to depict how communicative reason has broken down in contemporary society, and how choric consensus has to be struggled for against an oppressive mass.
The novel is subtitled ‘A New Dramatic Fable’, yet the solitariness of the novel form chosen over the dramatic form indicates a fear of the public multitude to some extent; on hearing Portia’s neologism, the Cry ‘wanted nothing but the assistance of cat-calls with their shrill and piercing notes, to express their dislike, in order to have been a true picture of a condemning play-house audience’ (i: 192). For all that The Cry adopts a dramatic schema and Shakespearean characters (the original Portia, significantly, poses as a lawyer and here she defends Truth in a judicial situation), Fielding is deeply suspicious of the theatrical, associating the performance with feigned, strategic speech acts. Here, Portia defends herself against the Cry’s accusation that she lacks simplicity: ‘I should be very sorry if I could not be imposed on by a judicious actor, as that would imply a suspicion of mind that I abhor’ (iii: 153).  She thus illustrates the pitfalls of sensibility in a corrupt public; the cunning can employ distorted speech to deceive the pure, but the person of sensibility can see through the crudely theatrical, whose intended audience is plebeian and uncritical: ‘raving and ranting, however it may on the stage attain a thundering acclamation from the upper gallery, will never pass for soft sensibility of heart’ (iii: 153). And when Portia, in her anguish over Ferdinand’s apparent behaviour, manages to fend off the enthrallment of turba, the Cry ‘give a play-house groan’ (iii: 197).
Portia declares herself on the side of sociality, against the suspiciousness of an atomised antagonistic society, ‘in a continual state of war’ (i: 140), as theorised by Hobbes and practised by the Cry; Bree refers to ‘This most social of Fielding’s fiction’.​[434]​ Portia would rather be deceived by the strategic action of others than accept that she is ‘doom’d to an impossibility of conversing with any sort of creatures, but beasts of prey, tigers, wolves, and foxes, who are ever laying in wait to destroy me’ (i: 140). And she will reject that strategic action herself, refusing the practice of ‘forming stratagems to escape the wiles of my supposed adversaries’ (i: 140). Portia has a profoundly analytic understanding of how reason corrupted by material interest becomes instrumental, and integrates this into a theory of language acquisition and socialisation, reflecting Fielding’s concerns elsewhere with education:
this desire of obscuring truth, will begin to peep forth and shew itself even in children, when the doll or the plumb cake happens to be the subject of contention; and each will use as many perplexing words, to engage mamma to determine the right of property to be invested in the little speaker, as any the most eloquent lawyer in Westminster-hall. (i: 121-22)

The virtues of a sound education and the pitfalls of an inadequate one (as Cylinda’s has been) are stressed in this novel. As with many eighteenth-century novels and particularly Fielding’s own The Governess (1749), the narrative is minutely concerned with the effects of education; Oliver has been indulged; his younger siblings are raised rationally, and it is Ferdinand who will be Portia’s beloved and Cordelia her close friend.​[435]​ But it is mainly through a rational courtship that Fielding envisages alternatives to this distortion of sociality. Ferdinand, Portia’s would-be lover, initially charms her by his proper use of language, his commitment to communicative reason (after rejecting earlier the language of flattery, so commonly addressed by men to women), and by his unconscious revelation, through narrative, of his benevolence.​[436]​ Thus Portia assesses others predominantly through an analysis of their linguistic performance. But she is also won over by the promise of intellectual mutuality that he offers: ‘Another way which Ferdinand had of making love to me, altho’ I dare say very undesignedly, was by being ready at all times to give me information concerning any thing, in which I had a curiosity to be inform’d’ (i: 80). This provokes the Cry, who throughout are antagonistic towards women’s entry into any kind of intellectual community: ‘Oh! now our love of knowledge is going to be display’d, whisper’d the Cry’ (i: 80).
Portia avoids the snares and pitfalls, the irrational disturbances, the psychological ‘turba’, that are allegorised and voiced by various members of the Cry, in order to negotiate a rational and mutual love with Ferdinand (‘turba’ is Portia’s neologism for the force of division and irreason).​[437]​ All this is represented diagetically through her narrative, but her justifications of her behaviour before the tribunal are presented directly as dialogue. The actual dialogicity of her relationship, however, is not shown; other novels represent the discourse of lovers immediately, and The Cry is very unusual in not doing this. It may disappoint emotionally and aesthetically in this regard, yet this distancing is obviously intentional and the experiment should be accepted on its own terms. 
Portia’s coinage of ‘turba’ arouses the rage of the Cry against her presumptions of scholarship; it is meant ‘to convey the idea of all the evil passions, such as wrath, hatred, malice, envy, &c. which sometimes altogether posses the human breast’ (i: 194). The atomised diversity of the turba reflects that of the Cry and of society itself as Fielding sees it: ‘Turba means not only a multitude, but a multitude of various kinds’ (i: 195). The connotations of the word link the internal psychological turmoil that Fielding wants to denote with the division of her physical chorus, the Cry itself, and suggest some of the latter’s hostility. Bearing in mind Fielding’s credentials as a classical scholar, there may well be an allusion to Lucretian materialism, and even to the political disorder invoked for the notion by Cicero: 
Even Cicero, who did so much to acclimatize reluctant Romans to Greek intellectual developments, mocked the Epicureans as cranks and made out that their prophetic vision of a world composed of randomly moving atoms (atomorum turba) bore a worrying resemblance to the anarchic crowds currently threatening the Roman state.​[438]​

Thus Fielding’s ambivalence towards modernity focuses on the demotic crowd and sets limits to her dialogism. This would connect, too, with Swift’s often fascinated use of Lucretius in A Tale, and his polemic against materialism. The tourbillions, the dynamic activity of commerce—mercantile, dialogic, and erotic—that are embraced by Fontenelle are echoed phonetically and etymologically by Fielding’s mistrusted turba. And Cylinda is seduced, metaphorically and then literally, by and through Epicurean philosophy—not that of the refined kind actually practiced by Epicurus, but the debased, more bodily Cyrenaic philosophy of Aristippus (scorned by Xenophon) (iii: 5-11).​[439]​ Yet, as with other eighteenth-century fallen women that we are invited to sympathise with, she is not grossly sensual: Fielding is careful to stress that her vices are of the intellect and pride:
I solemnly declare, that the blameable part of the manner in which I lived with him, was owing to the uncontroulable warmth of his passions, and not of mine: for could I have had my choice, it would have been to have considered him purely as my friend and companion. (iii: 39)

Cylinda yearns for the true mutuality of intellectual partnership, without the troubling pangs of lust; Fontenelle’s more embodied dialogism is rejected here on grounds of female propriety.
The false dialogue of flattery, ‘the common flattering language of courtship’ (38), that the Cry embrace is counterpoised to the authentic pleasures of social and humane conversation. Ferdinand responds with deep sensibility to a story of distress told to the company, including Portia, but this Shaftesburean feeling for others is practiced through the pragmatic analysis of language; for Portia observes him strip bare the language of false philanthropy and ‘with so deep a penetration and clear distinction ran through the several specious methods of veiling the want of generosity, and a stubborn hardness of heart, under pretended prudence and friendly advice’ (i: 77). It is this linguistic acuteness here as elsewhere that inspires Portia’s love and justifies her claim that ‘when I believe I have not been in his thoughts, and when he hath been addressing his conversation to some other part of the company; and in this sense [. . .] often might he be said strongly to make love to me’ (i: 76).
Portia delineates the opposite of rational, communicative eros in an analysis of lovers’ distorted language set out in an embedded dialogue, or rather ‘an altercation’, that she reports with comic accuracy between ‘a jealous woman, and a justifying lover’ (i: 95-102). This kind of love, ‘the only love that can be renew’d or heighten’d by quarrelling’, employs a degradation of the human faculty of language; Portia has ‘heard something not very unlike this between two animals’ (i: 102). By contrast, she demonstrates the communicative reason of authentic love associated with Plato:
without reciprocally understanding one another, there can be no true love. A man who chuses a companion, whose capacity does not reach high enough to comprehend any of his ideas, might [. . .] be as well struck dumb; for the utility of language is to him entirely vanished.  (ii: 227-28)

However, there is an uneasy compromise throughout The Cry which, though upholding such dialogic values among companions, particularly lovers, effectively rejects and fears the public sphere. This structures the work at various levels: the outer narrative of Portia defending herself in a public arena, but appealing to abstract allegorised Reason rather than concrete public deliberation; the final utopian—in a negative sense—retreat from public life of the protagonists; the constraints placed on the practice of critical thought, particularly for women. On each of the different levels of narrative and analysis (such as the interactions taking place before Una, Portia’s own recalled narrative, Cylinda’s tale, and so on) Fielding shows the different ways in which rational speech becomes distorted both inwardly and intersubjectively, by turba and its exterior, social analogue, the Cry, and by other agents like Oliver who themselves are driven by turba.
The Cry both despise and fear learning; they also deny its propriety for women (though ultimately Fielding herself sets limits to what is acceptable here, enforcing women’s exclusion from public dialogue to a certain degree). Perhaps drawing on Sarah Fielding’s own experience, Portia is reluctant to display her own learning. But she employs an inset narrative—an ‘illustrating story’ which, for the Cry, is as provocatively critical, ‘as dreadful’, as a Socratic question (i: 145). The story concerns the extension of learning to the lower classes, paralleling the interest in women’s education. The servant, John, engages in a distorted parody of the ideal courtship dialogue with Betty, where ‘fully to shew his learning, he began repeating to his sweet-heart several scraps of Latin verses which he had picked up at school’ (i: 151). Meanwhile, they mock their learned mistress as a slattern whom, if her father had ‘bred [her] a housewife [. . .] might have got her a husband, which with all her fine learning she has not yet been able to do’ (i: 147). The class limits of Fielding’s social critique emerge; she is oblivious to the irony of her contempt over extending the dialogic sphere to include servants, whilst seeking the same claims for women. Under examination here, too, is one of Fielding’s main concerns—flattery, a mode of distorted strategic speech, by which John woos Betty. 
Fielding depicts the antidialogue at work; the resistance of the mob to true dialogue—the Cry continually shout down Portia, or sneer and mock; they fail to observe the conventions of turn-taking and so on that enable dialogue. The Cry are a mob, unified in their irrationality and aversion to authentic communication, but differentiated by self-interest, and by Fielding herself in order to illuminate particular kinds of folly. Thus, following the ‘horse-laugh’ which greets Portia’s fervent description of the charms of Ferdinand’s speech, which ‘continued so long, that she almost despair’d of ever again resuming her discourse’ (i: 107), a ‘miss Notable’ stands forth from the general crowd to mock Portia’s ideal of ‘chaste and innocent men’ (i: 109); Miss Notable is, it will be remembered, one of the prurient sneerers of Swift’s Compleat Collection. Ridicule is particularly denounced by Fielding as a conversational strategy, but there are many other delineations of the types of speech act the Cry employ to distort communication. They are what Portia calls ‘discoverers in conversation’ (i: 117), who perpetually and maliciously follow false trails in order to hunt out supposed absurdities in the speech of others; they are guilty of ‘inattention’ (i: 118). So there is a paradoxical turn to Fielding’s dialogism in that she espouses it, but never represents it in public life; her contempt for the multitude means that she always depicts them as antidialogic.
The Cry negates many of the assumptions Schellenberg makes about such works as Sarah Scott’s Millennium Hall (1762) and Fielding’s earlier David Simple (1744) (including its sequel, Volume the Last (1753)) whereby
conflict, which most commonly supplies the energies of narrative, is replaced by an impulse towards alignment, consensus, and mutual reinforcement, while the normativeness and commonality of human experience are emphasized more than its complexity and uniqueness. The authority of individual experience and interpretation is strongly qualified in these works in favour of more vicarious and communal modes of knowing.​[440]​

This goes the right way in qualifying Watt’s stress on individualism but misses those aspects of consensual rationality that are not conservative, or that have a problematic relationship with hegemony. She does point out that The Cry, ‘published in the year after Volume the Last, is a lengthy exemplum of the conversational ideal’s unworkability in a hostile social context’,​[441]​ yet I suggest that this scepticism towards the communal is itself conservative, displaying a deep distrust of the wider populace and a lack of faith in the argumentative processes of the public sphere.
The plotting in Pamela that resolves into companionate marriage is what, for Katherine Sobba Green, defines the courtship novel.​[442]​ Here, we have seen how the dialogue, where courtship overlaps with intellectual debate and textual criticism and the testing of validity claims furthers that plot. This process will be developed in other novels through the period. It is crucial that dialogue moves towards resolution of mutuality in the realm of relationships between men and women. There is far more scepticism in Fielding, however, than in Pamela or in the Jacobin novels that I will discuss later; in these, there is a sense that the utopian realisation of mutuality can spread via the exemplary influence of the rational lovers. In Fielding, however, we are constantly aware of the exceptional and isolated nature of the enlightened couple, pitted against the hostile irrationalism of mass society. In at least some of the courtship novels, the plot that leads to companionate marriage parallels the plot of women’s intellectual development (Cylinda’s story explores this in isolation from the first strand—her moral errors preclude any joyful amatory resolution), and this development is frequently manifested in the dialogue. 
But, in The Cry, Fielding does not directly depict this convergence of erotic and intellectual dialogue; we only hear the lovers converse at second hand. She does, however, deal with the same themes: intellectual and erotic companionship combine, yet this dialogue is never represented—the formal dialogue itself here concerns the defence of this position rather than the representation of it in action. The amorous matter is curiously distanced as if Fielding is revealing a suspicion of the seductive powers of amatory fiction by this detached approach to the principal courtship narrative; there are other examples of this suspicion in the novel. And the dialogic situation itself is largely antagonistic—Portia faces a railing, irrationally sceptical crowd; the arena is more that of Alciphron than Fontenelle.
The second narrative strand, that which depicts Cylinda’s impetuous philosophical career and her consequent moral fall, gives an alternative account of how communicative reason can become distorted, especially when unguided young women engage with it. Dialogue—with persons of varying integrity—is the motor of Cylinda’s entire development. She undergoes a dialogic education that often goes wrong. Her story is a distillation of a common eighteenth-century pattern—the dialectical process of education of an individual mind through social and intellectual interaction. This is also the ideal promised in many of the courtship novels, but Cylinda is excluded from this paradise by the flawed responses to dialogue she has made and by the distraction of turba. Thus, again, the perils for women, particularly of engagement in public male discourse, are vividly made clear. Fielding reveals reservations about the dialogic activity even while asserting the validity of women’s claims to be included. 
Fielding creates a remarkable central metaphor for the turba stirred up in Cylinda by the unregulated dialogic activity of engaging with philosophy. It reveals Fielding’s hesitations about women’s sexual and intellectual autonomy, as does the characterisation of Cylinda herself as attractive, sympathetic, and yet culpable. It shows, too, her political ambivalence concerning the post-Restoration public sphere wherein authority is subject to questioning by the generality. So, in Cylinda’s complex introspective allegory, the State of her soul vacillates between tyranny and anarchy, showing again, Fielding’s uneasy and compromised liberalism: ‘I was in truth pretty well stock’d with social inclinations, and my mind would often spontaneously wander in search of the gratification of some affection’ (iii: 2). This natural sociality mitigates more austere philosophies, but will play a part in her fall. ‘Yet the despotic power with which I invested every monarch that was to preside over my bosom, never suffered any notion in the least contradictory to its absolute government’ (iii: 2). The ‘popular government’ which is ‘the natural successor’ to tyranny resembles the turba of the Cry in its unruly democracy. ‘[T]hose notions which had been silenced’, under the monological and repressive tyranny of stoicism (her previous fad), ‘now all at once raised such a clamor in my bosom with their different opinions’ (iii: 2) that she is driven to scepticism by this unresolved babble of demotic polyphony. And in an astonishing development of this figure, Cylinda equates absolute monarchy with sexual tyranny: Cylinda’s untamed intellectual hunger is compared to patriarchal lust:
I was amongst the virtues like the great Turk in his seraglio of women; and I chose to dwell with that virtue which looked the fairest in my eyes, and gave me at that season most pleasure. In short, I made wives of them; I first admired them, then made them my own property, and if they would not submit to my will, I again turned them off and divorced them. (ii: 312)

A different example of distorted dialogue between the sexes appears early in on Cylinda’s career of philosophical error, one that mimics the intellectual companionship that is Fielding’s ideal, but that masks vanity and lust. Phaon, Cylinda’s cousin, apes the mutual intellectual discourse that so often features in courtship novels, distortedly paralleling Ferdinand’s attractions: ‘I now began daily to discover in him such a variety of charms as rendered his conversation the most exquisite of pleasures. [. . .] His discourse to me was all concerning books and philosophy, never so much as mentioning my beauty’ (ii: 263-64). But this masks a cunning perception on his part that she is motivated, not by the usual female vices, neither by vanity over appearance nor lust, but by intellectual vanity:
for had he not disguised his admiration of my outward form under a pretence of adoring my own idol, he would highly have offended me; I should have thought that my understanding was affronted, and should have believed that he could have said as much to every illiterate girl. (ii: 264)

Phaon’s inadequately dialogic responses reveal his strategic misuse of the conversational situation, for he is too eager to please to engage properly and assert a view that might elucidate through contradiction or challenge: 
Whenever we read any book together, Phaon took care to insinuate that I had on every subject much brighter thoughts of my own: and the use he made of conversing with me was, by degrees to yield up all his opinions to mine. (ii: 265)

Here, intellectual exchanges, distorted by ulterior motives, never result in genuine edification of one by the other:
When he had a mind that I should embrace any opinions fitted to serve his turn, he would give only some distant intimation, and then artfully leading me into a repetition of such sentiments, would receive them as perfectly new; and by his acquiescence [. . .] confirm them in my mind. (ii: 265-66)

Cylinda is ‘artfully’ persuaded into thinking her reworking of Phaon’s ideas are an authentic dialogic response to the stimulation of intellectual companionship. The vanity that motivates her feminism is ‘a sentiment that has sacrificed the chastity of whole hecatombs of women’, that ‘women of uncommon understanding [. . .] ought not to be tied in fetters by the rules of honour or the forms of established custom’ (ii: 266); these women have confirmed such sentiments not through the force of communicative reason but by giving ‘an uncontrouled liberty to the violence of our own inclinations’ (ii: 266). Libertine seduction is thus disguised as Socratic elucidation; unlike Aphra Behn, who was happy to translate Fontenelle, the decorum Fielding lived by would ensure that the intellectual and the erotic do not meet except through a dematerialisation and sanctification of the latter. Later in the century, radical women writers like Wollstonecraft and Mary Hays would actually espouse this undermining of propriety, but to their conservative opponents intellectual seduction lay very close to sexual temptation. In the case of Elizabeth Hamilton’s later Rousseauvian heroine, Julia, who succumbs tragically to such a strategic distortion of dialogue, it is suggested that it is too dangerous to allow women entry into this dialogic sphere, and even Amelia Opie’s more sympathetic treatment of a heroine led astray by misplaced idealism results in that heroine’s death.​[443]​ Fielding negotiates the path between this and a more authentic, but utopian, female dialogic space. 
In her fictions Sarah Fielding repeatedly shows disillusionment over the possibility of a dialogic life in eighteenth-century England. The Socratic woman, guided by rational virtue, and her companionate partner, if found, can only flourish in a retreat from that society, as in Mrs Teachum’s female academy, the community of friends in David Simple, and the conclusion to The Cry. As with much in her brother’s works, this reveals Sarah Fielding’s ambiguous class position towards the new—and novelised—clamorous public sphere of a relatively impoverished family with aristocratic roots. But it also stems from protofeminist concerns over the authentic female voice being drowned by a philistine and patriarchal generality that would block women’s aspirations to learning and to participation in the public sphere. Yet it is that same public sphere that has enabled Fielding’s own entry into literary life. Hence, the formal uncertainty of The Cry that simultaneously revolves around a public arena and yet rejects this audience’s capacity for validation in favour of appeals to an abstract and disembodied Una. 
Hence Portia’s final appeal—despite the narrative having been performed in a public arena—is to Una alone. The Cry have proved inadequate judges, of textual effects and, through them, human motives; incapable of genuinely participating in the dialogue presented to them. Thus, she addresses Una (and, implicitly, the judicial readers):
And to your judgement I appeal, whether I have made a vain boast of keeping a due command over my passions; whether I have made the precepts learnt in my education the only rule of my life, and formed my practice from my principles; or whether I am guilty of the heavy charge of prejudice and partiality which the Cry so repeatedly and vehemently brought against me. (iii: 277-78) 

Like her Shakespearian namesake, Portia is advocate, for Cylinda as for herself. But Cylinda also enacts her own self-judgement, using the recurrent themes of theatre and rebellions against monarchies, and displaying the contrast between a life guided by dialogical reason and the fancy-driven disorder of her own:
My life hath been (without a metaphor) a tale told by an idiot, and my imagination a strutting player, full of sound and fury signifying nothing. I have from my youth been playing jugglers tricks with my mind, instead of planting there any seed which could produce me pleasure or real advantage. For whilst in my own wild ravings I was erecting monarchies in my breast, and placed there kings and emperors agreeable to my unbridled fancy, I now too plainly see that I was inviting cruel tyrants into my bosom; and whilst I rejoiced in my unbounded liberty, I was under the most abject thraldom. My life may properly be called the triumph of the imagination, as yours, Portia, is of the judgement. (iii: 279-80)
 
These political metaphors do reconnect Fielding with more democratic impulses that are contradicted elsewhere; disordered, turbulent language and narrative is associated with tyranny; by implication, dialogic judgement is more democratic. 
Finally, the rational few can only hope to escape the Cry in a utopian ‘sweet retreat’ (iii: 286). Despite Portia’s defence of her, Cylinda could otherwise only expect to be pursued by the clamour of this distorted chorus, who are now like the Furies in the Oresteia (significantly, the only Attic chorus they resemble is this premodern force of terror):
Notwithstanding all Portia last said, the Cry continued to abuse her with the most envemon’d reproaches. Then flying into rapturous encomiums on justice, they called aloud for it on Cylinda, who deserved they said to be abandon’d by all mankind. (iii: 287)
 
But this primitive mob justice of the Cry must be superseded by a new covenant—formulated through textual criticism and against false rhetoric—of Christian mercy (as exemplified in the speech of Shakespeare’s Portia). And this principle is what lies behind the possibility of communicative reason, regulating ‘every common conversation’ which otherwise would ‘render all intercourse between the nearest kindred or the greatest professors of friendship, but so many various scenes of heart-burning, strife, and fierce emulation’ (iii: 289). The narrative of The Cry ends with Cylinda somewhat tamed, penitent and reconciled to Una, protected in the company of Ferdinand and Portia, and with the apocalyptic vision of the demonic Cry, now showing their true nature as the force of division, haunting the world.

Rational love and strategic action: Robert Bage’s Hermsprong

The 1790s saw another movement of reinvigoration of the novel, again drawing on the dialogue, inspired this time largely by the French Revolution (although the innovative Robert Bage began his career in an earlier phase of radicalism, writing Mount Henneth in 1782). The impulse for renewal cannot be reduced to simple determination by political crisis; the commodity status of the novel has its own autonomous effect and the desire for novelty itself in a medium seen to be tired has a force of its own.​[444]​ Bage (1728?–1801), Thomas Holcroft (1745–1809), Mary Hays (1759–1843), and Elizabeth Inchbald (1753–1821) among others engaged with dialogues in various ways in their novels. The conservative, or moderate, reactions to these by, for example, Amelia Opie (1769–1853), Elizabeth Hamilton (1756?–1816), and Charles Lucas (1769–1854), are significant too. The experiments and innovations in both radical and conservative responses to the Revolution have been well documented.​[445]​ 
In these works, underlying tensions emerge for identifiable socio-political reasons as the ideal, or façade, of reasoned consensus begins to disintegrate, and the dialogue is openly contentious. The benignity of a Shaftesbury can no longer be sustained; his amenable sensibility was itself seen to be destabilising by conservatives and, by radicals, both complicit in oppression (see the denunciations of Burke by Wollstonecraft) and illuminating. Of course, the novel is not all about the harmonious, polite discourse between equals that Shaftesbury posits—less so, arguably, than other genres. The ambivalence in Bakhtin over whether heteroglossia is to be praised because it enacts unconstrained communication or because it faithfully represents a divided, conflictual society is paralleled by the different tonalities that dialogue takes on in this period, as my Chapters 2 and 3 have shown, and these tonalities inflected the novel too.​[446]​
Like most of the authors I have looked at, Robert Bage was situated within complex networks of affiliation which link him in dialogue with some of those same authors.​[447]​ He interacted intellectually with such important figures as William Godwin and Mary Wollstonecraft, and, through the Lunar Society, Erasmus Darwin, Thomas Day, and the Edgeworths. He was a member of the Derby Philosophical Society, which had its own vast connections; as Gary Kelly shows:
The society was founded in 1784 by Erasmus Darwin; it had links to the Lunar Society of Birmingham and the Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society, to the continental and Scottish Enlightenments, and to the English dissenting academies.​[448]​

Bage’s concern with dialogue is multiform. John H. Sutherland, although probably unaware of Bakhtin’s work, sees a Bakhtinesque dialogism in Bage’s ‘concern with the contrast and interplay of a number of ideas, rather than with the didactic recommendation of any single idea or point of view’.​[449]​ Like other radical novels of the time, his Hermsprong; or, Man as he is not (1796) is interspersed with actual dialogues, but it is important to see how many of these are between lovers, and how the conversation of courtship is inseparable from the exchange of ideas.​[450]​ What is adumbrated in Fontenelle, yearned for and attempted in Pamela, and glimpsed tangentially in The Cry—the amatory coupling of rationality and desire between two equally autonomous subjects—flourishes in the ‘Jacobin novels’ of the 1790s, though at the expense of the bodily frisson of Fontenelle’s eroticism. Bage, like Richardson and Fielding, plays with the tradition of the courtship novel and explores how lovers appraise and woo each other through rational dialogue. The conditions for harmonious exchange are precarious and dialogue is always in danger of becoming distorted. But in this case the corruption of dialogue is not the fault of the lovers themselves: in Pamela, Richardson depicts, with psychological realism, the dialogic struggle against despotic forces internalised by Mr B himself; here, the oppression is external to the lovers: the father, and metonymically, the state.
The formal dialogue is principally the dialogue of ideas, and I have noted a shift in interest from the testing of ideas to the testing of character; in novels, the representation of dialogue, of conversation, is employed to depict character, to facilitate the exploration of psychological interaction, and so on. But, these functions may overlap and shade into one another. In Holcroft’s Anna St Ives, and more so in Hermsprong, we find the pure formal dialogue of ideas, of considered rational argumentation, tripping over into genteel and even romantic conversation. Thus, the testing of ideas inherited from the dialogue persists in the novel alongside the testing of character. But, intriguingly, as these are novels that presuppose a rational kind of love, and a mutuality between the sexes that grants women a place in intellectual discussion, values, and even desires them for this, these particular dialogues can be simultaneously rational debate and the tentative exploration of romantic interest—a theme more conventionally novelistic.
In Hermsprong, our understanding of the characters and our sympathies towards them are clarified and orchestrated according to their behaviour as dialogists. Thus the tyrannical aristocrat and father, Lord Grondale, and his cronies, Dr Blick, the clergyman, and Corrow, the lawyer, are depicted as continually flouting the conventions of rational exchange in various ways—silencing their interlocutors, performing obsequious flattery, perverting ideas of truth and justice. By contrast, the hero, Hermsprong; his lover and Grondale’s daughter, Caroline Campinet; and Maria Fluart, Caroline’s vivacious and assertive friend, engage in rational and respectful dialogue with their fellows.​[451]​ 
Thus, like many eighteenth-century novels, Hermsprong shows a concern with the acts of conversation and of language use. In particular, language can have profoundly material effects. In a letter to his daughter, Grondale lists the offensive speech acts she has committed in challenging paternal authority and claiming equal dialogic status: she ‘stipulates conditions’, ‘talks prettily about duties and attentions’, ‘points out [. . .] a pattern of rectitude’ (216). To the bile of her father’s insults, Caroline receives dialogic antidotes of satire, sympathy, and dialectic. She ‘would have sickened and died, perhaps, had not Miss Fluart laughed; had not Mrs. Garnet soothed; and had not Mr. Hermsprong reasoned’ (217). The counter discourse at Grondale Hall is, again, of power: ‘It was not of justice they talked—it was of law’ (218). At the end of the novel, Grondale is symbolically punished for his abuse of the communicative faculty by a stroke that renders his speech physically distorted but after which, for the first time, he expresses courtesy and humility towards his daughter (245).
In a sense, Hermsprong himself—a savage, estranged from civilisation (like Voltaire’s Huron), raised among native Americans—is profoundly asocial, unwilling to dine, although it is truer to say that, as Swift did earlier with his polite diners, he despises the debased sociality of England in the 1790s.​[452]​ He has ‘a sort of secret contempt for politeness itself, or rather its forms’:
you talk, and call it conversation. You make learned remarks on winds and weather; on roads; on dearness of provisions; and your essays on cookery are amazingly edifying. Not much less so are your histories of your catarrhs and toothaches. (132)

Yet in deeper senses he is authentically social, espousing, for example, the dialogic rights of women. Thus Bage brings out an opposition between authenticity and civility, whereby Hermsprong is ‘distracted betwixt truth and politeness’ (138); this subverts earlier models of sociality (most prominently, Shaftesbury where reason and politeness coexist, but where strains and countertendencies were also evident). Bage uses Hermsprong’s otherness to expose the hegemonic antidialogicity of late eighteenth-century England, where, within the family, the dominant male can crush speech; or outside the domestic sphere, the State, acting on behalf of aristocratic relics, has all its forces of terror to do likewise. Hermsprong seeks a specially refined kind of sociality, ‘the reciprocal communication of mind with mind’ (36), but—and what is of particular interest—as the basis of marriage as well as homosocial friendships.
Glen, the narrator, asserts the importance of eros as the subject of dialogue: ‘When young ladies choose to philosophise upon attraction, they are unusually eloquent; and their ideas flow with a velocity with which few pens are able to keep pace’ (87). There may be gentle mockery here, faintly patronising even, yet this also redeems the amorous themes of (frequently female) novel writers for serious discussion, and Bage’s novel makes the exploration of mutual sexual love, coupled with a socially radical, dialogically questioning rationality, the engine of his plot and the central motif of the novel. Shaftesburean benevolence, for Hermsprong (as for Sarah Fielding’s Portia) has aphrodisiac qualities: Caroline is never ‘more lovely than when warm with the healthful glow of humanity’ (70). Rational women, ‘who take the trouble to reason a little, and judge for themselves’, are, for Hermsprong, ‘heavenly women’—their attractiveness depends upon their autonomy and rationality (170). Likewise, during ‘a tender expostulation’ from Caroline, who appeals to her ‘not to indulge her vivacity on improper occasions’, Maria Fluart argues for the centrality of ‘reciprocity’ for genuine respect (84-87). Here, she is concerned with the father-daughter relationship; towards Lord Grondale, Caroline feels she has ‘a duty which forbids [her] giving him offence’ (85). Caroline is represented as possessing sensibility but irrationally passive; Maria urges resistance to Grondale’s tyranny, whereas she herself has deployed both manipulative flirtation and mockery against the lecherous lord.
Hermsprong, who has recently saved Caroline’s life, declares his admiration of her beauty and intelligence, triggering an exchange which is both the tentative, flirtatious probing of would-be lovers, beginning to know each other, and a dialogue, on charity at first, which elides into a metaconversation on flattery (a frequent concern of eighteenth-century novels) and on the proper nature of conversation between the sexes, all the while maintaining the amorous charge (71-74). Thus a dialogue on virtue, and on love and affection, with overtones of flirtatious banter, becomes part of the process of courtship; the spirit of liberty has itself a powerfully aphrodisiac quality:
‘Lord Grondale dislikes my manners, and I his. Humility to a proud man is a price I cannot pay—even for life.’
The sentiment, and the mode of utterance, made Miss Campion turn to look at her companion. She had before thought him possessed of the finest face she ever beheld; it seemed improved now by the animation which lightened from his eyes. But young ladies are not permitted to look long or intently upon young men: so, resuming her position, she said, ‘Do you know any country in the world, Mr. Hermsprong, where this price is not paid?’
‘Among the aborigines of America, Miss Campinet. There’—added Mr. Hermsprong with a smile—‘I was born a savage.’
Miss Campinet felt the strangest sort of feel; she never could tell what it was like. (73)

This ‘strange feel’ is also inspired by the novelty, the novel-ness, of Hermsprong’s exotic narrative as well as his person, and the intellectual appeal of her dialogic engagement with him. Caroline’s sexual attraction to Hermsprong is apparent; she acutely notes ‘the animation’ of his gaze, an animation inspired by his communicative activity. Here, Bage transcribes that authentic dialogue which Richardson had shown in formation, and which Sarah Fielding posits but does not directly depict. But there are socially imposed limits to this ocular dialogism; she is ‘not permitted’ reciprocity in this exchange, where the physical and the intellectual are so intimately fused.
In Hermsprong, the conditions for undistorted dialogue are inextricably linked with political and social freedom. An exchange between Lord Grondale and Dr Blick, of submissive and obsequious antidialogue, follows Hermsprong and Caroline’s dissection of flattery and shows how this mode of distorted speech has a very determinate relationship to social structures of inequality and power, flattery being the tool of servile ambition (75-6). Glen, the narrator, suggests slyly that dissent and negation characterise true dialogue:
There are men—classes of men, I believe, to whom no human attainment is so useful and profitable as assentation. It is for the benefit of young beginners in this respectable art, that I have recorded this dialogue. Dr. Blick was an adept. He cannot but be a bishop. (76)

Bage has a utopian dialogic model to oppose this state of corruption. An almost archetypically eighteenth-century dialogue takes place between Glen and Hermsprong, over the merits of civilised life, and the ‘progressive state of improvement’ therein, in contrast to the state of ‘the aborigines of America’ (87-89). This is a perfectly balanced episode of reasoned debate, with each speaker granted mutual respect and both arguments having credibility, and the libertarian theme of their debate reflects these conditions of mutual exchange. But from central Enlightenment motifs of progress, the state of nature, pleasure and luxury, the debate turns to love—the feminine concern of novels. Native Americans here represent undistorted communication, particularly in the arena of lovers’ exchanges: 
All I have observed is [says Hermsprong], that you are not satisfied with [love] in the simple way that American Indians possess it. With you the imagination must be raised to an extraordinary height; I might almost say, set on fire: and this you perform by dress, by concealments, and by sentiment, like sugar treble refined. (89)

Thus Western eros is distorted by luxurious adornment and rhetoric. There is a suggestion, too, that the corrupted raw material of Western luxury is derived from the exploitation of slaves; the over-refined sugar of distorted speech corresponds to a distorted economic relationship in the colonies as well as in the Cornwall setting of the novel. 
The balanced forces of American dialogue suggest a desired reconciliation between the material progress of Europeans and the honest simplicity of Americans, much as there is in Spence. Bage admires the virgin terrain of America, finding there a primitive purity and vigour which could form a synthesis with the intellectual achievements of civilisation; again, as did Spence. The native Americans observe rules of polite conversation that facilitate dialogue, to the extent that the village head man will ‘lend his ear to a woman [here, Hermsprong’s mother] for instruction’, despite this appearing ‘an inversion of order’, for they have ‘a politeness derived from education, as well as ours, which qualifies them for patient hearers to a degree’ that Hermsprong has ‘never observed in more polished nations’ (167). 
Hermsprong spells out one precondition for communicative reason at the onset of another dialogue with Mr Sumelin (Maria’s guardian) on wealth, happiness, and civilisation: ‘conversation to be agreeable must have a certain degree of freedom’ (132). This initiates a discussion on women’s rights and the nature of their intellect and education: 
‘But Mr. Sumelin, I understand it is not the custom here to talk upon politics before ladies. I am told it is a breach of politeness.’
‘Is it not your opinion also, sir,’ Miss Fluart asked, ‘that the subject is improper for our sex?’
‘I think no subject improper for ladies, which ladies are qualified to discuss; nor any subject they would not be qualified to discuss, if their fathers first, and then them selves, so pleased.’
‘You do not then,’ said Miss Fluart, ‘approve our mode of education?’
‘Not quite.’
‘’Faith, nor I neither,’ said Sumelin. ‘Women have too much liberty.’
‘I, on the contrary, think they have too little.’ (135)

Thus Hermsprong again, in thinking ‘no subject improper for ladies’, rejects the conventional sociality of ‘politeness’ in order to affirm a deeper sociality that would welcome women’s dialogic participation in the public sphere. He considers, drawing heavily on Wollstonecraft, that their ‘mode of education’ denies them that liberty without which conversation cannot be agreeable.  
But Hermsprong’s feminist sympathies only go so far; Miss Fluart imagines herself his hypothetical wife betrayed by her husband: ‘You play the false. Am I’, she asks Hermsprong, ‘at liberty to return the favour?’ Hermsprong declares that women, in marriage, have ‘contracted an obligation with society also’, because they ‘bear the children’; this ties them more than their husbands (172-73). Yet Bage nevertheless has allowed Maria to raise serious challenges to this in favour of reciprocal obligations between father and daughter, husband and wife.
In an exchange with her father that is decidedly not authentic dialogue, Caroline insists that the duty of a daughter must be limited by reason:
‘Your name, I think,’ said he, ‘is Caroline Campinet?’
This question so awfully put, did not tend to strengthen the young lady’s nerves. She answered by a courtesy.
‘You will have the goodness, Miss Campinet,’ said his lordship, ‘to endeavour to answer by words rather than signs.’
‘You terrify me, sir,’ said the lady.
‘You have courage enough to disobey and insult me by your actions, madam; it is pity you cannot, like your friend, support your amiable propensities by words. I wish to know, Miss Campinet, whether you suppose yourself my daughter?’
‘Certainly, my lord.’
‘Have you ever heard of any obligation, any duty attached to this relation?’
‘Certainly, sir.’
‘But this duty does not reach so high as obedience?’
‘Pardon me, sir, I think obedience its first duty.’
‘Under certain limits?’
‘I believe, sir, all virtues have their limits.’
‘And to be set by daughters?’
‘No sir; by reason alone.’
‘The reason of daughters?’
‘My lord, I am unequal to this. To a father I cannot answer what my simple judgment would suggest.’ (183-84).

This bullying, probing catechism resembles a distorted Socratic exchange. The formal apparatus of dialogue is present but Grondale uses strategies that, rather than elicit definitions from a partner deemed a rational soul, instil fear. Thus, the initiating move, rather than establishing Caroline’s essence, renders her speechless and obliterates her identity. Such responses as Caroline’s ‘all virtues have their limits’ are not accepted as rational suggestions; Grondale is explicitly contemptuous of the rules of dialogic reasoning as, when Caroline declares her adherence to ‘reason alone’, his ‘the reason of daughters’ sneeringly excludes her, and all daughters, as a rational subject.
Lord Grondale’s domestic cruelty is part of a wider background of counterdialogic forces. In Sarah Fielding the mob of the rising bourgeoisie constitutes the counterdialogic sphere; in Bage, it is the rump of ancient tyranny and their ideologues and rumour-mongers. Acts of communication in and of themselves could be suspicious; ‘correspondence’ in the 1790s, it must be remembered, could lead directly to transportation; Horne Tooke and Holcroft had both been prosecuted. The very word would have conjured up certain dangerously dialogic networks: the London Corresponding Society, the Society for Constitutional Information—the names of these radical groupings indicate a commitment to communicative practices. The British State was such that, as in some of the dialogues contemporary with this discussed in Chapter 3 above, the law can strategically intervene to close down dialogue; Pitt’s Two Acts were aimed directly at democratic speech acts such as inciting ‘hatred of the Constitution’ and holding unlicensed meetings.​[453]​ Hermsprong has ‘read the Rights of Man’ (207), he has incited anti-English sentiments, favouring America and revolutionary France, and this provokes the very real threat of law intervening in dialogue. As the linguistically corrupt Carrow says, ‘the bench of justices will not bear such things now; and if your lordship will exert your influence, I dare say they will make the country too hot to hold him’ (207). Sexual tyranny is exposed alongside political corruption, linking again the public and domestic spheres: the marriage to Sir Philip will be ‘consummated by force’, and Carrow, ‘the honest attorney’ will have Hermsprong ‘taken up as a French spy’, though already Hermsprong has the reasoned judgement of the people on his side—Carrow fears that ‘People of some consideration begin to talk of him, and give him credit for many virtues’ (204). ‘Opinion is very powerful’, he warns, and Grondale responds with the need to employ strategic action against such public debate: ‘We must counteract it’ (204).
Towards such antidialogic forces, Bage adopts a radical optimism, tempered by a realist pragmatism. Rather than resignedly adopt the absolute retreat of Fielding, he chooses to adapt counterdialogic strategies and turn them against oppressors. For Fielding, her pessimism meant that a community of rational lovers and/or friends had to be established outside the atomised chaos of contemporary society. Grondale, as incarnation of the State’s tyranny, is eventually defeated by Hermsprong’s integrity and persuasive dialogue, but also by Maria Fluart’s pragmatic manipulations. Maria is able to use flattery strategically to good ends—perhaps the only power the subaltern woman has—in order to oppose tyranny: ‘now and then the sting of Miss Fluart’s tongue was recompensed by the delightful feeling which the touch of youth and beauty is supposed to impart to elderly gentlemen’ (91). She, excruciatingly, given what we know of her intelligence and independence, plays with conventional feminine roles to protect her less guileful friend from paternal oppression:
For this young lady had the kittenish moods imaginable; in which she would sometimes take possession of his lordship’s lap, or draw him on to a small game of romps, or say agreeable things respecting his person; the more grateful, as his lordship, in this particular, had almost begun not to flatter himself. (91)

For Maria, then, ‘Dissimulation, I hope, is not one of the seven deadly sins; for it is monstrous convenient on certain occasions’ (118). Dissimulation is a severe violation of Habermas’s conditions for communicative rationality, yet here, in the cause of female solidarity and developing the autonomy of women, it becomes ‘a necessity imposed by friendship’ (118). So even the enlightened have to resort to strategic action, as Maria does. This is facilitated by alternative dialogic practices. Maria and Caroline receive crucial information via covert networks, formed from servants resistant to tyranny (209); Hermsprong, too, has his communicative intelligence, in ‘public whisper’ and from the mole at the heart of despotism, Maria, whilst she is resident at Grondale’s house, flirting with him in aid of her friend (206).
I have touched before on satire’s problematic relationship to the dialogic. Satire in Bage features among his representations of distorted communication. Bage’s concern with women’s rights brings the relation of satire and gender to the fore. Male satire against women is oppressive and monologic (and frequently focussed on their speech); that of a Maria Fluart may be another example of the necessity of strategic action on the part of a subaltern. Thus, Lord Grondale is happy to bully his daughter vocally; he is less happy when his pride is wounded by Maria’s arch speech acts:
though his vanity and, as well as spleen, was gratified by the success of his triumphant satire, when his gentle daughter was the subject, over Miss Fluart he could boast no such gratification; but often smarted under the playful lash of this laughing, good humoured, unmalignant girl. (186-87)

This ‘playful lash’ is also wielded against two baronets, guests of Lord Grondale, Sir John Wing, and Sir Philip Chestrum, whom Grondale intends as Caroline‘s husband. Bage represents them performing a comic antidialogue with Maria Fluart (here, it is actually printed as formal dialogue, with speech markers) (190-93). The baronets’ speech is vapid; Maria’s responses are pert and satiric, and the baronets are confused by her muddying of the communicative channel, Sir Philip protesting that Maria was talking ‘one thing always, and meant another’ (191). Maria’s double-voicedness, although not in itself dialogic, serves dialogicity by exposing the monologic speech of the two would-be suitors.
Grondale contemptuously dismisses the possibility of women being dialogic subjects: ‘Young ladies are privileged, We allow them, Sir Philip, to say what they please. The pretty things have seldom any meaning.’ Maria characteristically replies with sarcastic wit, before exposing the hollowness of Sir Philips aristocratic values: ‘I subscribe to the wit and truth of this, as I do most of your lordship’s remarks’ (202).
Maria’s strategic dissemblings are finally exposed, having served her goals. She has aided Caroline’s escape and apparent elopement with Hermsprong. Unsure of how to cope ‘with a giddy girl’, Grondale is advised by Blick that ‘the law corrects women’, and that ‘the law doth coerce women’ (211). Lord Grondale proceeds to invoke this terror: ‘The crime is capital, and you are accessory before the fact’ (213). Maria mocks this threat and launches a Socratic interrogation of the implication that women are property that can be stolen or repossessed: ‘Oh dear! how you take a delight in terrifying poor innocent young women! But, pray, my lord, what is stealing?’ (213-14). Threatened with forcible detainment before being delivered ‘to due course of law’, Maria’s desperate recourse, in a complete antithesis to dialogicity, is to draw a pistol ‘under the necessity of leaving this hospitable house by force’ (214). Recognising the impossibility of resisting aristocratic and patriarchal tyranny by dialogue alone she, as elsewhere with her flattery, deception, ambiguity, and satire, resorts to the purest of non-communicative strategic action. Although Bage, as with other liberals made nervous by the Jacobin moment, elsewhere stops short of advocating violent revolution, here it takes place in miniature.
Bage suggests the possibility of rational reform through the example of the greater mass of society who, significantly, offer much more dialogic potential than Fielding’s Cry, and are often the agents themselves of liberty. But Bage’s dialogism has its limits, as Enlightenment radicalism often did when confronting class. Although radically democratic, as a manufacturing capitalist (he ran a paper mill) he found himself in conflicted sympathy with his labourer’s demands for wage rises whilst under the pressure of economic constraints, particularly parasitic taxation from the State.​[454]​ With some inevitability, when he depicts the activism of the tin miners in Hermsprong, motivated by the ‘dearness of provisions’ (219), his radicalism is compromised: he has his hero persuade them out of insurrection into capitulation; his speech calms the potential rioters and his rhetorical skills restore their deference. Significantly, there is no representation of dialogue between him and the protesting workers. In fact, when accused by one of the men of being ‘one of King George’s spies’, he ‘without reply, knock[s] him down’ (225-26): decidedly undialogic strategic action (although he then admits his error and gives the man a half-crown, winning the workers’ sympathies even more).
Hermsprong’s presence among the rioters leads to his trial (among other things, as a supposed French agent, reminiscent of the paranoia and distortions of rumour surrounding Wordsworth and Coleridge’s residence in Somerset) whereby his true identity as the genuine heir to the Grondale estate is revealed. This section of Bage’s narrative is again concerned with the authenticity of dialogue and the corruption of speech mechanisms by State power. The second-hand account of the miners’ uprising is laced with a telling sequence of words that relate to the communication of events, employed ironically in that each describes, not truthtelling, but the distortions of ideologically inspired rumour (like Fielding’s Cry, but here working against the mass of the people). Thus, ‘news’ arrives that the miners are rioting; the second day’s ‘report’ is that ‘they threatened violence’; ‘the third day’s intelligence’ is that French spies are present; amongst the ‘information’ is that Hermsprong is involved (219; my emphases). This is followed by an exposé of the inauthentic nature of legal exchanges in the trial of Hermsprong, where his truthfulness confronts the strategic rhetoric of Glondale’s corrupt lawyer, Carrow (22-28).
Bage’s radicalism in the sphere of gender apparently falls short, too. In that very mode that had undergone a dialogic radicalisation—the courtship narrative—the assertive and communicatively autonomous Maria is rejected in favour of the more passive, and traditionally feminine, Caroline. As the plot is resolved, the rich and independent Maria Fluart does not marry, being ‘not yet willing “to buy herself a master”’ (247). Her fate instead is to deploy her argumentative wit as a sort of salonneuse (247-48); she ‘establishes a little household’ where:
Once a day she quarrels with [Hermsprong] and the greatest vexation she has yet to complain of is, that she cannot vex him. She calls him savage; abuses his antediluvian ideas; and then tells her friend, with half a sigh, she will have a savage like himself, or die a maid. (247-48)

There is a certain pathos about her fate; it is hinted (and has been suggested through flirtatious exchanges all along) that Hermsprong is her ideal lover. But Bage’s delineation of relationships is perceptive and faithful: Hermsprong has compromised himself, for Caroline, despite her beauty and sensibility, is a lesser spirit than Maria, judged by the dialogic values the book espouses; for all her benevolence, she submits too easily to irrational authority.
Simultaneously, then, Bage extends the Enlightenment utopian promise of mutual dialogue to women, depicting the fusion of eros and intellect between men and women, whilst illustrating the real limits of dialogue in Pitt’s Britain, where tyranny can only be resisted by strategic means. And the final few paragraphs perform a dialogue with readers (after the manner of Sterne) which represents the novel itself as a dialogue whereby the female readers are invited to form their own conclusions, in keeping with the libertarian sympathies of the novel and the concerns for women’s agency.

Dialogic seduction and the anti-Jacobins

Other radical novelists such as Thomas Holcroft (a writer and translator of dialogues) and Mary Hays (a pedagogical dialogist herself) employed embedded dialogues in the same way as Bage and to similar ends, though his dialogues of rational courtship are among the most deftly handled.​[455]​ And, as those dialogues were modelled on those I have described above, so, too, were those of their antagonists. Conservative responses to the ‘Jacobin’ novels were not hesitant themselves to employ the dialogue as a constituent unit, though their commitment to dialogic values may be questionable and the embedded subgenre often becomes distorted into catechism or parody. As Grenby points out, the possibility of discourse itself is negated:
anti-Jacobin novelists [. . .] were above all keen to avoid debating what was perhaps the principal subject of their novels, the new philosophy. Reasoning was treacherous, to broadcast the doctrines of modern philosophy in a novel was irresponsible, and so strategies were developed [. . .] by which new philosophy could be countered without disclosing what it actually was.​[456]​

Among these strategies was the parodic depiction of the enlightened dialogue of intellectual courtship. Here, Cylinda’s mistaken path of intellectual romance is the only possible outcome of the heroine’s aspirations to dialogic participation. In the anti-Jacobin novels, the courtship of equals becomes distorted into the strategic action of the rapacious (and rationalist) male seducing the artless female victim, thus appropriating what had been a standard motif of the eighteenth-century novel, which ‘was evidently perfectly suited to presuming that new philosophy, Wollstonecraft included, would be merely a mask for traditional modes of sexual predation’.​[457]​ 
Elizabeth Hamilton, in Memoirs of Modern Philosophers (1800), dramatises this kind of distortion in two ways, using parallel plots: in tragic mode, her Rousseauvian heroine of sensibility, Julia, is seduced by the Jacobin, Vallaton.​[458]​ Vallaton is rhetorically gifted; he employs artfully deceptive conversation and sophistic speech, akin to fiction (and to coiffure, to which he had been apprenticed). Mingling intellectual argument with flattery—a debased rationalist courtship, like that exposed in The Cry when Cylinda is seduced—Vallaton appeals to Julia’s intellectual pride: ‘so artfully did he contrive to mingle argument with flattery’ (209). Distorted lovers’ dialogues take place between Vallaton and Julia; one example is on the ‘enlightened’ view of familial loyalty and compassion (with Mr Myope, a deluded enthusiast, joining in). Here communication fails due to Vallaton’s solipsistic inhumanity and dishonesty, opposed by Julia’s sensibility, untainted as yet by sophistry (49-51). These are parodies of the kind of rational exchanges between lovers found in Bage, or even Fielding (though the principal target is Mary Hays). Julia is redeemed by her sensibility or, in other words, her incomplete commitment to rationalist dialogue; here, she is not persuaded to abandon the concept of duty where a loved parent is concerned. Thus Hamilton, in particular, revisits the interplay between courtship and intellectual debate of the radical writers, but in order to show the dangers of dialogue. Women are not equipped for rational debate, though their superior sensibility may see through the delusions of philosophy; the courtship dialogue is, however, too often the means by which Jacobins possess both female minds and bodies. False dialogue is dangerous: Julia is ‘perverted by argument’ (369). 
Hamilton employs the dialogic device of footnotes to engage with Jacobins such as Godwin, whom she cites extensively, in notes and by embedding quotes seamlessly within her own text in order to render them foolish. This is a parodic appropriation of Mary Hays’s lavish citation of Helvètius, Condorcet, and other Enlightenment figures, whilst her title mocks Charlotte Smith’s The Young Philosopher (1798).​[459]​ Bakhtin finds this double-voicing dialogic: I have already discussed the problematic relation of satire to dialogue; the satiric voice being a wilfully unreceptive participant in dialogue, deliberately practicing systematic distortion. Compare the satire here with Bage’s use of it; here, it is an ideological instrument of the dominant classes.
Hamilton creates a satirical double of the unfortunate Julia, another young woman seduced by revolutionary ideas. Comically, Bridgetina Botherim attempts to court Henry Sydney with ‘metaphysical harangues’, rather than genuine dialogue (159). Bridgetina, with her cultivation of individualism, can barely communicate. She is frequently just not understood. The neologisms of philosophers break the conventions of language; idiolect becomes isolation, and the innovative, creative aspect of language undermines the social in the way that Swift so objected to. Hamilton’s skilful mishearing of revolutionary discourse becomes an effective weapon against dialogue (though, admittedly, very funny).
However, much of Hamilton’s critique is of the bourgeois individualism of the new philosophy, where ‘All compose themselves; all play their own tune; no two in the same key’ (143). The socialised sensibility of Shaftesbury has become egotistical and private in Bridgetina—it threatens social order through its individualism. But perhaps this was latent anyway. In other words, it is the potential to subvert dialogic mutuality that concerns Hamilton—though, of course, her fears of the overturning of rank and property motivate the novel. Thus both conservative and radical discourse in this period very often shared the same themes and concerns. Hamilton employs notions of sociability and reason, coupled with a version of sensibility, in the service of religious, familial, and social order; though this conservatism is tempered by a reformist liberalism and a certain tolerance, it still opposes the threat of revolutionary system.
Another anti-Jacobin strategy, one which realises the extent of their underlying hostility to communicative rationality, was the parody of the democratic forum. The alternative public sphere of the labouring classes is satirised by Hamilton when, ‘In a certain three-penny spouting club’ Vallaton receives ‘the unbounded applause of all the apprentices, journeymen, and shop-sweepers’ (56).​[460]​ Charles Lucas, in The Infernal Quixote (1801) also presents parodic accounts of the London Corresponding Society.​[461]​ In a prologue, appropriating the radical Milton, democratic dialogue appears as Satanic council, where the ‘Peers of Hell assembled’ are addressed by Satan as his ‘Brethren united, free, equal participators of unconfined, indiscriminate, independent Chaos’ (39). Invoking the spectres of Voltaire and Robespierre, he threatens to disrupt the monologic order of a Britain untouched as yet by reform or revolt. To the anti-Jacobins, a plebeian public sphere and the democratic extension of dialogue was, precisely, chaos and pandaemonium. Thus, Lucas’s later description of a radical meeting ‘where, under the mask of discussing liberal opinions’ shows them, rather than Pitt’s spies and political police, as contorting the bases of rational speech and ‘endeavouring to propagate [French] principles’ that subvert morality, religion, and property relations (166).
Amelia Opie’s Adeline Mowbray (1805) is more ambivalent politically; wary of the dangers of radicalism but recognising the aspirations of women who seek the synthesis of intellectual and romantic liberty, it is much preoccupied with the effects of dialogue, even including dialogues which contain reflections on the nature of persuasion and conviction through dialogue itself.​[462]​ Opie treats her misled heroine (who is another Cylinda figure) with sympathy, but the novel does suggest that it is injudicious to trust young women with dangerous ideas.​[463]​ Yet it does yield a glimpse of the possibility of mutual romance between the sexes, though social norms and the death of Adeline’s lover, the radical philosopher Glenmurray, shatter this ideal. 

Burney, Edgeworth, and Austen

Other less blatantly partisan novelists, in the latter part of the long eighteenth century, were equally attracted by the potential of incorporated dialogues; Frances Burney and, later, Maria Edgeworth both display an obvious concern with the dialogic in this sense. I could adduce many more examples from a random reading of eighteenth-century novels. There are some striking cases which, had I more space, I would like to have examined in detail: from Burney and Edgeworth, Holcroft, Mary Hays, and more novels from the earlier part of the century such as Sarah Scott’s utopia, Millenium Hall (1762), all of which deploy this technique.​[464]​
These novelists wrote keenly about talking, or writing, just as more austere intellectuals had been fascinated by the origins and processes of language. In Frances Burney, Cecilia (1782), note how many of the chapter headings name speech acts or dialogic situations; out of 102 chapters, 38 (at least) have titles such as: ‘An Argument’, ‘A Supplication’, ‘A Narration’, ‘An Examination’, ‘A Tête à Tête’, ‘A Debate’, ‘A Railing’, ‘A Conference’, ‘A Discussion’, ‘A Confabulation’, ‘A Prating’.​[465]​ But there are brief dialogues embedded here too. Early on, in ‘An Argument’, the worldly-wisdom of Monckton engages with Belfield’s Enlightenment faith in human reason and education, arousing the reader to the concerns with social exchanges that permeate this novel (14-17). Cecilia herself craves the setting for an ideal speech situation that itself would foster dialogue, where friendship and affection meets intellectual stimulation, and where ‘social converse’ is ‘the greatest of human enjoyments’ (163-4). 
Burney represents exchanges at a fashionable concert that are the antithesis of conversation and perfect specimens of distorted dialogue (274-7). Cecilia’s friend, Mr Crosport, then satirically enumerates these various modes of distorted communication, pointing out members of such sects as Insensiblists, the Voluble, the Supercilious, and the Jargonists (280-1). Satire itself has an uneasy status with the dialogic and with sociality, as I have observed above, but here, Crosport is in sympathy with the isolated and unfulfilled Cecilia and his discourse is not one which favours the powerful. Cecilia finally attains her communicative happiness with Delville, who persuades her of the authenticity of his commerce with her by rationally articulating his dialogic premises: ‘by sophistry, believe me, I never shall injure: my ambition, as I have told you, is to convince, not beguile, and my arguments shall be as simple as my professions shall be sincere’ (561).
Educational writers such as Maria and Richard Edgeworth were committed to dialogic theories of pedagogy; the many educational dialogues written during these years were genuinely open-ended and not the monologic catechisms of other periods, as various writers have shown. The Edgeworths even transcribed actual dialogues with children in Practical Education. Thus we might expect to find that, in Maria Edgeworth’s own novels, the absorption of the dialogue into the novel was coloured by her own educational concerns.
The ‘domestic utopia’​[466]​ of the Perceval family in Maria Edgeworth’s Belinda (1801) is an instance where companionate marriage exists in reality, rather than in the Arcadian retreat of Fielding’s examples. The dialogue extends to the whole family, making the links with the Edgeworths’ dialogical pedagogy evident. In the chapter, ‘A Family Party’, a constant interplay of educational dialogue between children and parents is taking place where the children pursue questions of natural science and of ethics through authentically non-catechistical communication.​[467]​ This episode novelises the familial, pedagogical dialogues that Maria and her father had investigated as a foundation of their educational theory. Edgeworth’s dialogic interests do not rest there. There are, too, formal intellectual dialogues between Belinda and, adversarially, Harriet Freke over her distorted variety of feminism (in the chapter ‘Rights of Woman’);​[468]​ and as a Socratic conversation about lovers with Lady Delacour where Deborah Weiss rightly says, ‘Edgeworth turns the conversation into a philosophic dialogue’, thus exploring the terrain of intellectual love that I have identified in the practice of wooing—here, though, as the subject of metadiscourse between women.​[469]​ Weiss notes that ‘The two begin by asking each other to refine, or define their terms’; this is, of course, the elenctic method.​[470]​
Jane Austen may have perfected the technique, though I want to avoid that kind of crude teleology that sees Austen as the pinnacle of the prior century’s experimentation. Michael Prince in his excellent discussion follows a similar path through Shaftesbury, Mandeville, Hume, and Berkeley to Austen, tracing the connection between novel and dialogue but from a different perspective. However, I differ from him in seeing more of a continuity with the tradition of philosophical dialectic whereas he considers that a radical break occurred; according to Prince, dialogue in Sense and Sensibility (1818)—whose very title suggests a dialogue—‘has little in common with the abstract metaphysical disquisitions one finds in Shaftesbury, Berkeley, and Hume. Although dialogues on set topics abound, they are rarely sustained or resolved’.​[471]​ Yet Austen’s dialogues do have a great deal in common with the wider variety of dialogues on moral behaviour and aesthetics that prevailed; Prince measures the novel against one form of dialogue only, and that in a very abstract version. Austen shares, too, the same interest in rationally examining validity claims, trusting to the same values of mutuality. That her exchanges are ‘rarely sustained or resolved’ is not immensely significant; many of the dialogues I have considered have similar interruptions and aporias and this is more a symptom of the sophistication of the dialogue in this period than the indication of a breach. Ian Campbell Ross highlights this continuity in an illuminating comparison of Austen with Bage: ‘in her reclamation of the novel as a means of engaging in political debate with wit and humour, she has more in common with the elusive Bage than she, or modern readers, might suspect’.​[472]​ The interplay between courtship and discourse that I have shown in earlier novels may persuade readers that something similar takes place in Austen’s novels: see the ethical and aesthetic debates throughout her work. And Austen shares the vision of discursive mutuality in marriage; as Tandon says, ending Emma (1816) ‘with a marriage that is a perpetual conversation’.​[473]​ The antagonistic and eirenic poles of dialogue are all explored; in Pride and Prejudice (1813), ‘romance abides with raillery, “flyting” with flirting’.​[474]​ Tandon has a deep awareness of Austen’s concerns with sociality and demonstrates, superbly, how her fiction and her characters constantly evaluate the discourse of others, assimilating the art of intelligent courtship to that of the novel itself.​[475]​ It is true, as Prince says, that Austen’s dialogues ‘are always turned to the investigation of character’.​[476]​ Note the attention paid to conversation and the evaluation and regulation of it; texts, too, particularly letters, are evaluated and their validity claims examined by her characters as part of this ‘investigation of character’. The famous discussion of novels in Northanger Abbey (1811) is revealing here; Terry Castle has pointed out Henry Tilney’s Socratic manner: ‘Henry does not so much tell Catherine what to think as show her that she can think’.​[477]​ Tilney woos and educates Catherine through dialogic exchanges on poetics and ethics; the formal structures of dialogue once more enrich the novel and enable the realisation of intellectual and romantic mutuality. 

Despite all the difficulties and qualifications that have been and have to be made over the notion, I want to argue still for ‘the rise of the novel’; something did arise in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century that was remarkable enough for us to talk in this way.​[478]​ In contrast with, say, fictions of the Roman empire, the eighteenth-century novel becomes the dominant genre.​[479]​ Its form, if form can be ideological, enacts dominant and emergent ideologies, or at least the struggles over them. Raymond Williams alerts us to the possibility of multiple ideologies in contestation: ‘In authentic historical analysis it is necessary at every point to recognize the complex interrelations between movements and tendencies both within and beyond a specific and effective dominance.’​[480]​ There are fluxions of what Williams calls ‘emergent’, ‘dominant’, and ‘residual’ discourses at any historical juncture. The novel exerts its dominance by novelising the other genres, including those that have participated in its formation (autobiography, journal, dialogue—the lyric, too, despite Bakhtin’s declarations that the lyric cannot be dialogical).​[481]​ It is the generalised means of literary production.​[482]​ Greco-Roman ‘novels’ were brief efflorescences of experiment and subversion that never really propagated. Their resemblance to the fictions that become the characteristic texts of the late seventeenth century and beyond is superficial and it is misleading to see them as precursors or to assimilate them to these later texts.​[483]​ By contrast, during the eighteenth century, the features deemed central to novelism such as Watt’s ‘formal realism’, demotic speech, the ‘questions of virtue’ that centre upon aristocratic power, individualism, and, I would argue, a dialogic situation for that individualism—dominate every aspect of culture.​[484]​






There are human constants and there are the transformations of these performed by history. Dialogue is both a permanent potentiality and, if Habermas is right, a necessary precondition of human existence. It is an activity that is fostered in some periods and cultures more than others. Modern approaches to genre attempt the same double perspective whereby an archetypal literary form can be observed through the mutations it undergoes within a particular cultural context. For Raymond Williams, an adequate theory of genre must recognise two facts:
first, that there are clear social and historical relations between particular literary forms and the societies and periods in which they were originated or practised; second, that there are undoubted continuities of literary forms through and beyond the societies and periods to which they have such relations.​[485]​

The formal dialogue obviously maps on to the dialogic aspects of human interaction in important ways and its various avatars are of more than scholastic interest. Dialogue as a genre flourished in eighteenth-century Britain because, I have argued, there were for the first time significant opportunities for dialogism, based on real material conditions and institutions which facilitated this. Thus thinkers from various positions within a particular cultural moment mediated their particular responses to these conditions through a radical transformation of a pre-existing genre, one which had always answered to the essentially human discursive faculty. That same openness encouraged the development of the novel, which involved further generic transformations, including the incorporation of the revitalised dialogue into the new kind.
An approach to genre that respects the persistence of forms through history yet is alert to its transformations and particular manifestations would work in dialogue with cultural materialism, stressing the transformation of genres and involving a historicism that aims to uncover tensions in texts that once mediated real social contradictions, but with the half-formed suggestion of contemporary relevance. What various historicisms try to do is to negotiate these two questions: ‘Why did it matter then?’ and ‘Why would we read it now?’ Brecht put it thus, finding pleasure in instruction from this dual perspective:
We need to develop the historical sense [. . .] into a real sensual delight. When our theatres perform plays of other periods they like to annihilate distance, fill in the gap, gloss over the differences. But what comes then of our delight in comparisons, in distance, in dissimilarity—which is at the same time a delight in what is close and proper to ourselves?​[486]​

Hans-Georg Gadamer and Hans Robert Jauss, in different ways, see the historically aware reading of texts itself in terms of dialogue; my study has been an attempt to celebrate the dialogic both by uncovering the importance of the genre and by participating in this historical dialogue.​[487]​ I aim to recover the ‘delight in comparisons’ that these distant texts give us, especially through their conjunction with the novel, and remind the reader that their concerns with communicative reason are very much ‘close and proper to ourselves’.
Michael McKeon’s dialectical transformation of Ian Watt’s original description of the rise of the novel points to the shifting interplay of parts within a whole at a moment when a new genre emerges.​[488]​ This dynamic account allows for and explains the co-existence of dialogues which are themselves somewhat novelistic with the early novels themselves. McKeon invokes certain crises, both epistemological and cultural, as a background, and sees the novel as a means of negotiating these crises; the same could be said for the dialogue.​[489]​ He talks of a crisis in ‘how to tell the truth in narrative’; the eighteenth-century dialogue also attempted to resolve that crisis, or perhaps an epistemological crisis in how that truth is uncovered.​[490]​ It did so by advocating open critical argument: truth is derived intersubjectively. Watt hints at the public dimension to the empiricism he discovers in the novel: ‘The novel’s mode of imitating reality may therefore be equally well summarized in terms of the procedures of another group of specialists in epistemology, the jury in a court of law’.​[491]​ This is a move away from Locke’s individualistic empiricism, which Watt and McKeon concentrate upon, and also an elaboration of conditions the former helped inaugurate by articulating the bourgeois theories of liberty that demanded a public sphere. McKeon’s questions of virtue and truth loosely overlap with Habermas’s validity claims, and the intersubjective aspect of the latter has already been noted. Thus novels engage with the same questions as the dialogues and in potentially similar ways. McKeon’s (and Watt’s) narrative ends with the 1750s, but the dialectic between competing ideas of value and their mediation through clashes over modes of representation does not end there; the burst of dialogic activity around the struggles of the 1790s draws our attention to further re-formations of the novel and the symbiosis of dialogue then, as my argument in Chapter Four has shown.
I have cut short my discussion at the end of ‘the long eighteenth century’. The popularity of the dialogue seems to have truly waned by then but I do not want to say that an era of dialogue was abruptly terminated any more than I claim that it began as abruptly. For if dialogism is a permanent potentiality, then no matter the distorting powers that lie in its way, the expression of this in a literary genre is likewise always an available strategy of writing. There has been much recent work on the sociability of the Romantic period, laying emphasis on the same kinds of intellectual formations and networks that I have pointed to, amidst a general recognition of the complex dialectical continuities of ‘Romanticism’ and ‘Enlightenment’.​[492]​ 
The conversation poems of Coleridge bear, of course, the imprint of dialogue; however, though resting on sociality they are not in themselves conversational.​[493]​ William Blake revives the more ludic and irreverent tradition of Lucian in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell (c. 1790) which, with its inset dialogues of the dead is, according to Marilyn Butler, ‘a direct rendering of current political tension’, affiliating it with the polemical dialogues I discuss in Chapter 3 above.​[494]​ There have been Bakhtinian analyses of the dialogism of Romantic writing, yet there are not many striking dialogues as such from this period.​[495]​ The one notable exception is Thomas Love Peacock who, it seems, argues from an earlier perspective. Peacock created exquisite examples, not of dialogue only, but of the rare genre of the novel in dialogue form which Sarah Fielding had practiced.​[496]​ There, we find the conjugation of aesthetic and political discourse with the authentication of personal values through the amatory plot, often celebrating the pleasures of sociality with plentiful food and drink. I have shown how the dialogue was facilitated and stimulated by both the institution of the public sphere and the challenges that were provoked by its shortcomings. Peacock responded similarly to the arguments in public thought around the Napoleonic Wars and then the Reform Bill. As Marilyn Butler says, ‘It is no accident that almost all his writing is concentrated in two short periods of intense controversy’; the dialogue is pre-eminently a genre suited for crisis.​[497]​ 
The wave of reaction after 1789 in the early nineteenth century had a part to play in closing down dialogues, though one must be careful not to oversimplify, as did the apparent introversion associated with Romanticism (which may well be linked to this reaction). Michèle Cohen accounts for the degradation and decline of one subvariety, the familial educational dialogue, in gendered terms, but this must be seen as one factor in a more systematic reaction against the genre.​[498]​ There was, too, the growing division of intellectual labour, which set philosophical argument off from literature. As Spacks suggests, the representation of discourse in novels that we have come to see as the peak of the genre has very different ends than those of the eighteenth century.​[499]​ The former, privileging interiority and affect were less inclined to feature the formal dialogue (though this is not ruled out in practice). On the other hand, it may plausibly be argued that the dialogue faded precisely because the novel came to be a more satisfactory, more pleasurable and consumable, medium for argument. There is, too, the way that ‘common sense’ (particularly with the implied qualifier, ‘British’) becomes a reaction against ‘system’ (and not only from the right).​[500]​ The formal exposition of argument in the dialogue surely suffered because of this. 
 There have been impressive and highly individual performances of dialogue through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, of course, but they remain very isolated (there is some pathos about the loneliness of these examples of this highly social genre). Walter Savage Landor continued the tradition of Dialogues of the Dead with his Imaginary Conversations (1824, 1826, 1828, 1829, 1846), which cover a diverse range of subjects with varying modalities, but rarely concentrate upon intellectual discourse; they are rather inventive character sketches.​[501]​ Wilde, Brecht, and Becket in turn have been entertaining and genuinely dialogical in employing the form to continue that tradition of interrogating aesthetics, as also Valéry’s L’Ame et le dance (1923) and Eupalinos (1921).​[502]​ When in despair at the fragmentation of civilisation, the young Lukács chose to write about the alienated form of epic that represented that world—the novel—he originally conceived the work as ‘a series of dialogues’.​[503]​ 
Western philosophy was characterised by Whitehead as a series of footnotes to Plato; the dialogue, then, has been figured as the original genre for philosophical thought, and would seem eminently suited to it.​[504]​ Philosophers still turn to the genre: Santayana, in his Dialogues in Limbo (1925), encounters Socrates, Democritus, and others in the manner of the dialogues of the dead.​[505]​ Jane Heal detects a concealed dialogue within Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, where an unnamed participant is present.​[506]​ More recently, Imre Lakatos, Iris Murdoch, and Roger Scruton have all written witty, paradigmatically classical philosophical dialogues on mathematics, morality, and religion.​[507]​ A certain revival of the dialogue is apparently a trend among advocates of animal rights—oddly, perhaps, given the uniquely human faculty of dialogue, from out of which the key concept of rights arises.​[508]​
The novel has continued to interact with this genre in the ways that I have outlined. In a Russia fermenting with new ideas and on the brink of transformation, dialogue irrupted into the realist novel, charging it with the energy of the clashing arguments then abroad. With Bakhtin’s paradigmatically dialogic novelist, Dostoevsky, we encounter Ivan Karamazov’s increasingly more anguished dialogue with his brother, Alyosha, over the justification of God’s ways with, embedded in the midst, the astonishing set piece, ‘The Grand Inquisitor’.​[509]​ This too takes the dialogue form but one interlocutor, Christ, stays silent in the face of the Inquisitor’s appeals. Then there is the hallucinated exchange between Ivan and the Devil, which may ambiguously be Ivan’s own inner colloquy.​[510]​ Bakhtin’s sense of dialogue as polyphony and my own more literal usage overlap to great effect here. There are manifestations still in novels in the modern age. Henry James’s The Awkward Age (1899), is a novel ‘made up almost exclusively of talk’.​[511]​ Though the subject matter is not that of the traditional dialogue, the form owes much to the dialogue, and discourse itself is placed under examination. Against the background of Mrs Brookenham’s salon—that is, a milieu constructed primarily as a space for formal dialogue—James’s characters perform other dialogues that interrogate the values and norms of discourse itself. As Todorov puts it, ‘A large proportion of the dialogue in this novel [. . .] in fact consists of requests for explanation [. . .] about various aspects of discourse’​[512]​ James’s characters are asked to defend their validity claims. But here faith in dialogue has broken down. 
The modernist novel, rebelling against a certain generic stability, shared the experimentalist spirit of the period of The Cry and, typically, sought to incorporate diverse genres within itself. In Ulysses, there is the aesthetic dialogue in the library in the ‘Scylla and Charybdis’ chapter (whose presiding art is dialectic); the symposium on procreation, contraception, and women’s bodies in ‘Oxen of the Sun’; the polemical, one-sided failed dialogue on citizenship in ‘Cyclops’; and ‘Ithaca’, Joyce’s catechism (which is often not catechistical at all, and interrogates its own genre).​[513]​ Each of these dialogues is, in turn, brilliantly modulated by other genres and speech-genres. There are too the novels of Ivy Compton-Burnett, though these are not generally dialogues that portray purely intellectual argument; they are conversations, but often pursuing minute inspections of questions of moral value; Compton-Burnett performs an examination of systematically (or otherwise) distorted communication.​[514]​ Aldous Huxley’s novels are characterised by intellectual dialogues and symposia. I have argued for the probability that the periodic return to the dialogue as a generic resource for novelists is one way of mediating certain kinds of social crises, where validity claims and McKeon’s questions of virtue and of truth suddenly become contestable. 
More recently, there appears Philip Roth’s Deception (1990) (filled with dialogues on writing and on love), a novel deeply concerned with the representation of conversation itself. Roth is, again, preoccupied with the process of dialogue. The subject matter consists of the validity claims of sincerity, rather than truth, which the dialogue proper is more concerned with. Yet this novel bears the traces of the process I have sketched in that mutual communicative reason and the amatory are intertwined and, as Bronwen Thomas notes, ‘Although many of the conversations have an erotic edge typical of the discourses of romantic love and the illicit affair, the characters seem to be seeking much more than a purely physical intimacy’.​[515]​ As with many eighteenth-century novels, there is a concern with metadialogue, or, as Thomas puts it: ‘the self-consciousness of the characters about their participation in, and co-management of, the talk’.​[516]​ My attention is drawn to such examples because, either in their formal markers, or the absence of narrative or expository material, they reveal a kinship with the dialogue proper. The contemporary novel thus retains this heritage of incorporated formal dialogue, a technique largely initiated by eighteenth-century writers.
Dialogue has been frequently invoked as a central philosophical theme in the last century; there is Bakhtin, of course, and then the ethical dialogics of Martin Buber and Emmanuel Lévinas. There are other approaches from analytic philosophy, including the speech act theory inaugurated by J.L. Austin, continued by Searle, and which Habermas incorporates into his wider, more critical, more anthropological project; this has informed my study throughout.​[517]​ In the same tradition, there is argumentation analysis (a journal, Argumentation, is devoted to this) and, relatedly, the technical and empirical approach of discourse analysis.​[518]​ M.A.K. Halliday has performed an important, pragmatic response to the dominant Chomskian strand in linguistics that implies a dialogic context.​[519]​ There have been numerous non-literary studies of dialogue from various perspectives.​[520]​ Dialogue, too, is seen as central to many contemporary therapeutic practices.​[521]​ 
The spectacularly rapid growth of the Internet and World Wide Web, other technologies, and of new genres that exploit these media such as blogging has spurred many discussions over the dialogue that new technology supposedly brings into being and talk of a new public sphere. Wikipedia, with somewhat typically uncritical enthusiasm talks of ‘Collective intelligence (CI)’ which ‘can also be defined as a form of networking enabled by the rise of communications technology, namely the Internet. [. . .] Collective Intelligence draws on this to enhance the social pool of existing knowledge.’​[522]​ There is much wildly utopian ecstasy, such as ‘One CI pioneer, George Pór, defined the collective intelligence phenomenon as “the capacity of human communities to evolve towards higher order complexity and harmony, through such innovation mechanisms as differentiation and integration, competition and collaboration”’, countered by jeremiads about the distortion of speech and the disintegration of society.​[523]​

This thesis offers an attempt to supplement various accounts of the formation of the early English novel by focussing on one particular secondary genre that novelists were able to incorporate into their narrative framework, one which had already developed a sophistication and richness that owed much to the intensely dialogic activity of the period. The alertness of eighteenth-century writing to language that I demonstrate in Chapter One persists in the novel’s attention to conversations and to other texts, and it is the dialogic nature of language that comes to the fore. I have shown that dialogues necessarily oscillate between the polemical and the eirenic. Both poles of dialogue are touched upon in the novel, often presented simultaneously with a polyphony that the pure formal dialogue itself rarely achieves. The novel may celebrate the modes of mutuality explored by Shaftesburean benevolence, Humean even-handedness, and given an erotic component by Fontenelle. Equally, it may incorporate earthy Mandevillean exchange, where the practicality of economic commerce is valued alongside the commerce of free debate. It embraces, too, the antagonistic modes of politicised debate or invective, often satirical, revealed in Berkeley and the dialogues of the 1790s. And the full utopian potential of dialogue is dramatised in the moments of rational courtship that we have observed in some of these novels; society is founded again on dialogic principles and from a repetition of the primal encounter in dialogue, this time of subjects mutually engaging in communicative reason. Finally, the novel, with its emphasis on the amorous and on emotional life, takes the cerebrality of the dialogue proper and restores it to that ‘commerce of light’ that Fontenelle envisaged. Thus the study of eighteenth-century English dialogues is important in that it may illuminate the ongoing process of generic transformation in the continuing development of the novel.
The very idea of dialogue in the twenty-first century has come under suspicion from relativism and notions of incommensurability, and state intervention in public speech has become increasingly acceptable once more. It is illuminating to return to the (admittedly problematic and ambivalent) practices of Enlightenment dialogue and its symbiosis with the novel, that epitome of humanism. This study hopes to clarify the aspirations towards communicative reason glimpsed in the various dialogues of eighteenth-century Britain at the onset of our quarrelsome modernity. Against the despair of Adorno and the counter-Enlightenment moves of postmodernism, Habermas asserts the utopian potential of communicative reason:
the rationalization of the lifeworld simultaneously gave rise to both the systematically induced reification of the lifeworld and the utopian perspective from which capitalist modernization has always appeared with the stain of dissolving traditional life-forms without salvaging their communicative substance.​[524]​
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^125	  As elsewhere in Mandeville, there are shades here of Freud. See, in particular, Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, in Civilization, Society and Religion, ed. by Albert Dickson, The Penguin Freud Library, 12 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985), pp. 243-340.
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^148	  ‘Επεα πτεροέντα’ (‘Winged words’) was to be the title, of course, of John Horne Tooke’s antagonistic response to Harris’s theories, discussed briefly below.
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^227	  Most notably, Francesco Algarotti’s Il Newtonianismo per le dame (1737), disseminated in English as Sir Isaac Newton’s Philosophy Explained for the Use of the Ladies in Six Dialogues on Light and Colour, trans. by Elizabeth Carter, 2 vols (1735; London: E. Cave, 1739). 
^228	  Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle, A Discovery of New Worlds, trans. by Aphra Behn (1686; London: J. Hindmarsh, 1688), in The Works of Aphra Behn, ed. by Janet Todd, 7 vols (London: William Pickering, 1992-96), iv: Seneca Unmasqued and other Prose Translations (1993), pp. 69-165. All further references, unless stated otherwise, are to this edition and are given in parentheses after quotations in the text.
^229	  Development of character is, of course, a central concern of the novel. It is also, implicitly, a concern of many Enlightenment dialogues, particularly those loosely categorized as ‘educational’, since the educational theories behind these were committed to a developmental view of learning. See Richard A. Barney, Plots of Enlightenment: Education and the Novel in Eighteenth-Century England (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1999).
^230	  Bazin’s dialogue on bees, addressed to women and another notable successor of Fontenelle, Histoire naturelle des abeilles (1744), was described by its author as a ‘true novel’. Marc Olivier argues that ‘Through Clarice’s request for a novelistic presentation of “true” natural history, Bazin defines a literary means whereby women ostensibly become naturalists without disrupting gender conventions.’ I would argue that, at least in Fontenelle’s similarly novelistic dialogues, gender conventions do become destabilised. See ‘Gilles Auguste Bazin’s “True Novel” of Natural History’, Eighteenth-Century Fiction, 18.2 (Winter 2005-6), 187-202; and Gilles Augustin Bazin, The Natural History of Bees [. . .] [trans. anon.] (London: printed for J. and P. Knapton; and P. Vailant, 1744).
^231	  Thus, Oroonoko, Behn claims, is a ‘true story’; The Fair Jilt ‘has but this merit to recommend it, that it is truth’; Defoe, famously, and others make similar truth claims (‘Oroonoko’ and Other Writings, ed. and intr. by Paul Salzman (Oxford and New York: OUP, World’s Classics, 1994), pp. 5, 74.
^232	  Janet Todd, in a footnote, sees ‘numbers’ as pertaining to ‘The meter or rhythm of the prose’ (note c, p. 87), but I think there is a pun involved that accommodates this sense, making learnedness harmonise with elegance, but including too, by antithesis to ‘the learned’, readers unaccustomed to digesting the ‘rough and harsh’ diet that the educated could cope with. Hargreaves’s translation has: ‘neither too dry for men and women of the world nor too playful for scholars’ (Fontenelle, Conversations, trans. by H.A. Hargreaves, p. 3).
^233	  ‘Tourbillions’ are Descartes’ vortices, which he postulated to explain the motions of the planets; they were made obsolete by Newton’s theory. Fontenelle was not post-Newtonian; rather, post-Galilean even in the later editions, since he was reluctant to accept Newton’s refutation of Descartes’ theory of vortices as an explanation for the motions of heavenly bodies, clinging to the older theory throughout the numerous editions of the work. Newton had published his Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica in 1687; it was popularised in French by Voltaire—whom Fontenelle knew—in his Eléments de la philosophie de Neuton (1738), and by Madame du Chatelet, who translated the Principia in 1749. Du Chatelet also translated Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees and wrote a rationalist grammar; this interplay of key English and French thinkers and texts neatly illustrates the dialogue of translation and mutual inspiration at the heart of Enlightenment. Voltaire gives a good contemporary account of the excitement felt over Newton’s discoveries and of the displacement of Descartes’ theories, written in English, and incidentally criticising Fontenelle’s Elogium on Newton, in Letters Concerning the English Nation (1733; Oxford: OUP, World’s Classics, 1994), pp. 61-75 (Letter xiv, ‘On Des Cartes and Sir Isaac Newton’; Letter xv, ‘On Attraction’).
^234	  Aileen Douglas treats Fontenelle’s attitude to his female readership sympathetically, though raises questions about colonial attitudes in Entretiens and its descendants (which she also delineates); I hope to show that even his relationship to the colonial ‘other’ is not monolithically exclusive (see ‘Popular Science and the Representation of Women: Fontenelle and After’, Eighteenth-Century Life, n.s., 18.2 (May 1994), 1-14).
^235	  ‘The Translator’s Preface’ (or ‘Essay on Translated Prose’), pp. 73-86.
^236	  Despite Behn’s Tory Royalist politics, she was something of a progressive modern too: her Lucretian poem to Creech shows daringly materialist leanings; she chose to translate Fontenelle’s highly sceptical History of Oracles as well as his Conversations. See Aphra Behn, ‘To Mr Creech (Under The Name of Daphnis) On His Excellent Translation of Lucretius’, in ‘Oroonoko’ and Other Writings, ed. and intr. by Paul Salzman (Oxford and NY: OUP, World’s Classics, 1994), pp. 239-43; The History of the Oracles, and the Cheats of the Pagan Priests (London: [n. pub.], 1688) ); facs. repr. in The Works of Aphra Behn, ed. by Janet Todd, 7 vols (London: William Pickering, 1992–96), iv: Seneca Unmasqued and other Prose Translations (1993), pp. 168-275.
^237	  Line Cottegnies, ‘The Translator as Critic: Aphra Behn’s Translation of Fontenelle’s Discovery of New Worlds (1688)’, Restoration: Studies in English Literary Criticism, 1660-1700, 27.1 (Spring 2003), 23-37.
^238	  Lisa Anscombe sees Fontenelle as deliberately characterising the Marquiese as intellectually inferior and Behn as critical of this. However, I feel she misreads the tone of what is essentially a protofeminist text; she misses, for example, the active agency of the woman in dialogue, the mockery of the male’s pretensions as lover, the genuinely mutual moments, and the serious commitment to an eroticised philosophy. The Marquiese is not a passive absorber of male discourse but an active interlocutor, and the ludic and romance elements are not simply disparaged as feminine (‘“As far as a woman’s reasoning can go”: scientific dialogue and sexploitation’, History of European Ideas, 31.2, Instruments of Enlightenment (2005), 193-208).
^239	  Matthew 4: 8-9.
^240	  Cottegnies claims that here Behn’s translation actually dilutes the xenophobia of the original: ‘The Translator as Critic’, p. 32.
^241	  Steven F. Rendall identifies a scepticism towards the ‘people’ which led Fontenelle to circumscribe his universalism, in ‘Fontenelle and his Public’, MLN, 86.4 (May 1971), French Issue, 496-508.
^242	  Given Behn’s embroilment in Royalist controversy and intrigue and the still-recent memory of devastating civil strife in England, this is oddly even-tempered; Behn does not seem, however, to have stressed or altered this passage; the Hargreaves translation does not differ significantly: see Conversations, pp. 23-24.
^243	  Bakhtin notes the prevalence of shipwrecks in what he calls the ‘adventure novel of ordeal’ such as Heliodorus’ Æthiopica, and Longus’, Daphnis and Chloë (‘Forms of Time and Chronotype in the Novel’, in The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, ed. by Michael Holquist, trans. by Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, University of Texas Press Slavic Series, 1 (Austin, Texas: Univ. of Texas Press, 1981), pp. 86, 88. Confusingly, Bakhtin sees what is often called the romance here as a species of novel—it is their multigeneric quality and the extent to which they are parodic that he finds noteworthy. 
^244	  Robin Howells expands on this theme, finding in Fontenelle’s ‘principle of mobility’ an energy that links the dynamism of nature with the dialogism of ‘constant shifts in argumentation’ and ‘an affective and even erotic dimension’, where ‘The play of the heavenly bodies, of their own thought, and of their conversation all give pleasure’: ‘The Principle of Mobility in Fontenelle’s Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes’, French Studies, 46.2 (April 1992), 129-43 (p. 129).
^245	  I discuss Hume briefly below.
^246	  There are important interactions between all these writers: Mandeville’s thought originates, as did Fontenelle’s, in the scepticism of Pierre Bayle; it is likely, too, that Mandeville, with his interest in the physical sciences, knew Fontenelle’s work; Shaftesbury corresponded with Bayle; Hume engaged with Bayle, Mandeville, and Shaftesbury, and was influenced by Fontenelle. For Bayle and Mandeville, see Irwin Primer, ‘Mandeville on War’, in Mandeville and Augustan Ideas: New Essays, ed. by Charles W.A. Prior, ELS Monograph Series, 83 (Victoria, BC: Univ. of Victoria, 2000), pp. 117-40 (p. 118); Bayle and Shaftesbury are discussed by Robert Voitle in The Third Earl of Shaftesbury 1671-1713 (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State UP, 1984), pp. 86-90. For Bayle and Fontenelle and their influence on British Deists, see Roy Porter, Enlightenment: Britain and the Creation of the Modern World (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2000), pp. 120, 234). For Hume, see David Fate Norton, ‘Introduction to Hume’s thought’, in Norton, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Hume (Cambridge: CUP, 1993), pp. 1-32 (p. 2); and Peter Jones, ‘Hume’s literary and aesthetic theory’, in Norton, pp. 255-80 (p. 259).
^247	  For Hume and the further development of Shaftesbury’s ideas of sympathy, see Todd, Sensibility, pp. 26-27. Raymond Williams focuses on Hume’s link between sceptical, questioning ‘irony and ridicule’, and his humanism: ‘David Hume: Reasoning and Experience’, in The English Mind: Studies in the English Moralists presented to Basil Willey (Cambridge: CUP, 1964), pp. 123-45 (p. 131), and how his style rests on a notion of communicative, social reason (p. 137).
^248	  Even beyond the point where dialogue becomes impossible; he contemplated his own Dialogue of the Dead with Charon, justifying his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion as enlightening the populace away from superstition; written on the verge of his own death, Hume’s imaginary conversation with Charon emerged out of a dialogue with Adam Smith over Lucian (see Norton, ‘Introduction’, pp. 23-24). There is also his exploration of moral relativism, ‘A Dialogue’, in Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, intr. by L.A. Selby-Bigge, 3rd edn, revd. by P.H. Nidditch  (1777 edn; Oxford: OUP, 1975), pp. 324-43.
^249	  David Hume, ‘Of Essay Writing’, in Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, ed. and intr. by Eugene F. Miller, revd. edn (1758; Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1985), pp. 533-37. All further references are to this edition and in parentheses.
^250	  See my Chapter Four below.
^251	  And it is important, in this multi-voiced text, to avoid assuming that Pamphilus’ views on dialogue are necessarily those of Hume, as Paula Wood Brown points out in ‘The Unnatural Aspects of Natural Religion Revealed: A Skeptical Reader’s Response to Hume’s Dialogues’, Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture, 22 (1992), 269-80 (pp. 273-74); as with others who have commented on this text, she draws our attention to its literary, as well as philosophical, nature. Other writers, however, have asserted that Pamphilus is the ‘true’ voice of Hume: for example, Jeffrey Wieand, ‘Pamphilus in Hume’s “Dialogues”’, The Journal of Religion, 65.1 (January 1985), 33-45. This all testifies to the evasive nature of the text and the uncertainty of Hume’s own stance.
^252	  David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, in Principal Writings on Religion including ‘Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion’ and ‘The Natural History of Religion’, ed. and intr. by J.C.A. Gaskin (1751; Oxford: OUP, World’s Classics, 1993), p. 29. All further references are to this edition and are given in parentheses after quotations in the text.
^253	  Cicero, The Nature of the Gods, trans. by P.G. Walsh (Oxford: OUP, World’s Classics, 1998). See J.C.A. Gaskin, ‘Hume on religion’, in The Cambridge Companion to Hume, ed. by David Fate Norton (Cambridge: CUP, 1993), pp. 313-44 (p. 314).
^254	  David Simpson, for example, says that ‘Any writer [. . .] who faces one or another kind of censorship and is working within a social context where people can be punished for their ideas will tend to look for a way of putting his arguments without leaving himself open to obvious attack’ (‘Hume’s Intimate Voices and the Method of Dialogue’, Texas Studies in Literature and Language, 21 (1979), 68-92 (p. 77)).
^255	  However, as regards the particular case of Hume’s Dialogues, Prince finds this argument unconvincing: Michael Prince, ‘Hume and the End of Religious Dialogue’, Eighteenth-Century Studies, 25.3 (Spring 1992), 283-308 (p. 284). Prince’s article forms the basis for his chapter on Hume in Philosophical Dialogue, pp. 136-60.
^256	  For example, Simpson, ‘Hume’s Intimate Voices’; Jeffrey R. Smitten, ‘Hume’s Dialogues concerning Natural Religion as Social Discourse’, Eighteenth-Century Life, 15 (February/May 1991), 39-56; Pheroze Wadin, ‘Philosophy as Literature: The Case of Hume’s Dialogues’, in Compendious Conversations: The Method of Dialogue in the Early Enlightenment, ed. by Kevin L. Cope (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1992), pp. 34-53.
^257	  W.B. Carnochan, ‘The Comic Plot of Hume’s “Dialogues”’, Modern Philology, 85.4 (May 1988), 514-22; Prince, ‘Hume and the End of Religious Dialogue’, 283-308.
^258	  Jonathan Dancy, ‘“For Here the Author is Annihilated”: Reflections on Philosophical Aspects of the Use of the Dialogue Form in Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion’, in Philosophical Dialogues: Plato, Hume, Wittgenstein. Dawes Hicks Lectures on Philosophy, ed. by Timothy Smiley, Proceedings of the British Academy, 85 (Oxford: OUP for the British Academy, 1996), pp. 29-60 (p. 32).
^259	  Dancy, p. 55.
^260	  Dancy, p. 52. The quote in Dancy’s title is from Shaftesbury’s The Moralists.
^261	  Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, ed. and trans. by Caryl Emerson, intr. by Wayne C. Booth, Theory and History of Literature, 8 (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1983).
^262	  Ivy Compton-Burnett, A Heritage and its History (1959; London: Panther, 1969), p. 35.
^263	  Maria and R.L. Edgeworth, ‘On Geometry’, in Practical Education, History of British Educational Theory 1750-1850, 2nd edn, 3 vols (1801; repr. London: Routledge/Thoemmes Press, 1996), ii, pp. 450-51.
^264	  Plato, Protagoras and Meno, trans. by W.K.C. Guthrie (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1956); Imre Lakatos, Proofs and Refutations: The Logic of Mathematical Discovery, ed. by John Worrall and Elie Zahar (Cambridge: CUP, 1976).
^265	  See Donna T. Andrew, ‘The Code of Honour and its Critics: The Opposition to Duelling in England, 1700–1850’, Social History, 5.3 (October 1980), 409-34.
^266	  [Richard Steele], Tatler, no. 39, 9th July 17, pp. 318-24, in The Spectator Project <http://meta.montclair.edu/SPECTATOR/> [accessed 28 January 2010]. The motif of chivalry appears elsewhere, too, most memorably in the battle of values between Edmund Burke and Mary Wollstonecraft, the latter opposing it as an archaic device aiming to impede women’s communicative action.
^267	  See ‘The Bluestocking Legacy’, in Brilliant Women: Eighteenth-Century Bluestockings (London: National Portrait Gallery, 2008), pp. 127-28 (p. 128). Sarah Fielding’s dramatisation of psychological and social disorder as turba is discussed in Chapter Four below.
^268	  George Berkeley, Alciphron; or, The Minute Philosopher. In Seven Dialogues. Containing an Apology for the Christian Religion, against those who are called Free-thinkers [1732], in The Works of George Berkeley, with Prefaces etc. by Alexander Campbell Fraser, 4 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901), ii: Philosophical Works, 1732–1733, pp. 1-368. All references will be to this edition. But see also Berkeley, ‘Alciphron’ in Focus, ed. by David Berman, Routledge Philosophers in Focus (London: Routledge, 1993), which contains Dialogues i, iii, iv, and vi, and critical articles on the work. Alciphron provoked further dialogic exchanges: the ‘Republic of Letters’, like the Athenian Republic, was small enough for a publication to invite a rapid response, so Mandeville’s Letter to Dion appeared, as did the anonymous response to Alciphron in the Daily Post-Boy, 9 September 1732, and Berkeley’s response in turn to that (the Theory of Vision). This process, enabled by the same modernity that Berkeley resisted, was also productive for early novelists such as Richardson and Sterne, as I show in my next chapter. See Mandeville, A Letter to Dion, with an intr. by Jacob Viner, Augustan Reprints, 41 (1732; Los Angeles: William Andrews Clark Memorial Library, Univ. of Calif., 1953); ‘A Letter from an Anonymous Writer to the Author of the Minute Philosopher’, in Works, ii, pp. 372-74; and The Theory of Vision; or, Visual Language, Vindicated and Explained [1733], in Works, ii, pp. 379-415.  
^269	  John Richetti, Philosophical Writing: Locke, Berkeley, Hume (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard UP, 1983), pp. 126-27.
^270	  ‘I dine, I play a game of backgammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends; and when after three or four hours’ amusement, I would return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strained, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any farther’ (David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature. Book One (1739; London: Fontana, 1962), p. 318 (Book I, Part 4, Section 7)).
^271	  In The New Oxford Book of Eighteenth-Century Verse, ed. by Roger Lonsdale (Oxford: OUP, 1987), p. 175.
^272	  According to Peter Walmsley, the Preface to Alciphron bears ‘a thinly veiled reference to his own public disappointment in America’ (The Rhetoric of Berkeley's Philosophy, Cambridge Studies in Eighteenth-Century English Literature and Thought, 6 (Cambridge: CUP, 1990), p. 107).
^273	  George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], in A New Theory of Vision and Other Writings, intr. by A.D. Lindsay (London: J.M. Dent, Everyman’s Library, 1969), pp. 87-195; Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, ed. by Colin M. Turbayne (1713; New York: Bobbs-Merrill, The Library of Liberal Arts, 1954).
^274	  Three Dialogues, p. 5.
^275	  Three Dialogues, p. 106.
^276	  Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. by Thomas Burger with the assistance of Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992). Habermas describes the degeneration of the public sphere in the latter half of this book.
^277	  ‘Common sense’ is a term much struggled over in these texts. It can mean the spontaneous and demotic access to truth available to all—hence Paine’s title of 1776—or invoke the Gramscian suspicion of received opinion, where: ‘“Common sense” is the folklore of philosophy and always stands midway between folklore proper (folklore as it is normally understood) and the philosophy, science, and economics of the scientists. Common sense creates the folklore of the future, a relatively rigidified phase of popular knowledge in a given time and place’ (Antonio Gramsci, Selections from Cultural Writings (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1985), p. 421. According to Terry Eagleton, ‘If Berkeley is indeed an apologist for the mob, as he arrestingly remarks of himself, it is in the self-undoing sense that he catches up something of their common sense and turns it against the sort of scholastic quibbling which might lead them to forsake their duties in life. It is, in short, an elitist sort of populism, as the idea of a divine language of Nature is too.’ (Crazy Jane and the Bishop and Other Essays in Irish Culture, Critical Conditions: Field Day Essays and Monographs, 5 (Cork, Ireland: Cork UP in association with Field Day, 1998), pp. 42-43.
^278	  Walmsley alerts us as to how Berkeley will ‘command our interest in how each speaker will flesh out his portrait’ and how he ‘intends that we read the dialogue as an extension of individual lives’ (Walmsley, p. 107).
^279	  ‘Speech genres’ is Bakhtin’s term for minimal atomic genres, not confined to the literary and inflected by their pragmatic situation, that utterances fall into: ‘Each separate utterance is individual, of course, but each sphere in which language is used develops its own relatively stable types of these utterances. These we may call speech genres.’ Such speech genres can be incorporated into the novel. See Mikhail Bakhtin, ‘The Problem of Speech Genres’, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, trans. by Vern W. McGee, ed. by Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, University of Texas Press Slavic Series, 8 (Austin, Texas: Univ. of Texas Press, 1986), pp. 60-102 (p. 60).
^280	  According to Berkeley’s editor, this speech was originally part of Lysicles’, but has been transposed to Crito, recast as irony, in the third edition (n. 1, p. 114). 
^281	  ‘The first paragraph of the introduction to the Principles of Human Knowledge [. . .] is a comic narrative in which Berkeley compares the serenity of “the illiterate bulk of mankind that walk the high-road of plain, common sense” with the perplexity of philosophers’ (Richetti, Philosophical Writing, p. 142). Note below how the labourers in Hannah More’s pamphlets are made anxious by their encounter with radical debate.
^282	  See Habermas, Structural Transformation, pp. 32-33, 42; see also Brian Cowan, ‘Mr. Spectator and the Coffeehouse Public Sphere’, Eighteenth-Century Studies, 37.3 (2004), 345-66. 
^283	  Swift had a comparable suspicion that materialism is a huge conspiracy; see Roger D. Lund, ‘Strange Complicities: Atheism and Conspiracy in A Tale of a Tub’, in British Literature 1640-1789: A Critical Reader, ed. by Robert DeMaria Jr. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 142-68.
^284	  Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, ed. by Gareth Stedman Jones (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2002), p. 223.
^285	  As Nicholas Hudson observes; see Chapter One above.
^286	  In the speech act theory initiated by John Austin and developed by John Searle, ‘Performatives’ describe the pragmatic aspects of language whereby utterances are considered ‘as not, or not merely, saying something but doing something, as not a true or false report of something’. They perform rather than simply declaring something about the world (as ‘constative’ utterances do) (J.L. Austin, How to do things with Words. The William James Lectures delivered in Harvard University in 1955, ed. by J.O. Urmson (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1962), p. 25). Mary Louise Pratt, followed by Sandy Petrey, has set out to apply speech act theory to literary texts. See John R. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: CUP, 1970); Pratt, Towards a Speech Act Theory of Literature (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1977); Petrey, Speech Acts and Literary Theory (New York and London: Routledge, 1990). As Petrey shows, Austin’s original distinction becomes blurred; constative statements themselves cannot but be performative (p. 22-41). Another seminal text of speech act theory is Paul Grice, ‘Logic and Conversation’, in Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard UP, 1989), pp. 22-40; his ‘Cooperative Principle’ has implications for ideal dialogic behaviour. Habermas critically surveys the development of speech act theory in ‘Intermediate Reflections: Social Action, Purposive Activity, and Communication’, in The Theory of Communicative Action: Volume 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society, trans. by Thomas McCarthy (London: Heinemann, 1981), pp. 273-337. It becomes the basis of his universal pragmatics, which informs my study.
^287	  This doctrine is expounded in An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision (1709), and is clarified and made succinct in The Theory of Vision; or, Visual Language, Vindicated and Explained (1733), which Berkeley appended to Alciphron (pp. 378-415, this edition).
^288	  A. David Kline characterises Berkeley’s linguistics in his Visual Language argument as Cartesian. But, as with the criticisms raised against other Cartesians such as James Harris and Chomsky, the theory can be accused of being individualised, asocial, and undialogic (‘Berkeley’s Divine Language Argument’, in Essays on the Philosophy of George Berkeley, ed. by Ernest Sosa, Synthese Historical Library, 29 (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1987), pp. 129-42; repr. in Berkeley, ‘Alciphron’ in Focus, pp. 185-99).
^289	  Compare the atomised and unthinking individuals who confront each other with contemporary slang and evasions in Swift’s anti-dialogue, A Complete Collection of General and Ingenious Conversation (1738); see below. Berkeley here shares Swift’s distrust of the ‘ingenious’.
^290	  In the Gorgias, Callicles is the most cynical of the Sophist, Gorgias’, pupils; sophism and rhetoric are set in opposition to true philosophy, or dialectic, initiating a dialogue that can still be heard; incarnated, for example, in the arguments between Derrida and Habermas over the primacy of the poetic over the cognitive functions of language.
^291	  Most playfully, in the dialogue-as-novel, Jacques the Fatalist, trans. by Michael Henry, intr. Martin Hall (1755-84; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986). Diderot is a crucial figure in eighteenth-century dialogism. I must of necessity limit my scope to dialogues in English, but the constant intercourse of ideas across national boundaries, particularly between England and France, is an important manifestation of the dialogic spirit of this period and should be always borne in mind. Peter France gives a short, but comprehensive, account of Diderot’s life and work, emphasising his dialogicity, in Diderot, Past Masters (Oxford: OUP, 1983).
^292	  Succinctly expressed in the Theses on Feuerbach: ‘On Feuerbach’, in Early Writings, trans. by Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton, ed. by L. Colletti (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975), pp. 421-23; see also Wal Suchting, ‘Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach: Notes Towards a Commentary (with a New Translation)’, in John Mepham and D-H. Reuben, Materialism, Issues in Marxist Philosophy (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1979), pp. 5-34.
^293	  ‘Epic and Novel’, in The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, ed. by Michael Holquist, trans. by Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, University of Texas Press Slavic Series, 1 (Austin, Texas: Univ. of Texas Press, 1981), pp. 3-40 (p. 25).
^294	  As Prince hints, Crito’s narratives resemble instructive novels (or ‘secret histories’ and ‘cautionary tales’ in miniature (Philosophical Dialogue in the British Enlightenment: Theology, Aesthetics and the Novel, Cambridge Studies in Eighteenth-Century English Literature and Thought, 31 (Cambridge: CUP, 1996), p. 122). He argues, I think reasonably, that Berkeley justifies the use of ad hominem arguments—that is, novelistic evaluations of character—because they dispose people to act as free agents (pp. 126-30). That is itself a central and important concern of the novel; Prince explicitly stresses ‘the relevance of Alciphron to the history of the eighteenth-century novel’ (p. 135) though, as will emerge, with a different narrative from mine.
^295	  Thomas Spence, ‘Edmund Burke’s Address to the Swinish Multitude’, Pig’s Meat, 2 (1794), 39-41; repr. in The Political Works of Thomas Spence, ed. by H.T. Dickinson (Newcastle: Avero (Eighteenth-Century) Publications, 1982), pp. 124-26. Unless specified otherwise, all further references to Spence’s works are to this edition and page numbers are given in parentheses after quotations in the text.
^296	  If revolution prevails, ‘Along with its natural protectors and guardians, learning will be cast into the mire, and trodden down under the hoofs of a swinish multitude’ (Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, ed. by Conor Cruise O’Brien (1790; Harmondsworth: Penguin, Pelican Classics, 1969), p. 173). The image would have a long life, being reappropriated by radicals; apart from Spence, Shelley took it up in his political satire, Swellfoot the Tyrant (c. 1820); see Gertrude H. Campbell, ‘The Swinish Multitude’, Modern Language Notes, 30.6 (June 1915), 161-64.
^297	  As evidenced in his repugnance at the class composition of coffee-house clientele in Alciphron above. See, too, his Passive Obedience, or, the Christian doctrine of not resisting the supreme power, proved and vindicated [. . .] In a discourse deliver’d at the College-chapel, 2nd edn (London: printed for H. Clements, 1712); see also David Hume, ‘Essay xiii: Of Passive Obedience’, in Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, ed. and intr. by Eugene F. Miller, revd. edn (1758; Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1985), pp. 488-92. The conservative Hannah More named her two cats ‘Passive Obedience’ and ‘Non-resistance’, in defiance both of radical thought and feline nature.
^298	  As Spence himself would be silenced by his imprisonment after the suspension of Habeas Corpus and fellow dissidents would fall foul of the treason trials of 1794 and the Two Acts of 1795, by which ‘it became a treasonable offence to incite the people by speech or writing to hatred or contempt of King, Constitution or Government’ and where ‘no meetings of over fifty persons could be held without notifying a magistrate, who had wide powers to stop speeches, arrest speakers, and disperse the meetings’: E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, pp. 176, 177, 158-59. The state unequivocally engaged in strategic action directed against discourse and the formation of a plebeian public sphere.
^299	  Habermas, Structural Transformation, particularly parts v-vii. Eagleton adds to Habermas’s account of the degeneration of the public sphere, invoking both economic and political causes in The Function of Criticism: From ‘The Spectator’ to Post-Structuralism (London: Verso, 1984), pp. 35-43.
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